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Part One 
T H E P E R F O R M A N C E OF T H E L A T I N A M E R I C A N E C O N O M Y 
I. E C O N O M I C A C T I V I T Y , I N F L A T I O N A N D T H E 
E X T E R N A L I M B A L A N C E 
A. M A I N T R E N D S 
Three salient facts basically characterized the economic evolution of Latin 
America in 1983. The first was the worsening of the crisis which had begun in 
1981 and which by 1982 had attained dimensions unrecorded since the Great 
Depression of the 1930s. The second was the remarkable adjustment effort 
made by many economies of the region in order to reduce the radical imbalances 
generated in the external sector in preceding years. Lastly, the third was the 
exceptional contraction undergone for the second year in succession by the net 
inflow of capital and the similarly exceptional scale on which, in consequence, 
Latin America had to transfer resources abroad. 
1. The decline in internal economic activity and 
the increase in inflation 
In 1983, just as in 1982, the crisis affected almost all the countries of the region 
and was reflected in the deterioration of the main internal economic indicators. 
Thus, during the year the gross domestic product decreased, the employment 
situation went from bad to worse, and there was a marked speeding-up of the 
rate of inflation. 
It is estimated that Latin America's total gross domestic product was 
reduced by 2 .9% in 1983, after having fallen by 1 % in 1982 and increased by 
barely 1.5 % in 1981. As a result of this further decline in economic activity and of 
population growth, the per capita product dropped by somewhat more than 5 % 
in the region as a whole, decreasing in 16 of the 20 Latin American countries. 
This downturn, together with those registered in the two preceding years, 
meant that in 1983 the per capita product was 9 % lower than in 1980 and was 
equivalent to that recorded in 1977 (see table 1). In effect, the retrogression in 
the real level of living was even greater, since per capita national income 
plummeted during the last three years by almost 13%, in consequence of the 
continuous and marked deterioration undergone in that period by the terms of 
trade and the considerable increase in net remittances of interest and profits. 
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The decline in economic activity was accompanied, moreover, by rising 
trends in rates of urban unemployment and decreases in real wages in the 
majority of the countries for which relatively reliable data are available. 
Nevertheless, inflation spiralled rapidly, as had already happened in the 
three preceding years, and reached unprecedented levels. Thus, in the region as a 
whole the simple average rate of increase of consumer prices rose from 4 8 % in 
1982 to 7 6 % in 1983, and the rate weighted by the population shot up still more 
steeply, from 8 6 % in 1982 to 131% in 1983. Although these upward movements 
reflected a more or less widespread trend, they were preponderantly influenced 
by the particularly high rates of inflation recorded in some countries. Thus, in 
the course of 1983, price levels increased above fivefold in Argentina, were easily 
quadrupled in Bolivia, trebled in Brazil, more than doubled in Peru, jumped by 
8 0 % in Mexico and went up by over 5 0 % both in Ecuador and in Uruguay. 
Table 1 
LATIN AMERICA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS" 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983® 
Basic economic indicator 
Gross domestic product at market 
prices (billions of dollars 
at 1970 prices) 237 253 263 278 292 305 325 344 349 346 336 
Population (millions of 
inhabitants) 288 295 302 310 318 326 334 342 350 358 367 
Per capita gross domestic 
product (dollars at 1970 prices) 824 858 868 895 917 937 974 1 007 998 965 916 
Per capita gross national 
income (dollars at 1970 prices) 821 871 868 896 919 930 923 1 010 985 935 880 
Growth rates 
Short-term economic indicator 
Gross domestic product 8.3 6.9 3.7 5.7 5.0 4.6 6.6 5.9 1.5 -1.0 -2.9 
Per capita gross domestic product 5.6 4.2 1.2 3.1 2.4 2.1 4.0 3.4 -0.9 -3.3 -5.2 
Per capita gross national income 6.6 6.0 -0.3 3.3 2.5 1.2 4.6 3.8 -2.4 -5.2 -5.8 
Urban unemployment rate' J 6.9 7.2 7.7 7.4 6.8 6.0 5.8 5.7 6.9 8.9 
6.0" 6.3' 6.8* 7.8' 
Consumer prices' 36.2 40.1 57.8 62.2 40.0 39.0 54.1 52.8 60.8 85.8 131.4 
Terms of trade (goods and services) 1.7 24.1 -11.9 3.1 3.0 -7.7 5.1 4.2 -6.4 -9.1 -8.6 
Current value of exports of goods 
and services 40.8 50.6 -5.7 15.1 18.1 9.9 33.7 29.0 7.9 -10.1 -2.5 
Current value of imports of goods 
and services 30.0 63.7 7.8 4.5 15.3 16.7 26.4 31.3 9.3 -16.8 -29.2 
Billions of dollars 
External sector 
Exports of goods and services 28.9 43.6 41.1 47.3 55.9 61.4 82.0 105.8 114.1 102.6 100.0 
Imports of goods and services 28.2 46.1 4 9 7 51.9 59.8 69.8 88.2 115.9 126.6 105.4 74.6 
Trade balance (goods and services) 0 . 8 -2.5 -8.6 -4.6 -4.0 -8.5 -6.2 -10.1 -12.5 -2.8 25.4 
Net payments of profits 
and interest -4.2 -5.0 -5.5 -6.8 -8.2 -10.2 -13.6 -18.0 -27.7 -36.9 -34.7 
Balance on current account -3.2 -7.4 -14.0 -11.0 -11.8 -18.3 -19.5 -28.1 -40.5 -40.4 -9.3 
Net inflow of capita] 7.8 11.4 14.2 18.2 17.0 26.1 28.6 30.0 37.7 20.3 8.0 
Balance-of-payments position 4.6 4.0 0.2 7.2 5.2 7.7 9.1 1.7 -2.8 -20.2 -1.3 
Official international reserves' 14.0 20.4 21.2 23.9 29.4 38.2 51.2 53.4 46.5 34.3 29.8 
Balance of disbursed external debt 
Total gross external debt 76.2 99.7 118.8 150.9 182.0 221.1 275.4 308.3 332.3 
Total net external debt* 55.0 75.8 89.4 112.7 130.8 167.7 228.9 274.0 302.5 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"All figures relate to the 20 countries appearing in table I J, except Cuba. A Provisional figures. 'Percentages. 
Weighted average rate for Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Mendoza, Rosario; Bogotá, Barrsnquilla, Medellín, Cali; México City, (iuadalajara, 
Monterrey; San José, Cost a Rica; Santiago, Chi le; Lima, Perú; Montevideo, Uruguay. ' Weigh te¿» ver age rate for the cities mentioned in 
footnote plus Rio de Janeiro, Säo Paulo, Belo Horizonte, Porto Alegre, Salvador and Recife. "'Variation from December to 
December. 'P lus monetary gold valued at London fine ounce prices, minus use of International Monetary Fund Credit. * Total 
gross external debt minus official international reserves. 
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2. Reduction of the external imbalance 
The falling-off in most of the indicators for the domestic economy coincided, 
however, with a significant although very costly reduction of the external 
imbalance. Indeed, partly on account of the marked contraction in domestic 
levels of production and expenditure —which curtailed demand for imports and 
released goods for export— and partly owing to the adjustment policies applied 
in many countries during 1983, Latin America achieved an unprecedented 
surplus in its external merchandise trade. In 1983 this trade, which up to 1981 
had regularly shown deficits, but by 1982 had closed with a positive balance of 
over US$ 8.4 billion, generated a surplus of nearly US$ 30 billion. 
This surplus was exclusively attributable, however, to a further spectacular 
drop in imports, whose value sank by 30%, after having decreased by 2 0 % in 
1982. This extraordinary reduction in the total value of external purchases of 
goods was accompanied, as in 1982, by an almost equally marked diminution of 
their volume, which was at once an effect and a cause of the decline in domestic 
economic activity. In turn, despite the fact that the volume of exports of goods 
expanded by about 8%, their values fell by nearly 2 % in 1983, mainly as a result 
of the considerable increases in real exchange rates in a number of countries and, 
in many of them, the significant contraction undergone by domestic demand. 
On the other hand, the aforesaid decline in internal economic activity and 
the reduction of nominal interest rates in the leading international financial 
markets helped to bring down net payments of profits and interest in 1983, thus 
modifying the dizzy pace at which they had risen during the preceding years. In 
fact, the amount of remittances under these heads, which between 1977 and 1982 
had more than quadrupled, soaring from US$ 8.2 to US$ 36.9 billion, fell to a 
little under 35 billion in 1983. 
As a result of the sizeable surplus obtained in merchandise trade, the 
decrease in remittances of profits and interest and the considerable reduction 
also undergone by net service payments, the deficit on current account abruptly 
sank from rather more than US$ 40 billion in 1982 to under 9.3 billion in 1983. 
This was the lowest figure recorded since 1974 (see figure 1). 
The steep drop in the deficit on current account coincided with and was 
largely caused by a no less drastic contraction of the net inflow of capital. This 
inflow, which had already shrunk by 4 6 % in 1982, after having swelled to an all-
time maximum of almost US$ 38 billion in 1981, diminished once again, but 
even more sharply, in 1983, when it barely amounted to US$ 8 billion. 
In these circumstances, and notwithstanding that the deficit on current 
account was so much smaller, the balance of payments closed with a deficit of 
US$ 1.25 billion. Although this was much lower than that of 20 billion recorded 
in 1982, it signified a further decrease in Latin America's international reserves. 
Likewise as a result of the decline in the net inflow of capital, the growth 
rate of the external debt slowed down for the second year in succession. Latin 
America's total external debt increased by 8 % in 1983, a rate a good deal lower 
than that of 12% corresponding to 1982 and far below the average of 2 4 % 
recorded between 1978 and 1981. Even so, owing to the fall in the value of 
exports of goods and services and the real decrease in the gross domestic product, 
both the debt/exports coefficient and the debt/product ratio reached 
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Figure 1 
LATIN AMERICA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
Urban unemployment 
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Source: F.CLAC, on the basis of official data. 
aAnnual growth rate. b \y e igM e ( j annual average for cities mentioned in table 8. cWeighted 
average annual rate for cities referred to in excluding cities in Brazil. ^weighted percentage 
variation from December to December. 
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unprecedented figures in 1983. Although in 1983 the proportion of the value of 
exports of goods and services absorbed by interest payments slightly decreased, 
it remained very high (34.5%) in comparison with its levels in the past 
(see figure 1.) 
3. The contraction in the capital inflow and the 
real transfer of resources1 
As mentioned above, in 1983 the net inflow of capital contracted sharply for the 
second year running. Its reduction was in fact so marked that in the end the 
amount it represented fell short of that of net payments of interest and profits. 
Accordingly, as in 1982, Latin America, instead of receiving a net transfer of 
resources from abroad, transferred resources to the rest of the world. 
Moreover, this transfer amounted to very considerable sums: US$ 17 
billion in 1982 and almost 27 billion in 1983, i.e., figures equivalent to 1 6 % and 
24%, respectively, of the value of exports of goods and services. Looked at from 
yet another angle, the reversal of the direction of net financial payments which 
took place between 1981 and 1983 was equivalent to a deterioration of 
'This topic' is more fully analysed in Section II of Part One of this survey. 
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approximately 3 6 % in the terms of trade. In the first of those years the positive 
difference between the net inflow of capital and payments of profits and interest 
added to the region's capacity tq import by the equivalent of almost 9 % of the 
value of exports of goods and services. In 1983, on the contrary, the negative 
difference between these two financial flows subtracted from the capacity to 
import the equivalent of 2 7 % of external sales of goods and services. 
For an adequate assessment of what this figure means, suffice it to recall 
that the effective deterioration of the terms of trade during that period was about 
16%. Consequently, in relation to the capacity to import, the negative impact of 
the decline in the net inflow of capital and the increase in payments of interest 
and profits more than doubled the effects of the deterioration in the terms of 
trade. 
Thus the spectacular change in the direction of net financial flows was a 
decisive cause of the almost universal contraction in economic activity in Latin 
America and the difficulties encountered by some countries in the servicing of 
their external debt. Up to 1981 the region had received capital of which the gross 
amount substantially exceeded the sum total of amortization payments, 
investment abroad and remittances of interest and profits. During the period 
1973-1981 this transfer of resources was equivalent on an average to 1 6 % of the 
value of exports, which, in its turn, increased during the same space of time at an 
annual rate of about 20%. In these circumstances, Latin America was able to pay 
amortization and interest payments on its external debt and the profits accruing 
on foreign capital by means of the new loans and investment received year by 
year. 
As from 1979, however, the size of this net transfer of resources began to 
diminish, since the increases in the net inflow of capital were more than offset by 
the still greater increases in payments of interest and profits. This trend 
sharpened in the period 1982-1983, during which the slump in the net inflow of 
capital aggravated the negative effects of the international recession and forced a 
number of countries of the region to apply much more drastic adjustment 
policies than would have been necessary to cope with the effects of the recession 
alone. Thus, in 1983, owing to the procyclical behaviour pattern of the capital 
flows, Latin America had to settle most of its payments of interest and profits 
with resources deriving from the trade surplus or from the international 
reserves previously built up. Nevertheless, as has already been explained, 
because of the unfavourable external context, the trade surplus was not achieved 
by an increase in the value of exports —which would have had an expansionist 
effect on the economy— but had its origin in an extremely severe contraction of 
the volume of imports, which was the main cause of the decline in economic 
activity. 
B. P R O D U C T I O N 
1. The rate and structure of economic growth 
As already pointed out, in 1983 there was a sharp accentuation of the loss of 
dynamism that the Latin American economy had been showing during the two 
preceding years. After increasing by barely 1.5% in 1981 —the lowest growth 
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Table 2 
L A T I N A M E R I C A : E V O L U T I O N OF T O T A L G R O S S D O M E S T I C P R O D U C T 







1981 1982 1983° 
1981-
1983°' 
Latin America' 7.1 4.8 6.2 1.5 -1.0 -2.9 -2.4 
Argentina 4.0 0.5 3.7 -6.2 -5.3 2.8 -8.7 
Bolivia 5.6 5.1 1.2 -0.9 -8.7 -7.6 -16.5 
Brazil 11.1 7.3 -1.9 1.1 -3.3 -4.1 
Colombia 6.6 4.7 2.3 0.9 0.8 4.1 
Costa Rica 7.1 5.7 
6.c/ 
2.8 -2.3 -9.1 0.8 -10.4 
Cuba4' 8 .7 ' 2.9 15.6 2.6 5.2 24.8 
Chile 0.9 1.7 8.0 5.7 -14.3 -0.8 -10.2 
Ecuador 11.5 7.0 5.1 4.5 1.4 -3.3 2.5 
El Salvador 4.9 -5.5 -5.3 -8.3 -5.6 - -13.5 
Guatemala 6.4 5.5 4.2 0.9 -3.5 -2.0 -4.6 
Haiti 4.5 3.7 7.5 -2.8 -2.5 1.3 -4.0 
Honduras 3.9 4.7 1.2 -1.8 -0.7 -1.3 
Mexico 6.8 5.3 8.8 7.9 -0.5 -4.7 2.3 
Nicaragua 5.4 -10.0 5.3 -1.2 5.3 9.6 
Panama 5.8 3.5 9.7 4.2 5.5 0.2 10.1 
Paraguay 6.4 11.0 8.5 -2.0 -3.7 2.3 
Peru 4.8 1.5 4.0 3.9 0.4 -11.8 -8.0 
Dominican Republic 10.1 5.4 4.1 1.6 3 9 9.9 
Uruguay 1.3 6.1 1.9 -9.7 -4.7 -12.3 
Venezuela 5.4 -0.5 -0.3 0.7 -3.0 -2.6 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figu 
"Provisional figures. Cumulative 
res. 
variations in the period 'Average, excluding Cuba. ä Refers to total social 
product. 'Refers to period 1971-1974. These data are not comparable with those for 1976-1983, for methodological 
reasons. 'Refers to 1976-1978. 
rate on record since 1940— and decreasing by 1 % in 1982, the region's gross 
domestic product went down by nearly 3 % in 1983 (see table 2 and figure 2). 
In consequence of this unprecedented decline in economic activity, the per 
capita product was reduced for the third consecutive year, but by a proportion (-
5.2%) much higher than those recorded in 1981 ( -0 .9%) and 1982 (-3.3%). It 
was therefore 9 % lower in 1983 than in 1980. 
The exceptional intensity of the retrogression in economic activity in the 
last three years was also reflected in the enormous decreases in the per capita 
product of many Latin American countries. During the period in question, it fell 
by 2 3 % in Bolivia and 2 1 % in El Salvador; 1 7 % in Costa Rica; over 14% in 
Chile, Peru and Uruguay; between 12% and 13% in Argentina and Guatemala; 
and almost 11% in Brazil, Haiti, Honduras and Venezuela (see table 3). 
As in 1982, the falling-off in economic activity was, moreover, quite 
widespread. The gross domestic product dropped in 11 of the 19 countries for 
which comparable data are available, remained virtually static in El Salvador and 
Panama and increased very slightly in Colombia, Costa Rica and Haiti. Thus, 
only in Argentina, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic did the growth rate of 
global economic activity exceed that of the population. In addition, in Cuba the 
global social product rose by about 5 % 2 (see table 2). 
2 The concept of global social product used in Cuban statistics represents the sum total of gross production 
in the agricultural, industrial, mining, energy, transport, communication and business sectors. 
13 
In contrast with what happened in 1982, however, the fall of the product in 
the region as a whole during 1983 was especially due to the very unfavourable 
evolution of productive activity in Brazil and Mexico, by far the two largest Latin 
American economies. 
In Mexico, the global gross domestic product, which had already slightly 
decreased in 1982, fell by 4.7%, while industrial production declined by more 
than 7 % and construction was reduced by nearly 14.5 %. The chief causes of this 
sharp drop in economic activity were the drastic contractions in domestic 
demand and in the volume of imports, resulting from the restrictive policy 
applied by the government with a view to strengthening the balance of 
payments and bridling the galloping inflation which had begun to escape control 
Figure 2 
LATIN AMERICA: ANNUAL GROWTH RATES OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
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Table 3 
L A T I N A M E R I C A : E V O L U T I O N OF PER C A P I T A 
G R O S S D O M E S T I C P R O D U C T 
Dollars at 1970 prices Annual growth rates 







1981 1982 1983° 
1981-
1983°' 
Latin america' 1 007 998 965 916 4.4 2.2 3.7 -0.9 -3.3 -5.2 -9.1 
Argentina 1 334 1 231 1 147 1 161 2.3 -1.2 2.0 -7.7 -6.8 1.2 -13.0 
Bolivia 382 368 327 295 3.0 2.4 -1.4 -3.5 -11.1 -10.0 -22.9 
Brazil 958 919 908 859 8.4 3.9 4.8 -4.1 -1.2 -5.4 -10.4 
Colombia 824 825 815 804 4.2 2.7 2.5 0.1 -1.2 -1.4 -2.5 
Costa Rica 974 926 820 805 4.4 2.6 -0.1 -4.9 -11.5 -1.8 -17.3 
Cuba'' 7.9' 5 .3 ' 2.2 14.8 2.0 4.6 22.6 
Chile 1 045 1 087 917 895 -0.9 0.2 6.5 4.1 -15.7 -2.4 -14.3 
Ecuador 723 734 723 680 8.2 3.9 2.1 1.6 -1.5 -6.0 -6.0 
El Salvador 433 386 354 344 1.9 2.5 -8.0 -10.9 -8.3 -2.9 -20.7 
Guatemala 589 578 542 516 3.5 2.6 1.4 -1.9 -6.2 -4.7 -12.3 
Haiti 114 108 102 101 2.2 1.3 4.9 -5.2 -4.9 -1.2 -10.9 
Honduras 356 348 331 317 0.8 2.2 1.1 -2.3 -5.1 -4.0 -11.0 
Mexico 1 366 1 436 1 391 1 292 3.4 2.3 5.8 5.1 -3.1 -7.1 -5.5 
Nicaragua 337 344 329 335 2.0 -1.6 -12.6 2.0 -4.4 1.8 -0.7 
Panama 1 174 1 197 1 236 1 211 2.9 0.9 6.2 1.9 3.2 -2.0 3.2 
Paraguay 633 665 632 590 3.2 5.6 7.5 5.1 -5.0 -6.6 -6.7 
Peru 690 698 683 587 1.9 -1.2 1.2 1.2 -2.2 -14.1 -15.0 
Dominican 
Republic 601 611 606 615 7.0 2.2 2.9 1.7 -0.7 1.5 2.4 
Uruguay 1 426 1 444 1 295 1 226 1.1 3 6 5.4 1.2 -10.3 -5.3 -14.1 
Venezuela 1 310 1 267 1 239 1 169 1.6 2.2 -3.6 -3.3 -2.2 -5.7 -10.8 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
* Provisional figures. Cumulative variations in 
product. 'Refers to 1971-1974. These data are noi 
the period 
: comparable 
'Average, excluding Cuba. Refers to total social 
with those for 1976-1983, for methodological reasons. 'Refers 
to 1976-1978. 
in the preceding year. Although this policy succeeded in halving the swollen 
public-sector deficit recorded in 1982 and helped to generate an impressive trade 
surplus, it also brought about considerable reductions in fiscal expenditure, 
private investment and wages, with the consequent negative effects on domestic 
spending and on the level of activity. 
In Brazil, in its turn —a country which by itself generates about one-third 
of the region's total domestic product— global economic activity declined by 
over 3%, after having marginally increased in 1982. As in Mexico, the decreases 
were very marked in manufacturing industry ( - 6 % ) and, above all, in 
construction ( -19%) , both of which sectors had remained at a standstill in 1982 
and had undergone a contraction in 1981 (see table 4). This slump in economic 
activity, unprecedented in the country's evolution during the last half century, 
was decisively influenced by a further drastic reduction in the volume of imports 
and the severe cuts introduced in the public sector's investment programmes, as 
also by the growing uncertainty consequent upon the acceleration of the rate of 
inflation and the prolonged and toilsome negotiations conducted by the 
economic authorities with a view to rescheduling the external debt and signing a 
stand-by agreement with the International Monetary Fund. 
The decreases in the product were even bigger in Bolivia ( -7 .6%) 
and especially in Peru ( -11 .8%) , two countries which in 1983 had suffered an 
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unwonted combination of natural disasters, characterized by torrential rains and 
floods in certain regions and severe and long-drawn-out droughts in others. 
These catastrophes inflicted particularly severe damage on agricultural 
production, which was reduced by over 1 1 % in Peru and 2 2 % in Bolivia. To 
these were added, in the case of Peru, a change in the ocean currents, by reason of 
which the results obtained in the fishing sector plummeted. In addition, 
economic activity was affected in both countries by exceptionally severe inflation 
and, in Peru, by the drastic contraction in the volume of imports. 
The situation was similar, although less serious, in Ecuador and Paraguay. 
In the former country, the domestic product declined by 3.3%, inasmuch as 
fishing, agriculture and industry in the coastal belt suffered the destructive 
effects of torrential rains, floods and tidal waves, and also because of the abrupt 
curtailment of the quantum of imports ( -35%) . 
In Paraguay, in its turn, economic activity decreased by 3.7%, so that the 
downward trend which had made its appearance in the preceding year was 
sharpened. This further falling-off was decisively influenced by the contraction 
of almost 5 % in agricultural production —which still carries a very great deal of 
weight in the economy as a whole— due to the heaviest rainfall and worst floods 
recorded in the country's recent history. The negative effects deriving from the 
evolution of agriculture were accentuated, in addition, by a 2 0 % drop in the 
volume of exports and an even greater reduction in the quantum of imports. 
Trends in economic activity continued to be very unfavourable in Uruguay. 
After raising its level by 2 % in 1981 and falling by almost 1 0 % in 1982, the gross 
domestic product diminished by 4 .7% in 1983. As in the preceding year, 
particularly powerful determinants of this new decline were the adverse 
evolution of industrial production and construction —which decreased by 7 % 
and 27%, respectively, after having undergone reductions of 1 7 % and 1 4 % in 
1982— and the violent contraction once again occurring in the quantum of 
imports, which shrank by 26%, after having done so by 3 0 % in 1982 and 1 4 % in 
1981. 
During 1983 the level of economic activity also fell in Venezuela, whose 
gross domestic product decreased by 3 % —an all-time low for the period since 
the war. As the GDP had remained almost entirely at a standstill since 1978, the 
per capita product declined for the fifth year in succession, while the rate or 
urban unemployment rose, likewise for the fifth year running, and attained an 
unprecedented level of nearly 10%. As in other countries, two important causes 
of the decline in economic activity were the drastic contraction of imports —the 
volume of which was reduced by about 5 6 % — and the increased uncertainty 
generated by the devaluation of the bolivar and the radical changes introduced in 
the exchange system, after a long spell during which a fixed exchange rate had 
been in force and complete freedom in exchange operations had prevailed. 
In Chile, in contrast, the headlong downward trend in economic activity 
which had started in mid-1981 and in 1982 had led to a drastic reduction of the 
gross domestic product by over 14% and to an equally spectacular rise in 
unemployment was to some extent attenuated in the course of 1983. Although 
activity continued to decrease during the first half of 1983, it subsequently 
showed signs of recovering slowly, through the operation of three factors: the 
expansion of public expenditure, the fall in real interest rates, and the greater 
1 6 
degree of protection for activities competing with imports which was signified 
by the maintenance of a higher real exchange rate, the raising of the general 
tariff from 1 0 % to 20%, and the establishment of higher special tariffs on 
imports of certain agricultural and industrial goods. Nevertheless, this recovery 
was not sufficient to offset the effects of the decline in economic activity during 
the first half of the year, and, consequently, the gross domestic product 
diminished by nearly 1 % in the year as a whole. 
The recovery of economic activity was much more marked in Argentina. In 
this country, the product increased by 2.8%, thanks in particular to a rise of about 
1 0 % in industrial production. But as in the two preceding years global economic 
activity had declined by 11%, while the output of the manufacturing sector had 
fallen by almost 2 3 % between 1979 and 1982, both the former and the latter 
were far from regaining their 1977 levels in 1983. 
In Colombia, on the other hand, the gross domestic product increased only 
very slightly (by 0 .8%) so that its growth rate slackened for the fifth year in 
succession. The main cause of the economy's loss of dynamism was the 
stagnation of industrial production. This was affected by the meagre expansion 
of domestic demand and by the decrease in exports to Venezuela and Ecuador, 
countries in which Colombian manufactures lost competitive capacity after the 
devaluations of the bolivar and the Sucre. As a result of the decline in industrial 
production, and nothwithstanding the moderate increase in construction, the 
unemployment rate went up for the second year running in the main cities of 
Colombia, reaching an annual average of almost 12 %, the peak figure for the last 
nine years. 
Trends in economic activity were likewise unsatisfactory in most of the 
countries of Central America, although as a general rule they were less 
unfavourable than in preceding years. Thus, the gross domestic product 
increased slightly in Costa Rica, after declining considerably for two years. The 
downward movement of economic activity was also interrupted in EI Salvador, 
where the domestic product, which since 1979 had continuously and sharply 
decreased, was stabilized in 1983. In Panama, too, economic activity stagnated, 
after having expanded persistently and fairly rapidly since 1978. In Guatemala, 
as in Honduras, the product fell for the second year in succession, although in 
those countries the contractions in economic activity were slighter than in 1982. 
In contrast, the activity in question rose by over 5 % in Nicaragua, thus more 
than offsetting its modest decline in the preceding year. This growth was 
particularly influenced by the marked increment in agricultural production 
shown for the third year in a row, and by the recovery of construction and of 
manufacturing industry. 
Lastly, in 1983 economic activity increased by nearly 4 % in the Dominican 
Republic and by somewhat more than 5 % in Cuba. In the former country, the 
growth of the product was based on the 3 0 % boom in mining —which thus 
almost offset its steep decline in the preceding year—, on an upswing of almost 
15% in construction —mainly due to the expansion of housing plans— and on 
the steady increase in agricultural production, which rose by about 4 % for the 
third year in succession (see table 4). 
The 5 % growth rate of the social product in Cuba, in its turn, stemmed 
mainly from a rise of almost 11% in construction, a 7 % increase in business 
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LATIN AMERICA: EVOLUTION OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT B Y BRANCH OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 
(Growth rates) 
Agriculture ouarrvino Manufacturing Construction Subtotal goods Basic services Other services 
1981 1982 1983" 1981 1982 1983° 1981 1982 1983° 1981 1982 1983° 1981 1982 1983° 1981 1982 1983° 1981 1982 1983° 
Latin America 4 .8 -0 .3 0 .7 5.7 3.1 -0 .4 -2.3 -2 .5 -4 .6 1.1 -5 .4 -13 .6 0.4 -1 .9 - 4 . 0 3.5 1.4 0 .7 3 .0 - 0 . 6 -2 .0 
Argentina 2.4 6.4 0.8 0.6 . -0.7 2.2 -16.0 -4.7 9.9 -13 .8 -19.8 -6.8 -9.8 - 3 1 4.5 -3.1 -1.5 4.2 -3.1 -9.2 0.2 
Boi iv ¡a 7.0 -2.2 -22.0 1.6 -9.4 -0.4 - 3 8 -15.3 -7.5 -34 .9 -40.0 - -1.4 -10.1 -13.4 0.8 -6.5 -4.3 -1.3 -8.4 -3 .8 
Brazil 6.9 -2.5 2.2 0.2 8.3 14.5 -6.4 0.1 -6.3 -4.3 -0.4 -19.0 -3.7 -0.4 -6.1 0.8 4.8 2.6 -0.1 1.1 -1.0 
Colombia 3.3 -1.9 2.1 5.3 3 8 10.1 -1.2 - 3 9 -0.2 -8.1 6.5 3.1 2.0 -1.7 1.6 5.5 3.2 0.8 4.2 8.1 1.6 
Costa Rica 5.1 -4.9 4.4 ... ... 0.5" -14.9® -1.8® -21.7 -32.6 - 6 0 -1.6 -12.7 0.9 1.4 -0.2 5.7 -3-5 -6.0 
Cuba' 13.0 -2.3 1.4 10.4'' 2.0" 17.8' 3.4' 4.r 20.0 0.2 10.7 16.6 1.5 4.7 16.2 -2.0 3 6 1 2 . y 5.8^ 
Chile 5.3 -2.3 -1 .0 8.0 5.7 -2.0 2.6 -21.6 3.0 21.1 -29.0 0.2 6.0 -12.5 0.6 1.4 -7.5 -1.2 5.7 -10.8 -9.2 
Ecuador 5.7 2.0 -14.9 3.9 -0.9 12.7 6.1 4 .0 -9.4 1.4 -0.7 -15.4 5.3 2.4 -9.3 5.4 5.6 -0.7 4.4 3.0 
El Salvador -6.4 -4.7 -2 .8 -2.6 - -10.5 -8.4 0.8 -15.3 -2.1 4.3 -8.4 -5.7 -1.1 -8.4 -5 .6 2.5 -7 .0 -4 .6 0 .5 
Guatemala 1.4 -2.0 -2.5 -36.4 5.2 2.2 -2.5 -5.2 -2.1 16.0 -11.7 -10.7 1.1 -4 .0 -3.1 -0.4 -4 .9 -1.4 Ì . 7 -2.2 -0.8 
Haiti -1.4 -4.2 3.3 -14.5 2 3 7 -99.3 -11.6 1.3 2.5 -1 .0 -5.6 5.8 -4.9 -2.2 0.7 -0.9 -3 .0 7.6 -0.2 -2.0 1.3 
Honduras 0.9 1.1 2 .6 5.1 -4.8 - 1.7 -1.3 -1.0 -7 .8 -4.2 -2.9 0.4 -0.4 0.8 -0.7 -2 .6 -1.4 1.0 -0 .6 -1.2 
Mexico 6.1 0.6 3 4 15.3 9.2 -2.2 7.0 -2.9 -7.3 11.8 -5.0 -14.3 8.0 -1.3 -5.4 10.4 -2.2 -3.2 7.0 1.4 -3 .8 
Nicaragua 10.1 2.9 9.5 5.9 -7.1 -9.3 2.8 -1.7 4.6 10.4 -25.5 7.6 6.9 -0.4 7.3 -0.1 -2 ,0 1.0 4 .9 -0.5 4 .5 
Panama 8.3 0.3 3.1 22.6 7.9 7.3 -3.3 2.4 -2.3 3.2 24.0 -27.8 2.7 7.5 -8.4 5.6 10.9 7.4 5.0 3.2 0 . 6 
Paraguay 6.7 - 3 0 -4.9 15.0 2.0 -9.8 8.0 -4.5 -4.2 16.7 -6.0 -5.4 8.7 -3.9 -4.8 3.9 9 .6 -2.1 9.2 -1.2 -1.0 
Peru 10.7 2.1 -11.4 -3.1 6.5 -6.6 -0.2 -2.5 -17.2 11.0 2.3 -21.4 3.1 0.8 -14.0 6.2 0.7 ... 4 2 0.4 ... 
Dominican Republic 5.5 3.6 3 8 7.1 -28.1 29.9 2.7 5.2 1.7 0 .6 -4.9 14.5 3 9 -0.5 6.6 5.9 2.1 1.5 3.9 3.1 2.3 
Uruguay 5.5 -11.4 2.6 ... ... -9.4 ' -16.9® -7.0® 3.0 - 1 3 6 -26.5 -3.6 -14.8 -7 .6 0.2 - 8 7 -3.5 7.3 -6 .8 3.8 
Venezuela -1.9 3.6 0.7 -2.5 -10.2 -5 .6 -2.5 4.1 -1.8 -2.1 -8.4 -10.8 -2.3 -1 .0 -3.5 5.5 5.0 0.4 -1.5 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
Provisional figures. Including mining and quarrying. 'Referring to the social product concept. 'including mining and metalworking. 
'Excluding metalworking. 'Referring to business and other productive activities in the non-material sphere of the social product. 
activity and communications and an increment of approximately 5 % in 
industrial production. The expansion of productive activity was facilitated by a 
relatively satisfactory supply of imports —of which the quantum rapidly 
mounted for the fourth year running— and by the progress made in global 
economic management and the greater autonomy granted to the units of 
production. 
2. Total supply and demand and domestic suplies of goods 
As in the preceding year, but to an even more pronounced extent, the economic 
crisis was reflected in 1983 in highly unfavourable trends in the total supply of 
goods and services, which, after decreasing by about 3 % in 1982, was reduced by 
over 5 % in 1983, as the result of a 2 .9% decline in the gross domestic product 
and a spectacular contraction —of nearly 3 0 % — in the volume of imports of 
goods and services (see table 5). Owing to this exceptional curtailment of 
external purchases (on top of that recorded in 1982) the import coefficient 
dropped from 1 2 % in 1981 to barely 7 .4% in 1983 —the lowest proportion on 
record in the region since the war— while their volume fell below the level 
attained in 1974 (see table 6 and figure 3). 
Since in 1983 the slump in the volume of imports was accompanied by an 
almost 7 % expansion of the quantum of exports, the decline in domestic 
supplies of goods was much greater than the decrease in the product. These 
supplies were reduced by 6 . 5 % in 1983, after having contracted by about 3 % in 
1982. Thus, in the course of the last two years alone, the per capita internal 
supply of goods and services —which is, in the last resort, the determinant of the 
current and future level of living of the population— fell by over 13%. 
As was to be expected, and as can be clearly seen in figure 3, this decline 
had a particularly intensive impact on capital formation, which had enjoyed a 
period of thriving growth between 1970 and 1980, but, after increasing very 
little in 1981 and falling by 11% in 1982, dropped by over 1 9 % in 1983. In 
consequence of these considerable decreases, the investment coefficient, which 
had been a little over 2 2 % in 1981, was barely 16.5% in 1983. As in the case of 
imports, this coefficient too was the lowest in the last 40 years. 
Furthermore, during 1983 there was a break in the sharply rising trend 
which net external factor payments had been showing. After increasing rapidly 
in the second half of the 1970s and almost doubling between 1980 and 1982 
alone, these payments decreased by nearly 4 % in 1983. Nevertheless, since at the 
same time the gross domestic product also declined, they went on absorbing the 
same very high proportion of the product (3.4%) as in the preceding year. The 
heavy burden imposed on the economy by the exceptional increase in payments 
on foreign capital during the preceding years was likewise reflected in the fact 
that the proportion of the product which they represented in the two-year 
period 1982-1983 was almost three times as big as had been customary in the 
mid-1970s (see table 6). 
Lastly, just as in the two preceding years, the negative effects on national 
income produced by the massive net external factor payments were aggravated 
by the deterioration in the terms of trade. In these circumstances (as can be seen 
in table 6), the existing gap between the domestic product and national income 
continued to widen. 
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Table 5 
LATIN AMERICA: EVOLUTION OF TOTAL SUPPLY, DOMESTIC DEMAND AND GROSS NATIONAL INCOME0 
Millions of dollars at 1970 prices Annual growth rates 





1981 1982 1983 
1981-
1983*" 
1. Total supply (2 + 3) 384 905 391 057 380 630 360 443 7.5 4.7 6.8 1.6 -2.7 -5.3 -6.4 
2. Gross domestic product at market prices 344 212 349 330 345 910 335 808 7.1 4.8 6.2 1.5 -1.0 -2.9 -2.4 
3. Imports of goods and services 40 693 41 727 34 720 24 635 11.4 4.3 12.0 2.5 -16.8 -29.0 -39.5 
4. Exports of goods and services 31 186 33 700 33 321 35 598 4.2 6.3 9.2 8.1 -1.1 6.8 14.1 
5. Available domestic supplies of goods and 
services (2 + 3 - 4) = domestic demand (6 + 7) 353 719 357 357 347 309 324 845 7.7 4.6 6.6 1.0 -2.8 -6.5 -8.2 
6. Total final consumer expenditure'' 276 919 279 964 278 582 269 338 7.5 4.1 6.8 1.1 -0.5 -3.3 -2.7 
7. Gross fixed capital formation 76 800 77 393 68 727 55 507 8.8 6.3 5.8 0.8 -11.2 -19.2 -27.7 
8. Terms-of-trade effect 6 776 4 128 619 -1 982 
9 Factor payments to rest of world 6 161 8 884 11 745 11 286 4.5 10.2 16.6 44.2 32.2 -3.9 83.2 
10. Real gross national income (2 + 8 - 9 ) 344 827 344 574 334 783 322 540 7.7 4.2 6.7 -0.1 -2.8 -3.7 -6.5 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official statistics. 
"Nineteen countries. Of the Caribbean countries, only Haiti and the Dominican Republic are included. ^Provisional figures. 'Refers to the cumulative variation in the period, 
''includes variation in stocks. 
Table 3 
LATIN AMERICA: RELATIVE SHARES OF COMPONENTS OF GROSS 
DOMESTIC PRODUCT AND OF GROSS NATIONAL INCOME" 
(GDP = 100) 
Final „ 
Gross consumer . . 























1970 80.6 19.6 100.2 8.9 9.1 100.0 1.4 98.6 
1971 80.7 19.8 100.5 8.5 9.0 100.0 -0.2 1.4 98.4 
1972 80.5 20.0 100.5 8.5 9.0 100.0 1.2 98.8 
1973 80.3 20.5 100.8 8.6 9.4 100.0 1.1 1.4 99.7 
1974 81.5 21.2 102.7 8.2 10.9 100.0 2.6 1.2 101.4 
1975 80.3 22.4 102.7 7.7 10.4 100.0 1.0 1.1 99.9 
1976 79.3 22.7 102.0 7.8 9.8 100.0 1.2 1.2 100.0 
1977 79.7 22.4 102.1 8.1 10.2 100.0 1.4 1.3 100.1 
1978 79.6 22.5 102.1 8.6 10.7 100.0 0.7 1.5 99.2 
1979 79.9 22.2 102.1 9.0 11.1 100.0 1.4 1.6 99.8 
1980 80.5 22.3 102.8 9.1 11.9 100.0 2.0 1.8 100.2 
1981 80.1 22.2 102.3 9.7 12.0 100.0 1.2 2.5 98.7 
1982 80.5 19.9 100.4 9.7 10.1 100.0 0.2 3.4 96.8 
1983' 80.2 16.5 96.7 10.7 7.4 100.0 -0.6 3.4 96.0 
Source: ECLAC,on the basis of official figures. 
"Nineteen countries. Of the Caribbean countries, only Haiti and the Dominican Republic are included. 
Includes variation in stocks. 'Provisional figures. 
C. E M P L O Y M E N T A N D U N E M P L O Y M E N T 
Trends in the employment situation in 1983 evidenced the exacerbation of the 
crisis which the economies of the region had been suffering since 1981, and to 
which was superadded the impact of the adjustment policies applied to cope with 
it. Thus almost all the countries witnessed a decline in their levels of 
employment. In some of them it resulted in further increases in open 
unemployment rates, while in others the already high levels of unemployment 
recorded in 1982 persisted. 
1. Employment in industry 
As was to be expected, trends in employment in manufacturing industry largely 
reflected the variation in that sector's level of activity in 1983. In most of the 
countries there were simultaneous decreases in the levels of production and 
employment; employment in industry showed a rising trend solely in Argentina 
and Chile, the only countries in the group under consideration that experienced a 
recovery in the manufacturing sector in 1983.3 
Even in these two countries, however, the recrudescense of employment in 
industry was very slight, and did not suffice to offset the notable reductions 
' Of the nine countries for which long and homogeneous statistical series on employment in manufacturing 
industry are available —Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, G>sta Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela— 
only Argentina and Chile showed increases in the industrial product (10% and 3%, respectively). In contrast, 
manufacturing activity slightly declined in Colombia, fell by 2 % in Costa Rica and Venezuela, and dropped sharply 
in the other countries ( - 1 7 % in Peru, - 9 % in Ecuador, - 7 % in Mexico and - 6 % in Brazil). 
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recorded in the preceding years. Thus, the nurrtber of persons employed in the 
manufacturing sector in Argentina, which had fallen by about 2 2 % in 1981 and 
over 5 % in 1982, rose by barely 3 % in 1983- This meant that employment in the 
sector was still 3 0 % below its 1977 level (see table7). 
Although the average level of employment in industry declined by 2 .6% in 
Chile, the number of workers employed in this sector began to increase as from 
the second half of 1983 and by the end of the year reached a level almost 1 4 % 
higher than that attained twelve months before. Nevertheless, owing mainly to 
the drastic reduction of almost 21 % which occurred in 1982, employment in the 
manufacturing sector in 1983 was more than 2 0 % lower than it had been at the 
beginning of the decade. 
Figure 3 
LATIN AMERICA: INDEXES OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, 
INTERNAL SUPPLIES OF GOODS AND SERVICES, 
INVESTMENT, IMPORTS AND EXPORTS 
¡1970--100) 
1970 1975 1980 1983 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis o f official data. 
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Table D-2 




















1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983° 
1982 1983 
I II III IV I II III IV 
109.7 99.3 97.2 100.0 78.4 74.2 76.7 77.5 73.2 72.2 74.0 78.0 77.0 74.8 76.9 
91.8 93.7 96.9 100.0 92.6 86.5 80.1 86.4 87.4 86.5 85.5 82.4 81.3 79.0 77.7 
96.9 98.6 100.8 100.0 95.5 90.7 85.1 91.9 91.2 90.1 89.5 85.5 84.4 
98.7 99.2 99.5 100.0 100.4 102.1 101.8 103.9 98.4 104.0 101.8 
91.4 92.7 93.1 100.0 102.2 80.9 78.8 90.9 86.7 74.9 70.4 75.4 75.8 82.7 81.1 
89.2 94.5 97.3 100.0 107.1 109.6 104.0 107.4 108.1 115.8 108.9 103.8 104.2 
82.5 86.6 93.2 100.0 105.6 103.0 94.4 105.9 105.7 101.7 97.9 97.3 96.0 93.2 91.2 
98.6 97.9 97.9 100.0 101.1 94.7 94.3 100.0 100.0 99.2 99.4 97.8 95.6 93.1 91.2 
91.7 99.6 99.1 100.0 101.8 100.8 94.5 100.6 100.9 94.5 
Percentage variation' 
-6.2 -9.7 -2.1 2.9 -21.6 -5.4 3.3 -6.9 -11.0 -5.2 -1.7 0.6 5.3 3.6 3.8 
1.0 2.1 3.4 3.2 -7.4 -6.7 -7.4 -12.6 -7.9 -3.6 - 1 9 -4.6 -7.0 -8.6 -9.1 
1.5 1.8 2.2 -0.8 -4.5 -5.0 -7.2 -4.8 -5.2 -4.9 -5.1 -7.0 -7.4 
7.0 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4 1.7 -2.0 3.5 4.1 -2.1 -2.0 
2.2 1.4 0.5 7.4 2.2 -20.8 -2.6 -7.0 -15.4 -28.8 -31.1 -17.0 -12.6 10.5 13.8 
6.0 6.0 2.9 2.8 7.1 2.3 -3.4 5.9 -1.3 8.5 -2.9 -3.4 -3.6 
-0.9 4.9 7.6 7.3 5.6 -2.4 -8.3 2.5 -0.2 -5.0 -7.7 -8.2 -9.2 -8.4 -6.9 
0.7 -0.7 - 2.1 1.1 -1.4 -5.4 -1.3 -1.1 -1.6 -1.4 -2.2 -4.4 -6.1 -8.3 
6.2 8.6 -0.5 1.0 1.8 -1.0 -6.1 -0.1 -1.4 -6.1 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Provisional figures. Personnel employed in manufacturing, according to periodic sample surveys of enterprises. 'Personnel 
employed in manufacturing, according to household surveys. " in relation to the same period in the preceding year. 
According to the partial data available, employment in industry decreased 
moderately in Costa Rica ( -2%) and Ecuador ( -3 .5%). 4 But since these 
downward movements were the first to take place in the last eight years, in both 
countries employment in industry exceeded the levels reached in 1980. 
In the other countries the decreases in employment in industry were much 
more marked. The biggest occurred in Mexico, where employment in 
manufacturing contracted by over 8%, after having declined by almost 2 .5% in 
1982. However, thanks to substantial increases between 1976 and 1981 —in 
which period the average annual growth rate of employment in industry was 
over 6 % — the number of workers employed in the manufacturing sector was 
still a little higher than it had been in 1979. 
Employment in industry followed a similar trend during the last two years 
in Venezuela, where it fell by 1 % in 1982 and by 6 % in the first half of 1983. But 
since its expansion during the three preceding years had been very slight, its 
level was 5 % lower in 1983 than in 1978. 
The decline in industrial employment was also considerable ( -5 .5%) in 
Peru. For this reason, and because of its unfavourable evolution in the preceding 
years, its level in 1983 was barely higher than in 1975. 
Employment in the manufacturing sector dropped even more sharply in 
Brazil and Colombia, in which two countries it decreased by over 7 % in 1982. As 
this downward movement succeeded others of considerable significance that had 
occurred in the two preceding years, employment in industry both in Brazil and 
in Colombia sank to its lowest levels in the last ten years (see table 7). 
4 Data for March in the case of G>staRica, and for the first two quarters in that of Ecuador. 
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2. Unemployment 
Largely as a result of these unfavourable trends in employment in the 
manufacturing sector, and also in consequence of the sharp drop in employment 
in construction, a further rise took place in the level of open urban 
unemployment, which had been soaring since 1981. In some countries, 
unemployment rates reached record levels, while the slight downturns of about 
one percentage point which occurred in Argentina, Costa Rica and Nicaragua 
were not sufficient to offset the increases in the rate of unemployment in 
previous years. Consequently, in all the countries there was a good deal more 
urban unemployment in 1983 than before the start of the current recession (see 
table 8). 
In five countries —Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Uruguay and Venezuela— 
open unemployment reached its highest levels in the last nine years (see 
figure 4). As in the preceding year, the peak rates were recorded in Chile, 
Nicaragua and Uruguay (22, 17.5 and 16.5%, respectively). 
What happened in Chile was mainly that the already very high level of 
urban unemployment noted during the preceding year was maintained,5 The 
rate remained especially high in manufacturing industry (26%) and, above all, in 
construction (49%) . Even so, in the course of 1980 the rate of unemployment 
Table 8 
LATIN AMERICA: EVOLUTION OF THE URBAN UNEMPLOYMENT RATE 
Country 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Argentina" 4.2 3.7 4.9 3.3 3.3 2.5 2.6 4.7 5.3 4.6 
Bolivia® 7.9 4.5 7.6 7.5 9.7 9.4 13.3 
Brazil' 6.8 6.4 6.2 7.9 6.3 6.8 
Colombia1* 12.7 11.0 10.6 9.0 9.0 8.9 9.7 8.2 9.3 11.8 
Costa Rica' 5.4 5.1 5.8 5.3 6.0 9.1 9.9 8.5 
Chile' 4.6 9.7 16.2 16.8 13.2 14.0 13.6 11.8 11.1 22.1 22.2 
Mexico* 7.5 7.4 7.2 6.8 8.3 6.9 5.7 4.5 4.2 4.2 6.7 
Nicaragua* 
Panama' 
21.4 18.3 15.9 18.5 17.5 
7.5 8.6 9.0 9.6 11.6 9.8 11.8 10.3 11.2 
Paraguay^ 6.7 5.4 4.1 5.9 3.9 2.2 5.6 8.4 
Peru 5.0 4.1 7.5 6.9 8.7 8.0 6.5 7.1 6.8 7.0 8.8 
Uruguay 8.9 8.1 12.7 11.8 10.1 8.3 7.4 6.7 11.9 15.5 
Venezuela1" 7.6 8.3 6.8 5.5 5.1 5.8 6.6 6.8 7.8 9.8 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures, 
'National urban rate. Average for Apr<7-October. *La Paz. 1978, second semester; 1979, annual average; 1980, May-October; 1981, 
national urban average; 1982 and 1983, average for J une-December. 'Metropolitan areas of Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Belo Horizonte, 
Porto Alegre, Salvador and Recife. Average for 2 2 months; 1980, average for June-December. 'Bogotá, Barranqu illa. Cali and Medellín. 
Average for March, June, September and December. 'National urban rate. Average for March, July and November. 'Greater 
Santiago. Average for March, June, September and December. 'Metropolitan areas of México City, Guadalajara and Monrerrrey. 
Average for four quarters. * National rate for non-agricultural activities, 'National urban rate. August of each year, except the 
years 1974 to 1976, where the reference is to non-agricultural unemployment; 1980, according to data from the National Census taken in 
February; 1981, official estimates. 'Asunción, Fernando de la Mora, Lambaré and urban areas of Luque and San Lorenzo, 1981, first 
semester; 1982, first quarter; 1983, four quarters. Metropolitan Lima. 1978, average for July-August; 1979, August-September; 1980, 
April; 1981, June; 1982 and 1983, official estimates. Montevideo, average for two semesters, "National urban rate. Average 
for two semesters. 
5 According to data from the Department of Economics of rhe Universidad de ChiJe. The figures presented 
by the Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, for their part, show a decline in the average annual rate from 2 0 % to 1 9 % 
between 1982 and 1983- But this decrease can be partly attributed to the change in the geographical base of the 
survey, which, as from the second half of 1983, was extended from Greater Santiago to the whole of the 
metropolitan region, thus including some rural areas where open unemployment is usually on a smaller scale. It 
may also have been influenced by the raising of the lower age limit for the labour force from 12 to 15 years. 
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Figure 4 
LATIN AMERICA: EVOLUTION OF URBAN UNEMPLOYMENT 
\Paraguay 
J I I I 1 L I I I J_ 
1973 1975 1980 1983 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
1973 1975 1980 1983 
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Figure 5 
LATIN AMERICA: EVOLUTION OF UNEMPLOYMENT IN SOME PRINCIPAL CITIES 
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T a b l e D-2 
LATIN AMERICA: EVOLUTION OF UNEMPLOYMENT RATE 
IN LARGEST CITIES 
1 9 7 8 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 3 — 
1 9 8 2 
II I I I I V — 
1 9 8 } 
I l III I V 
A r g e n t i n a " 
Capi ta l and G r e a t e r 
B u e n o s A i r e s 2 . 8 2 . 0 2 . 3 4 . 5 4 . 7 4 . 0 5.7 3 .7 4 . 9 3 .1 
C ó r d o b a 3 . 9 2 . 2 2 . 4 3 . 8 4 . 4 5 . 0 4 . 8 3 . 9 4 . 3 5 . 6 
G r e a t e r M e n d o z a 3 .2 3 .1 2 . 3 4 . 8 4 .1 4 . 5 4 . 8 3 .3 4 . 5 4 . 5 
R o s a r i o 3 . 9 2 . 9 3 . 4 5 . 8 8 . 4 8 . 3 8 .1 6 . 3 
Brazil® 
R i o de J a n e i r o 7 .5 8 . 6 6 . 6 6 . 2 9 . 3 6 . 8 5 . 6 4 . 5 6 . 0 6 . 5 6 . 5 6 . 2 
S a o P a u l o 5 .7 7 . 3 6 . 0 6 . 8 8 . 3 5 . 7 5 . 6 4 . 3 6 . 7 7 . 2 7 . 0 6 . 6 
R e c i t e 6 . 9 8 . 6 7 . 5 6 . 7 9 . 1 7 . 9 7 . 3 5 .7 7 . 5 8 . 5 8 . 5 7 . 5 
P o r t o A l e g r e 4 . 5 5 . 8 5 . 3 8 . 0 6 . 4 5 . 3 5 .2 4 .1 6 .1 7 .1 7 . 4 6 . 3 
C o l o m b i a ' 
B o g o t á 7 . 3 6 . 6 7 . 9 5 .5 7 . 4 9 . 4 8 . 5 7 . 0 6 . 8 7 .1 7 . 9 9 . 4 8 . 9 11 .3 
B a r r a n q u i l l a 7 . 4 6 . 3 8 .1 11.1 1 0 . 4 1 3 . 8 9 . 6 1 1 . 3 1 0 . 3 1 0 . 3 1 1 . 8 1 4 . 8 1 4 . 4 1 4 . 3 
M e d e l l t n 12.7 14 .3 14 .7 13 .1 13 .3 1 7 . 0 1 2 . 6 1 2 . 4 1 5 . 0 13 .1 17 .1 18 .2 16.1 1 6 . 7 
O l i 9 . 8 10 .7 1 0 . 0 9 . 0 9 . 6 1 1 . 6 9 . 7 9 . 6 9 . 9 9 . 0 1 1 . 6 1 1 . 8 1 1 . 8 11 .3 
M e x i c o 
M é x i c o City 6 . 9 5.7 4 . 3 3 . 9 4 . 0 6 . 0 3 .5 3 . 9 4 . 4 4 .1 7 . 0 5 . 5 6 . 2 5 . 4 
G u a d a l a j a r a 6 . 0 5.7 5 . 0 5 . 8 5 . 0 8 . 0 4 . 4 5 .2 5 . 3 5 .1 6 . 4 8 . 6 9 . 5 7 . 6 
M o n t e r r e y 7 . 6 5 . 9 5 .2 4 . 2 4 . 9 10 .7 4 . 3 4 . 7 6 . 2 4 . 5 9 . 0 10 .2 12 .5 11.1 
A s u n c i ó n 
( P a r a g u a y ) 4 . 1 5 . 9 3 . 9 2 .2 5 . 6 8 . 4 5 . 6 8 . 4 
La P a z ( B o l i v i a ) ' 4 . 5 7 . 6 7 . 5 9 . 4 1 3 . 3 7 . 0 1 1 . 8 12 .7 1 3 . 8 
S a n J o s é 
( C o s t a R i c a ) ' 5 . 8 4 . 5 5 . 6 8 . 8 1 0 . 0 8 . 0 1 0 . 4 1 0 . 6 8 . 9 9 . 5 8 . 7 5 . 9 
S a n t i a g o ( C h i l e ) * 1 4 . 0 1 3 . 6 1 1 . 8 11.1 2 2 . 1 2 2 . 2 19 .1 2 3 . 2 2 4 . 8 2 1 . 3 2 3 . 9 2 2 . 7 2 1 . 9 2 0 . 4 
L i m a ( P e r ù ) * 8 . 0 6 . 5 7 .1 6 . 8 7 . 0 8 . 8 7 . 0 8 . 8 
M o n t e v i d e o 
( U r u g u a y ) ' 10.1 8 . 4 7 . 4 6 . 6 1 1 . 9 15 .5 10 .7 1 1 . 3 11 .7 1 3 . 8 1 5 . 9 16 .1 1 5 . 2 1 4 . 6 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Figures for April and October. Quarterly averages. 'Figures for March, June, September and December. ' including 
Fernando de laMora, Lambari and the urban areas of LuqueandSan Lorenzo. ' 1978, second semester; 1979, average for two semesters; 
1980, May-October, 1982 and 198i , June and December. 'Figures for March, July and November. 'Figures for Mardi, June, 
September and December. *1978, average for July-August; 1979. September. 1980, April; 1981, June; 1982 and 1983, official 
estimates. 'Six-monthly averages for 1978, 1979 and 1980. Quarterly averages for 1981, 1982 and 1983. 
decreased slightly but steadily, reflecting the above-mentioned recovery in 
industrial employment (see figure 5). This decline was also influenced by the 
enormous expansion of government employment programmes, which managed 
to provide temporary jobs for 13% of the active population of the metropolitan 
region of Santiago in 1983. Despite these factors, the rate of unemployment at 
the end of the year remained above 20%, i.e., at double the figure recorded three 
years before (see table 9)-
The employment situation deteriorated to a more marked extent in 
Uruguay, where unemployment had been shooting up since the third quarter of 
1981 and continued to increase until mid-1983. Despite its slight decline in the 
following months, the average unemployment rate of almost 16% in 
Montevideo was the highest recorded since the relevant statistical series had 
been started in 1968. As in Chile, manufacturing and construction were the 
activities with the highest unemployment levels (17%). The rate of 
unemployment in the business sector, although lower in absolute terms (13%), 
almost doubled within the space of barely a year (see table 10). 
In Bolivia, too, there was a pronounced increase in unemployment. The 
rate of open unemployment in the city of La Paz, which in 1982 had already 
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exceeded 9%, continued to rise in 1983, until by the end of the year it reached an 
unprecedented level of nearly 14%. Although no precise figures are available for 
underemployment, it may be assumed to have increased substantially at the same 
time, having shown a sharply rising trend during the past five years (see table 
ll).6 
The increase in urban unemployment was equally striking in Colombia. 
The average rate of unemployment in the principal Colombian cities rose for the 
second year in succession, reaching almost 12%, the highest figure recorded in 
the last nine years. As in previous years, Medellin was the urban centre worst 
affected, with a rate that ranged from 16 to 1 8 % in the course of the year. As for 
Bogotá —where almost half the country's urban labour force is concentrated—, 
during the last quarter of the year it showed an unprecedented unemployment 
rate of 11%. In contrast, average underemployment in the four principal cities 
slightly decreased, and in March 1983 was not even as much as 11 % (see tables 9 
and 11). 
The contraction in economic activity also caused an increase in urban 
unemployment in Panama. Mainly as a result of the 2 % fall in the 
manufacturing product and the 2 8 % drop in that of construction, the 
unemployment rate went up from 1 0 % to 1 1 % between 1982 and 1983. In the 
same period, rural unemployment although on a smaller scale in absolute values, 
showed a proportionally bigger increase, rising from 6 % to 7%, largely in 
consequence of smaller sugar-cane harvests and of the drought which affected 
production of basic grains. 
The rate attained by unemployment in Venezuela —almost 1 0 % — also 
represented an all-time high. Although the deterioration in the employment 
situation was apparent in all branches of economic activity, it made itself 
especially felt in construction, a sector in which the proportion of unemployed 
went up from 1 3 % in 1982 to 2 1 % in 1983. 
Table 10 
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): EVOLUTION OF URBAN 
UNEMPLOYMENT IN SOME SECTORS OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 
(Average annual rates) 
Business Manufacturing Construction 
1980 1981 1982 1983° 1980 1981 1982 1983° 1980 1981 1982 1983° 
Costa Rica'' 3.4 5.1 8.8 7.9 5.2 7.1 10.0 7.3 5.6 11.7 15.0 14.6 
Chile' 6.4 5.9 14.5 16.0 11.9 11.8 26.7 25.9 16.5 16.4 49.4 49.0 
Peru'' 4.1 3.6 2.7 5.4 7.3 5.2 8.7 3.0 5.3 
Uruguay' 5.9 7.7 13.3 7.0 13.0 16.6 5.7 9.7 16.6 
Venezuela/ 4.6 4.8 5.6 7.4 7.9 7.8 8.0 12.4 11.7 11.8 12.9 20.8 
Source: ECLAC, on [he basis of official data. 
"Provisional figures. h Valle Central. Data for March in each year. 'Greater Santiago. Average for March,June, September and 
December. Data supplied by the Department of Economics of the Universidad de Chile. ^Metropolitan Lima. 1980, April; 1981 and 
1983, June. 'Montevideo. Average for four quarters. 'National total. Average for two semesters. 
6 According to official estimates, barely 8 0 % of industrial production capacity was in use in 1983, while the 
percentage of urban employment in low-productivity informal activities significantly increased. Reflecting the 
growth of employment in these latter, the proportion of the total number of employed persons represented by 
wage-earners dropped from 6 0 % at the beginning of 1983 to barely 5 7 % at the end of the year. 
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Table D-2 
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): NON-VOLUNTARY 
URBAN UNDEREMPLOYMENT 
(Average annual rates) 
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 ' 
Argentina' 6.5 4.1 5.2 4.0 5.6 6.4 6.8 4.8 
Bolivia' 43.9 46.1 48.5 50.9 53.5 
Colombia' 16.3 14.0 14.3 14.0 16.0 11.4 11.0 10.6 
Costa R i e / 9.3 8.1 10.0 13.8 15.6 19.3 24.2 17.7 
Peru8 32.7 39.2 43.7 44.1 41.4 40.3 43.9 46.3 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Percentage of the labour force whose working day is shorter than they would be willing for. Provisional figures. f Greater Buenos 
Aires. Average for April-October. ^National total. 'Bogota, Bairanquilla.Cali and Medellin. Average for March,June. September 
and December. 1983, March. /Urban national total. Average for March,July and November. 1983, March. 'National total. Non-
agricultural activities. 
Table 12 
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): TOTAL 
PARTICIPATION RATES" 
(Average annual rates) 
Country 1970 1976 1980 1981 1982 1983' 
Bolivia' 47.3'' 48.1 55.8 49.9 
Colombia' 49.8 54.4 52.3 53.0 54.6 
Costa Rica^ 44.9' ' 50.2 50.2 49.3 50.9 48.7 
Chile" 51.8 50.3 50.7 51.8 51.7 52.2 
Mexico' 50.9 50.1 50.1 49.5 46.8 
Uruguay1 48.5 52.8 56.4 54.6 56.6 56.9 
Venezuela^ 43.4 50.2 50.4 50.0 49.7 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of PREALC data and official figures. 
Economically active population as a percentage of population of working Jge, according to household survey data. The lower age limit varies 
slightly from one country to another (see the corresponding footnotes). Preliminary figures. 'National total. Lower age limit 
10 years, upper 64 years, Average annual estimate. According to data from the corres ponding national census. 'Barranquilla, 
Bogotá, Calí, and Medellin. Lower age limit 12 years. Average for March J u n e , September and December. ^National total. Lower age 
limit 12 years. March of each year. 'Greater Santiago. Lower age limit 14 years. Average for March, June, September and 
December. Metropolitan areas of México City, Guadalajara and Monterrey, lower age limit 12 years. Average for four 
quarters. National total. Lower age limit 14 years. Average for four quarters. ;National total. Lower age limit 15 years. First 
semester of each year. 
In Peru, too, the employment situation grew worse. As a result of the 
almost 1 2 % slump in global economic activity, open unemployment in Lima 
climbed from 7 % in 1982 to nearly 9 % in 1983, while urban underemployment 
reached the unprecedented level of over 46%. 
Although lower in absolute values, unemployment rates also rose 
significantly in Mexico and Paraguay. In the latter country, urban 
unemployment rose from 5 .6% in March 1982 to more than 8 % in December 
1983. 
In the principal cities of Mexico, in their turn, open unemployment went 
up from 4 % in 1982 to almost 7 % in 1983- The city hardest hit was Monterrey, 
where the rate of unemployment more than doubled, attaining a record average 
level of about 11%. The deterioration in the urban employment situation was 
also reflected in the above-mentioned drop in industrial employment, in the 
decline of the rate of participation (see table 12), and in the transfer of a 
considerable number of workers from the modern sector to the so-called 
informal activities. However, open unemployment in the three principal cities 
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decreased slightly in the last quarter of the year, partly thanks to emergency 
employment programmes.7 
In the case of Brazil, the methodological changes introduced in 1982 
preclude comparisons with preceding years. However, the quarterly evolution 
since that date shows a relative increase in urban unemployment, especially in 
the city of Recife. In Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro unemployment continued to 
hover between 6 % and 7 % throughout the year, which is surprising, since these 
are cities in which employment in industry carries a great deal of weight, and, 
given the marked contraction in this sector, a rise in unemployment rates might 
have been expected (see tables 7 and 9). 
Argentina, Costa Rica and Nicaragua, for their part, showed slight 
downward movements in 1983 in their respective rates of open unemployment, 
mainly in consequence of the recovery of economic activity in all these countries. 
Nevertheless, unemployment rates remained very high in Costa Rica and, 
particularly, in Nicaragua, where although the rate of urban unemployment fell 
by one percentage point between 1982 and 1983 it was the second highest in 
Latin America (see table 8). This modest decrease was essentially due to the 
increase of more than 5 % in the gross domestic product, and was also a 
consequence of the substantial rise in public employment and the expansion of 
urban informal activities. 
Urban unemployment also declined in Costa Rica, from an annual average 
of 1 0 % in 1982 to one of 8 % in 1983- In San Jose unemployment remained high 
during the first half of the year, fluctuating around 9%, but fell to 6 % in 
November. The most marked decrease occurred in manufacturing industry, 
where the unemployment rate dropped between 1982 and 1983 from 1 0 % to 
7%. In contrast, the proportion of unemployed workers was barely reduced at all 
in construction, and went down only a very little in the business sector. Another 
sign of improvement in the employment situation was a considerable decrease in 
urban underemployment, from 2 4 % in March 1982 to 1 8 % in March 1983 (see 
tables 10 and 11). These changes in the employment situation reflected a slight 
recrudescence of economic activity, after two years of sharp reduction. 
Lastly, during the second half of 1983 the reactivation of the economy also 
caused a decline in urban unemployment in Argentina. The most notable 
decrease took place in Greater Buenos Aires, where not only unemployment but 
also underemployment dropped steeply. According to provisional data,8 both 
the 3 % unemployment rate recorded in October 1983 in the capital and the rate 
of underemployment were the lowest observable since 1980. In contrast, in the 
other principal cities, the reduction in unemployment by the end of the year 
barely succeeded in offsetting the increases that had occurred in the first 
semester. The situation was particularly unfavourable in Cordoba, where 
unemployment continued to rise throughout the year and reached its highest 
level since 1977 (see figure 5). As a result of these changes, the average rate of 
urban unemployment fell from 5 .3% in 1982 to 4 . 6 % in 1983. This figure, while 
considerably higher than those prevailing during 1977-1980, was by far the 
lowest in Latin America in 1983. 
7 The Mexican Government put into practice several programmes of this type, both in urban and in rural 
areas. The aim was to provide training (in particular for persons looking for work for the first time) or temporary 
employment in various public or social utility projects (drinking-water, sewerage, housing, highways, etc.). 
Representing only 5 0 % of the sample customarily used. 
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Table D-2 
L A T I N A M E R I C A : E V O L U T I O N O F C O N S U M E R PRICES 
( Variations from December to December) 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Latin America" 57.8 62.2 40.0 39.0 54.1 52.8 60.8 85.8 131.4 
Count r ies wi th t radi t ion-
ally h igh inflat ion 68.9 74.5 47.1 45.7 61.9 61.5 71.7 102.8 156.6 
Argentina 334.9 347.5 150.4 169.8 139.7 87.6 131.2 209.7 433.7 
Bolivia 6.6 5.5 10.5 13.5 45.5 23.9 25.2 296.5 328.5 
Brazil 31.2 44.8 43.1 38.1 76.0 86.3 100.6 101.8 177.9 
Colombia' 17.9 25.9 29.3 17.8 29.8 26.5 27.5 24.1 16.5 
Chile 340.7 174.3 63.5 30.3 38.9 31.2 9.5 20.7 23.6 
Mexico 11.3 27.2 20.7 16.2 20.0 29.8 28.7 98.8 80.8 
Peru 24.0 44.7 32.4 73.7 66.7 59.7 72.7 72.9 125.1 
Uruguay 66.8 39.9 57.3 46.0 83.1 42.8 29.4 20.5 51.5 
Count r ies wi th t radi t ion-
ally moderate inflat ion 8.7 7.9 8.8 9.8 20.1 15.4 14.1 12.6 15.8 
Costa Rica 20.5 4.4 5.3 8.1 13.2 17.8 65.1 81.7 10.7 
Ecuador' 13.2 13.1 9.8 11.8 9.0 14.5 17.9 24.3 52.5 
El Salvador 15.1 5.2 14.9 14.6 14.8 18.6 11.6 13.8 15.5 
Guatemala 0.8 18.9 7.4 9.1 13.7 9.1 8.7 -2.0 8.1" 
Hait i -0.1 -1.4 5.5 5.5 15.4 15.3 16.4 8 . 0 ' 7.1' 
Honduras 7.8 5.6 7.7 5.4 18.9 15.0 9.2 9.4 10.2 
Nicaragua 1.9 6.2 10.2 4.3 70.3 24.8 23.2 22.2 37 .3 ' 
Panama 1.4 4.8 4.8 5.0 10.0 14.4 4.8 3.7 2.0 
Paraguay 8.7 3.4 9.4 16.8 35.7 8.9 8.1 8.9 14.1 
Dominican Republic 16.5 7.0 8.5 1.8 26.2 4.2 7.4 7.1 6.0 
Venezuela 8.0 6.9 8.1 7.1 20.5 19.6 10.8 7.9 7.0 
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistict, and ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
" D i e totals for Latin America and the partial figures for groups of countries correspond to the countries* price variations weighted, by each 
year's population. fcUp to 1980, represents the variation in the workers' consumer price index; from 1981 onwards, the variation in the 
national total, which includes workers and employees. ' U p to 1982, represents the variation in the consumer price index in the city 
of Quito; in 1983. the variation in the national total. 'Represents the variation between October 1983 and October 
1982. 'Represents the variation between September 1982.and September 1981. 'Represents the variation between September 
1983 and September 1982. 'Represents the variation between November 1983 and November 1982. 
D. PRICES A N D WAGES 
1. Prices 
Although economic activity declined and unemployment increased, and 
notwithstanding the weakening of external inflationary pressures, the rate of 
increase of prices continued to rise in most of the Latin American economies, 
and in the region as a whole reached a new àll-time high in 1983. The simple 
average rate of increase of consumer prices went up from 48% in 1982 to 66% in 
1983, and the rate weighted by the population soared from a little less than 86% 
in 1982 to 131% in 1983. 
Inflation speeded up particularly fast in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Peru, 
Ecuador and Uruguay; in Mexico, prices continued to increase at a very rapid 
rate. Inflation also worsened in most of the Central American economies, but 
particularly in Nicaragua and Guatemala. In contrast, it was spectacularly 
reduced in Costa Rica, underwent a moderate but steady decline in Colombia, 
and was very low in Panama (see table 13). 
Consumer prices continued to shoot up in Argentina, attaining a rate of 
over 430%, which more than doubled that of the preceding year and easily 
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exceeded the very high rates recorded in 1975 and 1976. This phenomena was 
linked, as in previous years, to the existence of a very considerable fiscal deficit 
and to the spread of more and more unfavourable expectations as to the future 
course of price levels. To the incidence of these factors was superadded the effect 
of the frequent wage and salary adjustments, which reached very considerable 
magnitudes, especially in the second half of the year, and helped to push up real 
wages. 
Inflation figures were likewise unprecedented in Bolivia, where consumer 
prices soared by almost 330%, on top of having already trebled in 1982. As can 
be seen in figure 6, the acceleration of inflation was particularly marked as from 
November, in which month the exchange rate was adjusted by 150% —after a 
year in which it had been pegged by the authorities— and when a rise of more 
than 70% in minimum wages was decreed. 
There was also a very marked intensification of inflation in Brazil. As a 
result of the massive public-sector deficit, of the maxidevaluation of the cruzeiro 
decreed in February and the continuous subsequent increases in the exchange 
rate, of the deterioration of the outlook and of the complex and generalized 
indexing system in force, consumer prices, which in 1981 and 1982 had risen at a 
rate of about 100%, went up by over 180% in 1983, while the overall price index 
was more than trebled. 
Galloping inflation was also the order of the day in Peru, where the annual 
rate of increase of consumer prices, after fluctuating around 70% in 1981 and 
1982, jumped to 125% in 1983. Special determinants of this notable increase 
were the policy of more rapid devaluation of the sol applied by the economic 
authorities until August, and also the sharp increases in food prices due to the 
poorer harvests caused by drought and floods. 
Although a great deal lower in absolute terms than in the four preceding 
countries, in relative terms the increase in inflation in Ecuador was greater; f rom 
24% in 1982 it rose to 52% in 1983. As in other countries, this acceleration of 
inflation was influenced by the devaluations of the sucre decreed as from 1982, 
after a long period of exchange stability; but another decisive factor was the 
reduction in supplies of agricultural products which was caused by floods, and 
which brought in its train unaccustomed increases in food prices. Towards the 
end of the year, however, the supply of these products became more normal, 
with the result that the consumer price index showed small decreases in 
November and December and the rising trend of the rate of inflation was 
abruptly reversed (see figure 7). 
The course followed by inflation was very similar in Uruguay, where the 
rate of price increases, after following a systematic downward trend between the 
beginning of I960 and November 1982, shot up again after the devaluation of 
the peso at the end of that month. Thus, the rate of inflation rose steadily and 
steeply during most of 1983, but was greatly reduced in December. Even so, the 
51% increase in consumer prices in 1983 more than doubled the corresponding 
figure for 1982. 
In Mexico, too, inflation remained very high during 1983, although its 
rates slowed down as from the middle of the year. As shown in figure 6, the 
annual rate of increase of consumer prices reached an all-time peak of almost 
120% in July, but subsequently declined almost continually, falling to 81% in 
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Figure 6 
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): TWELVE-MONTH 
VARIATIONS IN CONSUMER PRICE INDEX 
Source: E C L A C , on the basis o f of f ic ia l d a t a 
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December. This break in the inflationary trend was mainly attributable to the 
notable reduction of the fiscal deficit and the very restrictive wage policy applied 
by the economic authorities. 
The reversal of the inflationary trend was much more definite and 
spectacular in Costa Rica, a country where, as in Mexico, the rate of price 
increases had soared rapidly in 1982. As can be seen in figure 7, the rate of 
increase of consumer prices, after reaching an unprecedented level of close to 
110% in September 1982, declined exceptionally fast and persistently in the 
subsequent months, and by the end of 1983 has dropped below 11%. In fact, 
mainly as a result of the fixing of the exchange rate, of the restrictive wage policy 
applied and of a considerable expansion of the volume of imports, as from the 
middle of the year consumer prices were almost completely stabilized. 
The course followed by inflation during 1983 was more complex in Chile. 
Between June 1982 —the month in which the authorities decided to devaluate 
the peso after almost three years of exchange stability— and June 1983, the 
annual rate of increase of consumer prices climbed steadily from 4 % to 
Figure 7 
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): TWELVE-MONTH 
VARIATIONS IN CONSUMER PRICE INDEX 
Source: E C L A C , on the basis o f off ic ial data. 
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somewhat more than 32%. But the effects on the costs of tradeable goods 
produced by the abrupt upward movements of the exchange rate in the second 
half of 1982 gradually petered out and real wages and salaries went on 
decreasing; consequently, the pace of inflation began little by little to slacken as 
from August 1983, and fell below 23% by the end of the year. 
During 1983 inflation went on declining gradually but continuously in 
Colombia, the Latin American country in which the rate of increase of prices has 
been most stable in the last ten years. This slowdown of inflation took place 
despite the fact that, with a view to strengthening the balance of payments, the 
authorities speeded up the mini-devaluations of the peso. But the greater 
inflationary pressure that this might have caused was neutralized by the 
sluggishness of domestic demand. 
In Venezuela, likewise, the rate of increase of consumer prices was slightly 
reduced in 1983. They rose, in fact, by only 7%, notwithstanding the sharp 
devaluation of the bolivar at the end of February. The effects of this latter on 
consumer prices were mitigated by the maintenance of a preferential exchange 
rate for imports of essential goods, strict price controls in respect of these, 
reduction of previous years' stockpiles, a slump in domestic demand and a 
downward trend in wages. The impact of the raising of the exchange rate on 
costs was reflected, however, in the evolution of the wholesale price index, in 
which internationally tradeable products carried greater weight. Indeed, 
wholesale prices, which in 1982 had gone up only 6%, rose by over 10% in 1983 
and showed an upward trend which became particularly marked at the end of the 
second quarter of that year. 
In Paraguay, on the other hand, inflation notably accelerated its pace. After 
increasing by barely 4% in 1982, consumer prices rose by 14% in 1983. As in 
other countries, the increase in the rate of inflation was influenced by the raising 
of the exchange rate. The effects of the devaluation were combined with those of 
the abrupt reduction of the supply of agricultural products caused by adverse 
weather conditions —which stepped up food prices to a marked extent— and 
with the impact of the over-25% expansion of the means of payment generated 
by the significant increase in the credit granted to the central government. 
Lastly, price trends differed widely among the countries of Central 
America and the Caribbean, which have traditionally had moderate inflationary 
processes tending as a general rule to follow the variations in international 
inflation. Thus the rate of inflation increased to a marked extent in Nicaragua — 
from an average of 23% in 1980-1982 to 37% in 1983— and in Guatemala, 
where consumer prices rose by 8% after having decreased by 2% in 1982. In 
contrast, the rate of inflation did not vary very much in El Salvador and 
Honduras; it was spectacularly reduced, as has already been shown, in Costa 
Rica; it was very low in Panama; and it declined slightly for the third year 
running both in Haiti and in the Dominican Republic (see table 13). 
2. Wages and salaries 
As in previous years, the evolution of real wages and salaries was very unequal in 
Latin America, in accordance with the likewise widely differing paths followed 
by the countries of the region in respect of growth, employment, inflation and 
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wage policy. Of the countries for which relatively reliable statistical data are 
available, a majority (Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay) recorded 
substantial decreases both in average wages and salaries and in the minimum 
wages, mainly as a result of the contraction in internal economic activity and the 
acceleration of inflation. Similarly, in Ecuador and Mexico, countries for which 
statistical data are available only with respect to minimum wages, these suffered 
a marked reduction. In contrast, real salaries and wages continued to follow a 
moderate upward trend in Colombia, while they showed notable increases in 
Costa Rica and, above all, in Argentina (see tables 14 and 15 and figure 8). 
The most spectacular decreases —of about 20% for average wages and 
salaries and over 10% for minimum wages— occurred in Brazil and Uruguay. 
The deterioration in real wages and salaries began to make itself apparent on an 
unusually large scale in Uruguay as from the second half of 1982 and continued 
throughout the following year. This unfavourable trend was due in the first place 
to the abrupt drop in the gross domestic product, the negative effects of which 
were strengthened in 1983 by the impact of the marked acceleration of inflation. 
It was also influenced by the wage policy which formed part of the overall 
adjustment programme, and by virtue of which the salaries of public employees 
were frozen, compulsory adjustments in the private sector were suppressed and 
increases in the national minimum wage were made more moderate. This last, 
despite the intensive rate of inflation, was adjusted only twice in 1983 (by 15% 
in January and 33.5% in September). Moreover, these increases failed to match 
the rate of inflation, which meant that the real minimum wage fell by 10% in 
1983- The nominal rise in average wages and salaries was considerably lower, so 
that their purchasing power was lessened by 21 %. Since for several years both 
Table 14 
LATIN AMERICA: EVOLUTION OF REAL AVERAGE 
WAGES A N D SALARIES 
(1976 = 100) 
Country 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983° 
Argentina' 138.3 131.5 139.7 
Brazil' 78.1 85.7 86.4 
Colombia'' 117.4 98.3 105.2 
Costa Rica' 102.5 99.4 97.1 
Chile' 189.4 171.7 113.3 
Paraguay* 108.2 102.9 99.4 
Peru 110.1 
Uruguay' 144.2 118.5 115.0 
Argentina11 3-4 -4.9 6.2 
Brazil' 4.2 8.9 0.8 
Colombia'' -3.8 -16.5 7.0 
Costa Rica' 10.9 -3.0 -2.3 
Chile' 19.3 -9.3 -34.0 
Paraguay* -1.1 -4.9 -34 
Peru 
Uruguay' 5.1 -17.1 -3.8 
157.7 148.6 100.0 98.5 96.7 
88.3 96.8 100.0 104.6 112.7 
9 9 6 97.8 100.0 94.4 105.3 
91.6 88.3 100.0 109.4 119.0 
102.9 98.6 100.0 112.9 120.2 
95.0 94.9 100.0 95.4 98.8 
108.4 92.2 100.0 84.4 76.0 
116.5 106.2 100.0 88.1 84.9 
Percentage variation 
12.9 -5.9 -32.7 -1.5 -1.8 
2.2 9.6 3.3 4.6 7.7 
-5.3 -1.8 2.2 -5.6 11.5 
-5.6 -3.7 -13.2 9.4 8.8 
-9.1 -4.2 1.4 12.9 6.5 
-4.4 -0.1 5.3 -4.6 3.6 
-1.5 -14.9 8.5 -15.6 -9.9 
1.3 -8.8 -5.8 -11.9 - 3 6 
111.1 124.2 111.0 99.2 128.3 
116.3 122.5 129.4 140.0 113.0 
112.2 113.0 114.4 118.3 124.2 
124.7 125.7 110.9 89.1 97.7 
130.2 141.9 154.8 154.2 137.8 
92.4 93.0 98.0 95.4 88.6 
73.6 80.8 78.7 80.5 67.5 
78.0 77.8 83.6 8 3 3 66.0 
14.9 11.8 -10.6 -10.4 29.3 
3 2 5.3 5.6 8.2 -19.3 
6.5 0.8 1.4 3.7 5.0 
4.8 0.8 -11.8 -19.7 9.7 
8.3 9.0 9.1 -0.4 -10.6 
-6.5 0.7 5.3 -2.7 -7.1 
-3.2 9.9 -2.0 2.2 -16.1 
-8.1 -0.4 7.5 -0.3 -20.7 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
Provisional figures. Wages in manufacturing industry in the metropolitan area. 'Average wages in industry in 
general. Wages in manufacturing industry. 'Wages or salaries declared by affiliates of the social security 
system. ' W a g e s and salaries of workers and employees in the non-agricultural sectors, excluding large-scale copper mining and pulp 
and paper industries. "Wages in general for Asuncion. Wages in the private sector in the metropolitan area of 
Lima. 'Wages and salaries in the private and public sectors in Montevideo and the interior. 
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Table D-2 
LATIN AMERICA: EVOLUTION OF VALUE URBAN REAL MINIMUM WAGE 
(1980 = 100) 
Country 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983° 
Argentina' 104.0 99.7 81.0 92.1 100.0 105.6 105.5 166.6 
Brazil' 97.7 97.5 100.0 98.7 99:1 87.8 
Colombia1' 75.1 77.9 89.5 97.5 100.0 98.9 103.2 107.6 
Costa Rica' 79.5 86.2 96.0 98.5 100.0 90.5 85.7 99.3 
Chile' 67.5 120.9 100.7 99.8 100.0 99.2 97.2 78.3 
Ecuador^ 60.5 53.8 48.1 60.4 100.0 8 9 6 80.8 72.0 
Mexico® 113.5 112.5 108.6 107.2 100.0 97.6 93.4 71.9 
Paraguay' 100.6 92.0 94.8 92.4 100.0 103.2 101.1 93.6 
Peru' 107.3 94.2 72.3 80.8 100.0 84.7 80.0 79.7 
Uruguay'' 171.5 114.7 113.6 104.8 100.0 103.4 104.6 94.0 
Percentage variation 
Argentina -48.2 -4.1 -18.8 13.7 8.6 5.6 -0.1 57.9 
Brazil -0.2 2.6 -1.3 0.4 -11.4 
Colombia -6.2 3.7 13.1 10.7 2.5 -1.1 4.4 4.3 
Costa Rica 14.8 8.4 11.4 2.6 1.6 -9.5 -5.3 15.9 
Chile 17.9 26.5 -0.9 0.2 -0.8 -2.0 -19.5 
Ecuador -11.2 -10.6 25.7 65.5 -10.4 -9.9 -10.7 
Mexico 11.6 -0.9 -3.4 -1.3 -6.7 -2.4 -4.3 -23.0 
Paraguay -8.3 3.1 -2.5 8.2 3.2 -2.0 -7.5 
Peru -12.2 -23.2 11.7 23.8 -15.3 -5.4 -0.4 
Uruguay -3.1 -33.5 -0.5 -7.7 -4.6 3.4 1.2 -10.2 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
Provisional figures. National minimum wage. 'Minimum wage for the city of Rio de Janeiro, deflated by the corresponding 
CPI. Minimum wage for upper urban sectors. 'Minimum income. Minimum overall wage, calculated on the basis of 
annual minimum wages and legal supplementary benefits. 'National average minimum wage. Minimum wage in Asunción 
and Puerto Stroessner. 'Minimum wage in Lima for non-agricultural activities. 'National minimum wage for workers over 18 
years of age. 
real minimum wages and real average wages and salaries had been showing a 
persistent downward trend, the levels recorded in 1983 were the lowest in the 
last 15 years. 
In contrast, the slump in real wages and salaries in Brazil occurred in a very 
different context, as they had been increasing uninterruptedly up to 1982 (see 
figure 8). The decreases recorded in 1983 were equally spectacular, however, 
since average wages and salaries contracted by over 19%, while the minimum 
wage in Rio de Janeiro fell by 11%. 
As in the case of Uruguay, these reductions were particularly influenced by 
the speeding-up of inflation, which in 1983 reached rates never recorded in the 
country before. Other determinants were the changes in wage legislation, which 
was modified for the first time in January 1983 and again, after a long period of 
uncertainty and difficult internal negotiations, in November 1983.9 These 
reforms were aimed at bringing down the percentage levels of the six-monthly 
adjustment applicable to the different wage and salary steps. Thus, for wages and 
salaries amounting to less than three minimum wages, the percentage was 
reduced from 110 to 100% of the variation in the national consumer price index 
' T h e wage legislation in force since 1979 establishes a system of compulsory six-monthly adjustments, 
scaled in accordance with the ratio between the pay received and the minimum wage. It also provides for an 
additional increase if productivity rises. The latter, however, is largely determined by direct negotiations. 
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Figure 8 
LATIN AMERICA: EVOLUTION OF AVERAGE REAL WAGES AND SALARIES 
(Indexes 1976 •-100} 
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in January 1983.10 In turn, the adjustment percentages applied to wages and 
salaries exceeding three minimum wages were fixed at the beginning of the year 
at a level lower than the rate of inflation and were further reduced in November. 
The second reform in wage legislation consisted in the establishment of a ceiling 
for the increase under the head of productivity, in accordance with the variation 
in national per capita income in the preceding year. Since the ceiling was fixed at 
zero for 1982, in 1983 there was no increase on this account. 
As a result of these modifications, the rising trend that average real wages 
and salaries had been showing since the beginning of the 1970s was abruptly 
reversed, and as from June 1983 they began to fall steeply. Thus, by the end of the 
year their level was barely equivalent to that recorded in 1980. As for the salaries 
of public employees, which are not regulated by wage legislation, they were 
accorded nominal increases considerably lower than the rate of inflation, 
whereby they dropped 20% in real terms. 
Furthermore, with a view to gradually establishing a single minimum 
wage for the whole country, in May the number of different areas considered was 
further reduced, so that thenceforward only two levels were differentiated.11 
The policy of granting two six-monthly adjustments (in May and November) 
equivalent to the variation in the national consumer price index was maintained. 
But since the increase in prices in the principal Brazilian cities was 
proportionally higher, in all those urban centres the real minimum wage 
decreased. The sharpest drops occurred in the Federal District (-16%) and 
Recife (-17%), the two urban areas where the rates of inflation were highest. 
The notable acceleration of inflation in 1983 also contributed to the 16% 
decrease in average wages and salaries in Peru, which brought these down to 
their lowest level in the last 10 years. The worst deteriorations (-29% and -28%, 
respectively) corresponded to the construction and business sectors, which were 
especially affected by the slump in economic activity. In manufacturing industry, 
too, real wages declined to a marked extent (-21%). The reductions were 
smaller, although substantial, in the other sectors, ranging from 13% in the 
banking sector to 8% in non-government services. 
Average wages and salaries, however, did not follow the same behaviour 
pattern throughout the year. They were reduced by 21 % during the first half of 
the year, but in the last quarter rose by 3%. This was due partly to the slowing-
down of the rate of inflation in the last months of the year, and partly to the 
granting of a blanket wage increase of 15%, which had not been originally 
programmed. 
In contrast, the purchasing power of the average minimum wage scarcely 
varied at all in 1983. Thanks to the special 60% bonus granted in March, it 
considerably increased in real terms during the second quarter of the year (see 
figure 9). The three subsequent adjustments,12 however, did not suffice to offset 
10 This index also serves as a basis for the entire indexing system applied in Brazil. It should be noted that 
during 1983 the government, in calculating the variation in this index, excluded price increases attributable to the 
incidence of factors considered as exceptional or accidental (for example, those caused by the shortage of 
agricultural supplies due to floods in the south of the country). Naturally, this procedure reduced the size of 
automatic wage adjustments. 
" U p to May 1983, for the purpose of fixing minimum wages, three areas had been differentiated: firstly, 
the south and south-east region plus the Federal District; secondly, the states of Bahia, Pernambuco, and the rest of 
the central zone; and lastly, the remainder of the north-east. The legal minimum wage for these last two areas was 
unified as from May 1983. 
'^Nineteen per cent in July, 10% in September and 8%' in November. 
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Figure 9 
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): TWELVE-MONTH 
VARIATION IN REAL WAGE AND SALARIES 
Average wage in manufacturing sector 
— — — Minimum urban wage 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of table 15 and official data. 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
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the effect of inflation, so that during the following months the purchasing power 
of the minimum wage gradually declined. 
In Chile, too, the decrease in real salaries and wages was very marked, 
inasmuch as average wages were reduced by 10%, and minimum income by 
almost 20% (see tables 14 and 15). This unfavourable trend was due, in the first 
place, to the sharp contraction in the gross domestic product which took place in 
1982, and which, together with the restrictive wage policy, meant that as from 
the second half of 1982 real salaries and wages dropped steeply. This 
deterioration, however, was to some extent slowed down by the subsequent 
moderation of the rate of inflation, by the modest recrudescence of domestic 
economic activity during the second half of 1983 and by a slight relaxation of 
wage policy during the same period. From April onwards, public employees 
received several special bonuses.15 Then, in July, a nominal adjustment of 5% in 
their salaries was decreed, as well as in those of other workers not subject to 
collective renegotiation. Lastly, in December a Christmas box equivalent to 15% 
of the corresponding salary was paid. Thus the index of average wages and 
salaries declined more gently, and even rose a little in the last months of the year. 
Thus, at the end of 1983 its level was almost the same as that recorded twelve 
months before (see figure 9.) 
The biggest drop in average wages and salaries occurred in the 
manufacturing sector, where they fell by over 17%. Employees in the service 
sector, for their part, suffered an 8% reduction of their salaries, and at the same 
time real wages in mining declined by 6%. 
The minimum wage, in its turn, decreased by nearly 20%, since its 
nominal amount was frozen for two whole years (from July 1981 to July 1983) 
and subsequently benefited only by an increase of 5 % in nominal terms. 
In Paraguay both average wages and salaries and minimum wages fell by 
over 7%. In the case of the former, this downward movement was mainly 
attributable to the acceleration of inflation, since, in general, higher nominal 
increases were granted than in the preceding year. Thanks in part to these 
increments, the real wages of agricultural day-labourers actually rose slightly (by 
1%) and the reduction in real wages in the basic services sector was only 1%. In 
other activities, however, wages and salaries deteriorated a good deal. This 
happened particularly in the manufacturing and construction sectors, which 
were those hardest hit by the recession, and in which average real wages and 
salaries fell by 8% and 12%, respectively. Although no precise data are available 
on average salaries and wages of public employees, it may be assumed that they 
declined still more sharply, since no adjustments were granted in 1983. 
The same restrictive wage policy that had frozen the minimum wage from 
May 1981 was maintained until August 1983. At that time a nominal increase of 
10% was granted, which was equivalent to barely half the cumulative rate of 
inflation during that period. Consequently, this adjustment did not suffice to 
offset the loss of purchasing power completely, and the average minimum wage 
dropped by 7% in 1983 in relation to the preceding year. 
Where Ecuador and Mexico are concerned, the statistical data available 
only make it possible to show the very considerable deterioration undergone in 
B In April they were granted a special bonus of 30%, to be paid in the months of April, September and 
November. In practice, half the bonus corresponding to the month of November was paid in advance in October. 
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both countries by real minimum wages. But because of the impact of the 
recession in the two economies, and considering the usual backwash of the 
evolution of the legal minimum wage on the other wages, it may be assumed that 
average wages and salaries also dropped sharply in those countries in 1983. 
In Mexico the decline in the real minimum wage was of unwonted 
magnitude (-23%), bringing it down to the equivalent of barely three-quarters 
of its level ten years before. This decrease reflected at one and the same time the 
application of a restrictive wage policy and the persistence of a high rate of 
inflation. In practice, the 25% and 16% increases granted in January and June 
failed to counterbalance the deterioration undergone by the real minimum wage 
and were quickly absorbed by higher price increases than had initially been 
foreseen. 
In Ecuador, in turn, the rate of inflation more than doubled in 1983 and 
rapidly eroded the effect of the minimum wage adjustment which had been 
granted in November 1982. Neither did the further increase accorded in July 
1983 suffice to compensate the loss of purchasing power. Consequently, in 1983 
a reduction of the average minimum wage by nearly 11 % in real terms was 
superadded to the decreases of similar proportions recorded in the two 
preceding years. Thus the minimum wage dropped by more than one-third in 
the space of barely three years, so that most of the substantial increase (65%) it 
had enjoyed in 1980 was cancelled out (see table 15). 
In contrast, real wages and salaries rose in 1983 in Argentina, Colombia 
and Costa Rica. 
Although in Colombia the increases were moderate in comparison with 
those shown by the other two countries, the 5 % rise in the real wages of workers 
in the manufacturing sector appreciably speeded up their growth rate. As in the 
preceding year, the increase in the salaries of industrial employees was 
somewhat smaller, although not insignificant (4%). The daily wage of 
agricultural workers was raised on an average by about 1%, the biggest 
increments appearing in temperate-zone agricultural activities. In contrast, the 
purchasing power of wages and salaries paid in the business sector remained 
completely static. Lastly, real minimum wages increased by 4%, thanks to the 
nominal adjustment of 25% —equivalent to the rise in consumer prices during 
1982— granted in January, and to the slowing-down of the rate of inflation in 
1983. 
The upward trend of wages and salaries was more marked in Costa Rica, 
where average wages increased by almost 10% and the minimum wage by 16%. 
A contributing factor, in addition to the modest growth of the gross domestic 
product by 1%, was the notable decrease in the average rate of inflation, which 
dropped from 90% to 33%. By virtue of this slackening of the pace of inflation, 
average wages and salaries, which rose by 50% in nominal values, increased in 
real terms by 10%, the highest rate since 1971. However, owing to the 
substantial reductions they had undergone in the two preceding years (-12% and 
-19%, respectively) their purchasing power was barely as much as 78% of what 
it had been in 1980. In contrast, the urban minimum wage, which went up by 
nearly 16% in real terms, regained its 1980 level. 
Nevertheless, the most spectacular increases in real wages and salaries 
were recorded in Argentina. Average wages in the manufacturing sector shot up 
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by over 29%, so that the downward movements that had occurred in the two 
precending years were easily counterbalanced and the level reached was the 
highest since 1976 (see table 14). Consequently the participation of wage-
earners in the gross domestic product at factor cost rose from 32.5% in 1982 to 
40% in 1983. 
Furthermore, the recovery in real wages and salaries was widespread 
throughout all the economic sectors. Workers in public enterprises, whose 
wages had been frozen since the beginning of 1982, enjoyed the biggest increase 
(42%). Wages and salaries in the rest of the public sector went up by 11%, while 
salaries in the business sector rose by 23%. 
This evolution of real wages reflected, in the first place, the effect of an 
expansionary wage policy, to which were added the repercussions of the 
recrudescence of economic activity. The policy in question was expressed, on the 
one hand, in regular increases in negotiated basic wages. Up to September the 
adjustments were granted quarterly and fluctuated around 11%. During the 
fourth quarter, the acceleration of inflation, together with stronger trade-union 
pressure, led to the granting of at once more frequent and more considerable 
increases (18% in October, 16% in November and a fixed sum of 1 200 pesos in 
December). 
Moreover, an attempt was made to appreciably improve the lowest level of 
income, to which end a much more expansionary policy was pursued with regard 
to family allowances and minimum wages. The latter were favoured with 
nominal increases of a much larger proportion than was accorded to other 
incomes,14 with the result that they rose on an average by 58% in real terms and 
attained the highest level they had reached in the previous decade (see table 15). 
E. T H E E X T E R N A L SECTOR 
In 1983 Latin America made an enormous effort to reduce the imbalances which 
had been piling up in the external sector since the end of the 1970s. Thus, in 1983 
the rises in exchange rates to which many countries resorted in 1982 were 
reinforced by further devaluations, various other measures to restrict imports 
and encourage exports, and stringent fiscal, monetary and wage policies, directed 
towards reducing domestic expenditure. 
As a result of these adjustment policies, and not withstanding the 
unfavourable evolution of world trade, in 1983 the region obtained an enormous 
surplus on trade in goods, very significantly lessened the negative balance on 
current account, and reduced, likewise considerably, the size of the balance-of-
payments deficit. 
1. Foreign trade 
However, as already noted, the surplus of almost US$ 30 billion obtained in 1983 
on trade in goods was due exclusively to a new and drastic curtailment of 
imports, of which the total value fell by 30%, after having decreased by 19% in 
1982. On the other hand, the value of exports, which in that year had dropped by 
8.5%, declined by about 2% in 1983. 
14 Respectively, 25% injanuary,40% in April, 57% in July, 45% in September, 12.5% in October and 55% 
in December. 
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a) Exports of goods 
As in 1982, the reduction in the value of external sales occurred in spite of 
an increase in the volume exported. The latter, which had expanded at an 
exceptionally high and sustained annual rate of approximately 9% between 
1976 and 1981, and which, notwithstanding the international recession, had 
increased by just under 2% in 1982, rose by nearly 8% in 1983 (see table 16). 
Table 16 
L A T I N A M E R I C A : V A R I A T I O N I N E X P O R T S A N D I M P O R T S O F G O O D S 
(Growth rates) 
Exports Imports 
Value Volume Unit value Value 
Volume Unit value 
Latin America 
1970 9.2 1.0 8.1 14.2 9.2 4.5 
1971 3.0 1.1 1.9 10.1 6.1 4.7 
1972 16.4 6.6 9.2 14.8 7.1 6.3 
1973 44.3 8.5 33.0 32.8 13.2 17.3 
1974 54.7 -1.8 57.5 71.8 26.4 36.0 
1975 -7.8 -2.1 -5.8 6.5 -2.3 8.9 
1976 16.4 7.6 8.2 3.8 0.4 3 5 
1977 19.3 7.7 10.9 15.0 10.1 4.5 
1978 7.5 11.6 -3.7 13.9 5.7 7.7 
1979 34.6 11.1 21.1 25.8 8.0 16.4 
1980 29.3 6.4 21.6 32.4 12.2 17.7 
1981 7.3 11.6 -3.8 7.8 2.0 5.6 
1982 -8.5 1.7 -10.1 -19.2 -17.9 -1.6 
1983° -1.7 7.7 -8.7 -29.6 -28.4 -1.7 
Oi l -expor t ing countries 
7.8 2.7 4.9 1970 8.9 5.4 3.3 
1971 16.4 -1.2 17.8 11.9 7.8 3.8 
1972 4.4 -0.2 4.6 13.3 5.7 7.2 
1973 51.4 9.3 38.5 21.0 10.6 9.3 
1974 131.2 -10.0 156.8 57.8 37.5 14.7 
1975 -19.9 -21.5 2.1 36.7 21.7 12.4 
1976 9.2 2.9 6.2 7.4 3.0 4.3 
1977 12.3 6.0 5.9 18.8 11.8 6.2 
1978 8.4 15.0 -5.8 16.7 8.1 8.0 
1979 5 3 8 14.5 34.4 16.1 3.8 11.9 
1980 42.2 5.8 34.3 32.4 15.3 14.9 
1981 9.6 8.0 1.4 20.3 11.6 7.8 
1982 -5.7 11.8 -15.6 -20.0 -20.9 0.0 
1983" -6.1 6.2 -11.6 -45.0 -42.6 -4.2 
Non-o i l -expor t ing countries 
10.6 4.6 1970 9.2 -0.2 9.5 15.5 
1971 -0.8 1.7 -2.5 10.9 5.8 4.9 
1972 20.4 8.5 11.1 13.9 7.3 6.1 
1973 42.2 8.3 31.3 35.2 13.8 18.8 
1974 31.0 0.3 30.6 74.3 24.2 40.3 
1975 -1.2 2.4 -3.6 1.7 -7.3 9.6 
1976 21.9 9.6 11.2 1.4 -2.0 3.5 
1977 24.2 8.4 14.6 12.5 8.6 3.6 
1978 7.0 10.2 -3.0 11.8 3.5 8.1 
1979 22.3 9.7 11.5 33.2 12.0 18.7 
1980 19.2 6.6 11.8 32.3 9.9 20.4 
1981 5.2 13.1 -7.0 -0.7 -7.1 6.8 
1982 -11.3 -2.4 -9.1 -18.7 -15.5 -3-7 
1983° 2.8 8,3 -5.1 -17.2 -12.9 -4.9 
Source: "ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
'Provisional figures. ' U p to 1975, Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela are included; from 1976 onwards, Mexico and Peru are added. 
' A s from 1976, Mexico and Peru are excluded. 
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Table D-2 
L A T I N A M E R I C A : E X P O R T S OJj G O O D S 
(Indexes: 1970 = 100, and growth rates) 
Value Unit value Quantum 
Index Growt rates Index Growth rates Index Growth rates 
1983" 1981 1982 1983° 1983" 1981 1982 1983" 1983" 1981 1982 1982 
Latin America 619 7.3 -8.5 -1.7 295 -3.8 -10.1 -8.7 210 11.6 1.7 7. 
Oil-exporting 
countries 763 9.6 -5.7 -6.1 455 1.4 -15.6 -11.6 168 8.0 11.8 6. 
Bolivia 397 -3.5 -9.0 8.6 411 -3.3 -3.5 2.2 97 -0.2 5.7 -10. 
Ecuador 1 007 -7.9 0.9 452 -4.0 -7.7 -7.8 223 4.2 -0.2 9. 
Mexico 1 587 24.1 6.5 0.8 348 4.5 -13.0 -10.5 456 18.8 22.4 12. 
Peru 287 -16.7 -0.6 -8.1 291 -11.2 -10.4 3.6 99 -6.2 11.0 -11. 
Venezuela 530 4.8 -18.2 -15.5 1149 10.8 -5.1 -12.0 46 -5.4 -13.8 -4. 
Non-oil exporting 
countries 524 5.2 -11.3 2.8 221 -7.0 -9.1 -5.1 238 13.1 -2.4 8. 
Argentina 435 14.0 -16.9 1.5 243 -2.4 -12.0 -7.4 179 16.8 -5.6 9. 
Brazil 800 15.6 -13.3 8.6 224 -7.5 -7.2 -5.9 357 25.0 -6.6 15. 
Colombia 383 -20.8 10.3 -15.0 289 -17.7 8.9 -4.0 133 -3.8 1.2 -11. 
Costa Rica 368 0.2 -13.1 -2.3 243 -10.0 -5.5 -2.2 -152 11.3 -8.1 -0. 
Chile 344 -18.5 -3.4 3.3 134 -15.3 -16.7 -0.1 256 -3.8 16.0 3. 
El Salvador 310 -25.8 -11.8 4.0 276 -8.3 4.8 -5.5 112 -19.1 -15.8 10. 
Guatemala 367 -14.5 -7.6 -9.1 256 -4.0 -6.6 2.4 143 -11.0 -1.1 -11. 
Haiti 484 -30.3 15.5 9.0 261 -6.4 1.0 -4.1 186 -25.5 14.4 13. 
Honduras 395 -7.8 -13.7 4.1 267 -8.0 -4.0 -2.0 148 -0.2 -10.0 6. 
Nicaragua 230 11.0 -18.4 0.9 190 -8.0 -6.0 -9.6 121 20.6 -13.2 11. 
Panama 243 -8.3 0.4 -8.1 248 2.7 -15.1 0.6 98 -10.7 18.3 -a 
Paraguay 523 -0.4 -0.6 -13.8 255 7.9 -12.7 -9.3 205 -7.7 15.9 -4. 
Dominican Republic 366 235 -35.4 2.0 249 7.4 -30.0 6.9 147 15.0 -7.7 -4. 
Uruguay 502 -16.2 -2.2 -10.4 233 -2.1 -6.5 -7.3 216 18.7 9.3 -3. 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
'Provisional figures. 
This increment, like those in preceding years, easily exceeded the increase in the 
volume of world trade and reflected, in essence, the considerable adjustment 
effort that had been made in 1983 by many Latin American economies through 
measures designed to reduce domestic expenditure and modify the relative 
prices of tradeable and non-tradeable goods. 
However, the significant increment in the quantum of exports did not 
derive from a region-wide trend. In fact, in 1983 the number of countries in 
which the volume of exports contracted was the same as that in which it 
expanded. Outstanding among the latter instances were the considerable 
increases in the export quantum achieved by the three biggest Latin American 
economies —Brazil (15%), Mexico (12.5%) and Argentina (9.5%)—as well as 
those recorded by Haiti, Nicaragua, El Salvador and Ecuador. In contrast, the 
volume of exports showed considerable decreases, of about 11%, in Colombia, 
Peru, Guatemala and Bolivia (see table 17). 
In the region as a whole, however, the effect of the expansion of the export 
quantum was more than counteracted by the impact of the decline in their unit 
value. As can be seen in table 16, this latter dropped sharply for the third year in 
succession, so that the cumulative reduction in the last three-year period 
amounted to 20%. Although the further decrease in the unit value of exports in 
1983 was decisively influenced by the fall in petroleum international prices, 
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allowance must also be made for the effect of lower international quotations for 
products of great importance among the region's exports, such as coffee, wheat, 
wool, iron, bauxite and other minerales. Moreover, the substantial increases in 
the international prices of bananas, cocoa, maize, fish meal, soya, cotton and 
copper in 1983 were far from offsetting, except in the case of the first of these 
products, the enormous reductions they had suffered in preceding years (see 
table 18). 
In these circumstances, the total value of exports of goods fell by almost 
2% in Latin America as a whole and 6% in the oil-exporting countries. On the 
contrary, in the group formed by the other economies of the region the value of 
external sales went up by nearly 3%- But this increase —entirely attributable to 
the vigorous expansion of the volume of exports— only partly compensated for 
the decline of more than 11% undergone by the value of exports in 1982. 
Furthermore," the increase in question derived mainly from the considerable 
upswing (8.5%) in Brazil's external sales in 1983. In the remaining economies of 
the region, with the sole exception of Haiti, the value of exports rose only 
moderately or very sharply decreased (see table 17). 
Table 18 
LATIN AMERICA: PRICES OF MAIN E X P O R T PRODUCTS 
Annual averages in dollars Growth rates 
1970-
1980 1981 
1982 1983 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Unrefined sugar" 12.8 16.9 8.4 8.5 95.9 -41.1 -50.3 1.2 
Coffee (mild)" 121.8 145.3 148.6 141.6 -2.5 -18.7 2.3 -4.7 
Cocoa" 86.3 94.2 79.0 96.1 21.0 -20.2 -16.1 21.6 
Bananas" 11.8 19.2 18.4 20.4 21.2 1.6 -4.2 10.9 
Wheat ' 125.1 178.5 163.0 160.0 7.9 0.6 -8.7 -1.8 
Maize' 127.5 181.0 137.4 162.2 35.9 -13.9 -24.1 18.0 
Beef" 82.2 112.2 108.4 110.7 -3.8 -10.9 3.4 2.1 
Fish meal' 354.7 468.0 353.0 453.0 27.6 -7.1 -24.6 28.3 
Soya beans' 232.4 288.0 245.0 282.0 -0.7 -2.7 -14.9 15.1 
Cotton" 61.2 85.3 72.8 84.8 21.7 -9.5 -14.7 16.5 
Wool" 131.5 178.2 154.6 144.0 2.1 -8.4 -13.2 -6.9 
Copper" 69.6 79.0 67.2 72.2 9.6 -19.9 -14.9 7.4 
T in ' 3.9 6.4 5.8 5.9 8.6 -15.8 -9.4 1.7 
Iron o re ' 18.3 25.9 27.1 25.2 20.4 -10.4 4.6 -7.0 
Lead" 25.3 33.0 24.8 193 24.7 -19.7 -24.8 -22.2 
Zinc" 29.7 38.4 33.8 34.7 3.0 11.0 -12.0 2.7 
Bauxite' 103.5 216.3 208.3 179.5 39.3 1.8 -3.7 -13.8 
Crude oil'' 
Saudi Arabia 10.0 32.5 33.5 29.3 68.8 13.2 3.1 -12.5 
Venezuela 10.1 32.0 32.0 28.1 64.3 15.9 0.0 -12.2 
Source: UNCTAD, Monthly Bulletin of Commodity Prices. Supplement 1960-1980 andjune 1984. International Monetary Fund, International 
Financial Statistic!, Yearbook 1981 andjune 1984. 
Note : Unrefined sugar FOB Caribbean ports, for export to the free market. Coffee, Columbian mild arabica.ex-iiock New York. Cocoa beans, 
average daily price (futures), New York/London. Central American bananas, C1F Hamburg. Cotton, Mexican M 1-3/32", C1F, 
Northern turope. Wool , clean, combed, 50's quality, United Kingdom. Beef, frozen, boneless, all sources, United States ports. Fish 
meal, all sources, 6 4 - 6 5 % protein, CIF Hamburg. Wheat, United States, N° 2, Hard Red Winter, FOB. Maize, Argentina, CIF, North Sea 
ports. Soyabeans, United States, NQ 2, yellow, in bulk, CIF Rotterdam. Copper, T i n , lead and zinc, cash quotations on the London Metal 
Exchange. Iron ore, Canada, c .64% Fe, CIF, North Sea ports. Bauxite, Guyana. (Baltimore). Oi l , Venezuela (Tia Juana). 
"U.S. cents per pound. ^Dollars per ton. 'Dollars per pound. ''Dollars per barrel. 
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Table 55 
L A T I N A M E R I C A : I M P O R T S O F G O O D S 
iIndexes: 1970 = 100 and growth rates) 
Value Unit value Quantum 
Index Growth rates Index Growth rates Index Growth rates 
1983° 1981 1982 1983° 1983° 1981 1982 1983" 1983° 1981 1982 1983° 
Latin America 426 7.8 -19.2 -29.6 315 5.6 -1.6 -1.7 135 2.0 -17.9 -28.4 
Oil-exporting 
countries 376 20.3 -20.0 -45.0 263 7.8 - -4.2 143 11.6 -20.0 -42.6 
Bolivia 356 -37.0 12.4 297 1.9 -2.6 -3.3 120 -1.9 -35.3 16.2 
Ecuador 564 5.3 -7.6 -35.4 244 6.7 -1.0 231 -1.3 -7.6 -34.8 
Mexico 345 27.2 -38.9 -46.5 270 5.5 6.1 -7.3 128 20.5 -43.4 -42.3 
Peru 382 24.1 -0.4 -29.5 308 7.8 2.0 3.3 124 15.1 -2.3 -31.8 
Venezuela 387 11.5 12.0 -51.1 243 11.9 -5.7 -5.3 160 -0.4 18.8 -48.4 
Non-oil-exporting 
countries 459 -0.7 -18.7 -17.2 352 6.8 -3.7 -4.9 130 -7.1 -15.5 -12.9 
Argentina 274 • 10.2 -42.2 -15.9 307 2.4 -5.1 -4.4 89 -12.4 -39.1 -12.0 
Brazil 615 -3.8 -12.2 -20.5 421 10.9 -3.6 -6.0 146 -13.2 -8.9 -15.4 
Colombia 581 10.8 25.3 -21.9 254 6.2 -6.3 229 4.3 31.0 -16.7 
Costa Rica 311 -20.7 -28.4 14.6 354 5.0 5.3 2.8 8.8 -24.5 -32.0 11.5 
Chile 325 19.1 -44.1 -22.7 368 7.5 -7.7 -7.9 8.8 10.8 -39.4 -16.0 
El Salvador 412 0.2 -8.1 -2.8 334 4.9 5.7 1.7 124 -4.5 -130 -4.4 
Guatemala 405 4.6 -16.6 -15.9 347 4.6 3.3 117 -21.6 -18.6 
Haiti 656 12.3 -17.4 5.8 331 3.2 2.4 198 8.8 -22.7 3.4 
Honduras 359 -5.8 -24.2 7.4 312 5.8 1.0 -1.0 115 -10.9 -25.0 8.5 
Nicaragua 426 14.9 -21.6 5.2 353 3.8 5.3 3.1 121 10.7 -25.5 2.0 
Panama 376 9.4 -13.5 434 2.9 1.6 87 6.4 -4.6 -14.9 
Paraguay 914 14.4 -7.9 -1.6 320 3.2 3.7 -3.9 285 10.8 -11.2 2.4 
Dominican Republic 466 -4.5 -13.4 3.2 319 3.6 2.2 -1.7 146 -7.8 -15.3 4.9 
Uruguay 348 -4.6 -34.8 -32.0 325 10.9 -7.1 -8.4 107 -13.9 -298 -25.8 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Provisional figures. 
b) Imports 
As in 1982, the fall in the value of imports was much more marked than 
the decline in that of exports. As already noted, the value of external purchases, 
which in 1982 had been radically reduced by more than 19%, was lowered in 
1983 in the even higher proportion of almost 30%. Thus, the total value of 
imports of goods, which had climbed vigorously and uninterruptedly between 
1970 and 1981, dropped by over 43% in the course of the last two years. 
Furthermore, since both in 1982 and 1983 the unit value of imports declined only 
slightly, the decreases in the quantum of imports were almost as drastic as those 
in their total value. Such, in fact, was the scale of this contraction that in 1983 the 
volume of imports was not only much lower than in any of the eight preceding 
years, but scarcely exceeded that recorded in 1974. 
Besides being precipitous, the drop in the quantum of imports was very 
widespread, which meant that there was a recurrence of the situation that had 
occurred in 1982. The volume of external purchases shrank in 1983 by over 25 % 
in five countries, and between 12% and 20% in another six, it expanded only in 
Bolivia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua and 
Paraguay. Even in this last group of countries, however, the increase in the 
volume of imports was not enough to make up for the big reductions it had 
undergone in 1982 (see table 19). 
But the contraction in imports was particularly severe in the oil-exporting 
countries. Thus their quantum diminished by almost 50% in Venezuela, more 
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than 40% for the second year running in Mexico and about 33% in Ecuador 
and Peru. The decrease was also very substantial in Uruguay —where the 
volume of imports, which had already declined by over 40% in the two preceding 
years, dropped by 26% in 1983— and in Brazil, Chile and Guatemala, countries 
where imports fell between 15% and 19% in real terms, after having dwindled 
considerably in the two preceding years. 
c) The terms of trade and the purchasing power of exports 
Albeit in 1983 the unit value of imports decreased for the second year in 
succession, their downward movement (-2%) was much less than the fall in 
average export prices (-9%). Latin America's terms of trade therefore declined 
by 7%, after reductions of about 9% both in 1981 and in 1982 (see table 20). As 
in 1982, the deterioration in the terms of trade was more pronounced in the oil-
exporting countries than in the group formed by the remaining economies of the 
region. But as in the latter the terms of trade had seriously worsened in the five 
preceding years, the index was not only 29% lower in 1983 than in 1978, but was 
also the lowest in the last half century. In 1980-1983 it averaged considerably less 
than in 1931-1933, years which represented the most critical phase of the Great 
Depression. 
On the contrary, among the oil-exporting countries the deterioration of 
the terms of trade during the last three years did not completely counteract the 
notable progress they had made in the two-year period 1979-1980 as a result of 
the second series of increases in international oil prices. Thus, in all these 
economies except that of Peru, the terms-of-trade index was still much higher 
than in any of the non-oil-exporting countries, and the average level of the terms 
of trade in the group as a whole almost trebled the average index for the non-oil-
exporters in 1983 (see table 21). 
Table 20 
LATIN AMERICA: TERMS O F T R A D E (GOODS) 
(1970 = 100) 
Latin America Oil-exporting Non-oil-exporting 
Year countries" countries' 
Index Variation Index Variation Index Variation 
1970 100.0 3.4 100.0 -1.6 100.0 4.8 
1971 97.3 -2.7 1135 13.5 92.9 -7.1 
1972 100.0 2.8 110.7 -2.5 97.3 4.7 
1973 113.4 13.4 140.2 26.6 107.6 10.6 
1974 131.3 15.8 313.8 123.8 100.1 -7.0 
1975 113.6 -13.5 285.1 -9.1 88.1 -12.0 
1976 118.8 4.6 290.4 1.9 94.6 7.4 
1977 126.0 6.1 289.6 -0.3 104.7 10.7 
1978 112.6 -10.6 252.9 -12.7 94.0 -10.2 
1979 117.2 4.1 303.8 20.1 88.2 -6.2 
1980 121.1 3.3 355.5 17.0 82.0 -7.0 
1981 110.3 -8.9 335.5 -5.6 71.3 -13.0 
1982 100.8 -8.6 283.1 -15.6 67.3 -5.6 
1983' 93.6 -7.1 261.2 -7.7 67.2 -0.1 
Source : ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
From 1970 to 1975, includes Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela; as from 1976, Mexico and Peru are added. From 1976onwards , Mexico 
and Peru are excluded. 'Provis ional figures. 
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Table 55 
LATIN AMERICA: TERMS OF TRADE (GOODS) 
(Indexes: 1970 = 100 and growth rates) 
Indexes Growth rates 1979/ 
1983° 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983" 1980 1981 1982 1983° 
Latin America 114 126 117 110 94 3.3 -8.9 -8.6 -7.1 -17 
Oil -export ing 
-15.6 countries 189 192 202 222 173 17.0 -5.9 -7.7 3 
Bolivia 111 120 118 132 138 17.7 -5.0 -1.0 5.6 15 
Ecuador 162 199 214 215 185 11.9 -10.0 -7.7 -6.8 6 
Mexico 106 123 133 162 129 23.7 -1.0 -18.0 -3.5 8 
Peru 104 102 117 107 95 11.4 -17.6 -12.1 0.2 9 
Venezuela 340 348 406 506 473 26.0 -1.0 0.6 -7.1 52 
Non-oi l -expor t ing 
-5.6 countries 82 98 82 66 63 -7.1 -13.1 -0.2 -29 
Argentina 99 86 80 88 79 16.3 -4.7 -7.2 -3.2 0 
Brazil 85 100 79 55 53 -15.7 -17.0 -3.8 0.0 -39 
Colombia 82 190 130 98 114 -3.1 -22.5 13.9 2.4 -24 
Costa Rica 77 121 97 80 69 -3.8 -14.3 -10.2 -4.9 -30 
Chile 52 51 52 37 36 -9.9 -21.2 -9.7 8.3 -26 
El Salvador 87 180 121 91 84 -15.4 -12.7 -0.8 -7.1 -38 
Guatemala 69 121 96 85 74 -3.7 -8.2 -12.3 -0.8 -35 
Haiti 93 124 97 89 79 1.4 -9.4 -5.5 -6.4 -30 
Honduras 91 113 103 91 86 1.8 -13.0 -5.0 -1.0 -24 
Nicaragua 79 112 81 69 54 -4.3 -11.3 -10.7 -12.4 -44 
Panama 108 80 73 72 57 -1.3 -0.1 - 1 9 0 -1.0 -22 
Paraguay 104 139 109 100 80 -12.4 4.6 -15.8 -5.7 -35 
Dominican Republic 148 89 86 105 78 17.4 3.5 -31.4 8.6 -8 
Uruguay 74 80 89 70 72 -10.7 -11.7 0.6 1.1 -15 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
'Provisional figures. ^Cumulative percentage variations in the period. 
On the other hand, the further deterioration in the terms of trade nullified 
most of the positive effect that could have been expected from the considerable 
efforts made by Latin America in 1983 to expand the volume of its exports. 
Although, as already mentioned, this volume grew by about 8%, the purchasing 
power of exports rose only insignificantly in 1983 (see table 22 and figure 10). 
This increment, besides being insufficient to offset the decline undergone by the 
purchasing power of external sales in the two preceding years, benefited only 
half the Latin American countries. As can be seen in table 23, the purchasing 
power of exports increased meaningfully only in Brazil (owing exclusively to the 
large-scale expansion of the volume exported), Chile (in consequence both of the 
improvement in its terms of trade and of the real growth of exports) and Mexico 
(despite the deterioration in its terms of trade). 
2. The balance of payments 
a) The current account 
Since the reduction in the value of imports was much bigger than the 
decrease in the value of exports, the balance of trade in goods underwent a new 
and significant change in 1983. On top of the volte face which occurred in 1982 
(when a surplus of US$ 8.45 billion replaced the preceding year's US$ 2 billion 
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deficit), the year 1983 witnessed an exceptional increase of the trade surplus, 
which amounted to almost US$ 30 billion, and far more than trebled that of the 
preceding year. 
To this result the principal contributions were made by the very 
substantial increments in the trade surpluses obtained by Mexico, Brazil and 
Venezuela, and the considerable changes that took place in the merchandise 
trade of Argentina, Chile, Peru, Ecuador and Uruguay (see table 24). 
In Venezuela the 1983 trade surplus of about US$ 7.2 billion almost 
trebled that shown in 1982, even though, as in that year, the value of exports 
appreciably decreased. 
On the other hand, in Brazil —where the merchandise trade surplus 
increased by a factor of eight between 1982 and 1983, rising from US$ 780 
million to US$ 6.5 billion— the improvement was due both to an increase in 
exports and to a contraction of imports. In its turn, Mexico, which in 1982 had 
already succeeded in converting its 1981 deficit of US$ 4.1 billion into a surplus 
of nearly USS 6.8 billion, boosted its positive trade balance to US$ 13.7 billion, 
thanks to a new and massive curtailment of the total value of its imports — 
which in 1983 was equivalent to barely one-third of the figure for 1981— and to 
a slight increase in the value of its external sales. 
The trade balance evolved similarly to Mexico's in Chile and Uruguay, 
although, of course, in absolute terms the changes were much smaller. Thus, 
Chile, after showing a deficit of close on US$ 2.7 billion in 1981 and achieving a 
small surplus in 1982, in 1983 obtained a surplus of US$ 1 billion, deriving 
essentially from a new and significant decline in the total value of imports and a 
moderate increase in the value of exports. Uruguay, in the same lapse of time, 
converted a deficit of US$ 360 million into a surplus of US$ 430 million. In this 
country, however, the exclusive cause of the reversal of the trade balance was the 
Table 22 
LATIN AMERICA: PURCHASING POWER OF EXPORTS OF GOODS 
(1970 = 100) 





Index Variation Index Variation Index Variation 
1970 100.0 4.4 100.0 3.8 100.0 4.6 
1971 98.0 -2.0 112.1 12.1 94.5 -5.5 
1972 107.3 9.5 109.1 -2.7 107.4 13.7 
1973 133.6 24.5 151.1 38.5 128.6 19.7 
1974 161.2 20.7 304.4 101.5 120.0 -6.7 
1975 131.6 -18.4 217.1 -28.7 108.2 -9.8 
1976 145.2 10.3 224.4 3.4 127.0 17.4 
1977 162.9 12.2 235.1 4.8 150.6 18.6 
1978 161.9 -0.6 235.8 0.3 148.7 -1.3 
1979 193.2 19.3 327.8 39.0 154.4 3.8 
1980 217.0 12.3 408.4 24.5 1533 -0.7 
1981 215.0 -0.9 412.3 1.0 147.9 -3.5 
1982 199.6 -7.2 385.7 -6.5 135.8 -8.2 
1983' 200.1 0.2 380.9 -1.2 145.0 6.8 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
From 1970 to 1973, Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela are included; as from 1976, Mexico, and Peru are added. ''As from 1976, Mexico and 
Peru are excluded. 'Provisional figures. 
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Figure 10 
LATIN AMERICA: EVOLUTION OF SELECTED FOREIGN TRADE INDICATORS 
(Indexes: 1970 • 100} 
OIL-EXPORTING 
COUNTRIES«: 
4 5 0 
Terms of trade 
— Purchasing power of exports of goods 
Quantum of exports of goods 
NON-OIL-EXPORTING 
LATIN AMERICA a COUNTRIESb 
r 2 5 0 r 
• • ' ' ' ' 
1971 1975 1980 83 1971 1975 1980 83 1971 1975 1980 83 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
'Nineteen countries. bFrom 1970 to 1975 includes 16 countries. As from 1976 Mexico and Peru 
are excluded. c From 1970 to 1975 includes Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela; as from 1976 Mexico and 
Peni are added. 
radical reduction in the value of imports, which between 1981 and 1983 
decreased by 56%. 
A drastic contraction in imports was also the main cause of the new 
increase in the trade surplus obtained by Argentina; of the multiplication of 
Ecuador's trade surplus by a factor of six; and, in Peru, of the substitution of a 
surplus of USS 300 million in 1983 for the deficit of US$ 560 million recorded in 
the preceding year. 
In contrast with what happened in 1982, when the effect on the current 
account of the reversal of the trade balance was almost entirely neutralized by the 
sharp rise in payments of interest and profits, in 1983 the contribution of the 
bigger trade surplus to the reduction of the imbalance on current account was 
reinforced by a decline in financial remittances. 
The total value of these latter, which in the past five years had more than 
quadrupled, rising from US$ 8.2 billion in 1977 to almost US$ 37 billion in 1982, 
fell to a little under US$ 35 billion in 1983. This result was influenced both by the 
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decrease in remittances of profits resulting from the sharp contraction in 
domestic economic activity and by the reduction of interest payments on account 
of the drop in nominal interest rates in the international financial markets. 
In these circumstances, the deficit on current account —which had slightly 
exceeded US$ 40 billion in the two preceding years— was drastically reduced to 
less than US$ 9.3 billion in 1983 (see table 25). Almost all the countries of the 
region contributed to this result, either through a substantial decrease in their 
deficits on current account, or, as in Mexico and Venezuela, through their 
replacement by very large surpluses. The sole exceptions to this overall trend 
were to be found in Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Paraguay, 
which showed bigger deficits than in the preceding year. 
The magnitude of the adjustment effort made by the economies of the 
region in order to reduce their external imbalance was also clearly reflected in 
the notable decline in the relation between the deficit on current account and the 
value of exports of goods and services. This coefficient, which in 1982 had 
reached the unheard-of proportion of nearly 40%, dwindled in 1983, to scarcely 
more than 9%, the lowest figure on record in the last 12 years (see table 26). 
However, the exceptionally low level of this regional average was largely 
due to the massive surpluses on current account obtained in 1983 by Mexico and 
Venezuela. It therefore reflects the situation of many of the Latin American 
Table 23 
LATIN AMERICA: PURCHASING POWER OF EXPORTS OF GOODS 
(Indexes: 1970 = 100 and growth rates) 
Indexes Growth rates 1979/ 
1983°' 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983° 1980 1981 1982 1983° 
Latin America 132 163 193 215 204 12.3 -0.9 -7.2 0.2 20 
Oi l -expor t ing 
countries 166 180 250 315 291 24.6 1.0 -6.5 -1.3 62 
Bolivia 133 164 150 155 135 10.4 -6.3 -7.6 -5.7 -8 
Ecuador 280 347 441 435 409 5.6 -6.6 -7.8 2.0 13 
Mexico 127 181 299 538 586 53.2 17.3 0.6 8.4 157 
Peru 74 88 141 108 94 -0.8 -22.9 -2.5 -10.7 9 
Venezuela 214 201 258 282 216 16.4 -6.2 -13.8 -11.1 21 
Non-o i l -expor t ing 
countries 110 152 156 149 146 -0.7 - Î .5 -8.2 6.8 -3 
Argentina 78 135 137 154 142 1.5 10.6 -12.9 6.0 4 
Brazil 135 173 173 186 193 5.4 3.2 -10.2 15.3 14 
Colombia 124 177 201 145 150 -3.5 -25.5 14.8 -9.6 -23 
Costa Rica 107 173 155 135 106 -8.5 -5.3 -17.3 -4.6 -30 
Chile 67 82 109 83 95 - -24.1 3 9 11.2 12 
El Salvador 121 209 194 110 94 -19.5 -29.3 -16.5 2.5 -40 
Guatemala 101 195 163 140 108 5.5 -18.7 -12.9 -11.6 -38 
Haiti 99 166 139 129 150 38.8 -33.2 8.8 7.2 -11 
Honduras 94 135 171 142 128 -4.0 -13.2 -14.6 5.1 -16 
Nicaragua 113 174 133 87 66 -38.8 6.5 -22.3 -2.5 -59 
Panama 118 92 89 68 60 -12.8 -11.9 - 3 8 -9.2 -35 
Paraguay 139 237 228 194 166 -11.0 -4.4 -4.0 -10.7 -34 
Dominican Republic 224 176 164 177 116 -8.5 18.1 -36.7 3.6 -17 
Uruguay 83 127 131 147 156 6.9 4.9 8.7 -2.6 11 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
Provisional figures. ^Cumulative percentage variations in the period 
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Table 24 
LATIN AMERICA: TRADE BALANCE 
(Millions of dollars) 
Exports of Imports of Merchandise Net service Trade 
goods FOB goods FOB trade balance payments" balance 
1981 1982 1983 1981 1980 1983 1981 1982 1983 1981 1982 1983 1981 1982 1983 
Latin America 
(19 countries) 93 768 85 787 84 290 95 768 77 333 54 454 -2 001 8 451 29 836 11 422 12 082 4 943 -13 422 -3 631 24 894 
Oil-exporting 
countries 46 603 43 963 41 291 43 004 34 418 18 917 3 599 9 546 22 374 6 135 7 475 1 611 -2 535 2 071 20 763 
Bolivia 909 828 757 680 429 482 229 399 275 215 122 142 15 277 133 
Ecuador 2 544 2 343 2 365 2 362 2 181 1 408 183 162 957 487 530 367 -304 -368 590 
Mexico 19 938 21 230 21 399 24 038 14 437 7 721 -4 100 6 793 13 678 1 192 1 785 -492 -5 292 5 008 14 170 
Peru 3 249 3 230 2 970 3 801 3 787 2 670 -553 -556 300 237 213 249 -790 -769 51 
Venezuela 19 963 16 332 13 800 12 123 13 584 6 636 7 840 2 748 7 164 4 004 4 825 1 345 3 836 -2 077 5 819 
Non-oil exporting 
countries 47 165 41 824 42 999 52 764 42 915 35 537 -5 600 -1.095 7 462 5 287 4 607 3 332 -10 887 -5 702 4 131 
Argentina 9 142 7 598 7 710 8 432 4 873 4 100 710 2 725 3 610 1 702 478 799 -992 2 246 2 811 
Brazil 23 275 20 172 21 899 22 091 19 395 15 429 1 184 777 6 470 2 862 3 589 2 449 -1 678 -2 812 4 021 
Colombia 3 219 3 549 3 017 4 763 5 967 4 658 -1 544 -2 418 -1 641 169 94 -63 -1 712 -2 512 -1 578 
Costa Rica 1 002 871 851 1 091 780 894 -88 90 -43 44 -20 -5 -132 111 -38 
Chile 3 836 3 706 3 827 6 513 3 643 2 818 -2 677 63 1 009 712 561 577 -3 389 -498 432 
El Salvador 798 704 732 898 826 803 -100 -122 -71 110 72 32 -211 -194 -103 
Guatemala I 299 1 200 1 091 1 540 1 284 1 080 -241 -85 11 312 231 172 -553 -316 -161 
Haiti 150 174 189 358 296 314 -208 -122 -124 69 73 68 -277 -195 -192 
Honduras 784 677 704 899 681 731 -115 -4 -27 62 52 41 -177 -56 -68 
Nicaragua 500 408 411 922 723 761 -423 -316 -350 69 65 81 -492 -381 -430 
Panama 343 345 317 1 441 1 441 1 246 -1 098 -1 096 -929 -879 -849 -886 -219 -247 -43 
Paraguay 399 396 342 772 711 700 -374 -315 -359 -22 92 63 -352 -407 -422 
Dominican Republic 1 188 768 783 1 452 1 257 1 297 -264 -490 -514 42 -97 -164 -306 -393 -350 
Uruguay 1 230 1 256 1 126 1 592 1 038 706 -362 218 420 35 266 168 -397 -48 252 
Source: ECLAC, on (he basis of official data. 
"Excluding net payments of profits and interest. 
Table 25 
LATIN AMERICA: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(Millions of dollars) 
Trade Net payment of Balance on Balance on Total 
balance profits and interest" current account* capital account' balance'' 
1981 1982 1983 1981 1982 1983 1981 1982 1983 1981 1982 1983 1981 1982 1983 
Latin America 
(19 countries) -13 422 -3 631 24 894 28 533 37 785 35 201 -40 502 -40 457 -9 257 37 733 20 259 8 000 -2 769 -20 199 -1 257 
Oil-exporting 
countries -2 535 2 071 20 763 11 042 14 703 13 302 -13 197 -12 697 7 371 12 841 1 282 -3 363 -357 -11 415 4 008 
Bolivia 15 277 133 343 418 428 -312 -121 -252 319 153 237 6 32 -15 
Ecuador -304 -368 590 722 847 718 -1 027 -1 215 -128 656 875 274 -370 -340 146 
Mexico -5 292 5 008 14 170 9 531 10 855 8 980 -14 074 -5 316 5 320 14 775 2 431 -2 059 700 -2 885 3 261 
Peru -790 -769 51 1 020 1 053 1 152 -1 810 -I 823 -1 101 1 138 1 753 1 051 -672 -70 -50 
Venezuela 3 836 -2 077 5 819 -574 1 530 2 024 4 026 -4 222 3 532 -4 047 -3 930 -2 866 -21 -8 152 666 
Non-oil-exporting 
countries -10 887 -5 702 4 131 17 491 23 082 21 899 -27 305 -27 760 -16 628 24 892 18 977 11 363 -2 412 -8 784 -5 265 
Argentina -992 2 246 2 811 3 932 5 107 5 861 -4 712 -2 477 -2 571 1 519 1 809 1 570 -3 193 -668 -1 001 
Brazil -1 678 -2 812 4 021 10 274 13 509 11 701 -11 760 -16 314 -7 560 12 381 11 119 5 446 621 -5 195 -2 114 
Colombia -1 712 -2 512 -1 578 404 878 683 -1 895 -3 196 -2 152 2 328 2 222 340 433 -974 -1 812 
Costa Rica -132 111 -38 308 348 417 -407 -206 -383 358 331 401 -50 125 18 
Chile -3 389 -498 432 1 595 2 035 1 809 -4 817 -2 378 -1 222 4 952 1 038 693 136 -1 340 -529 
El Salvador -211 -194 -103 74 105 148 -272 -271 -239 223 242 418 -49 -29 179 
Guatemala -553 -316 -161 86 115 108 -567 -376 -238 265 338 327 -301 -38 89 
Haiti -277 -195 -192 13 14 15 -225 -160 -157 168 115 134 -57 -45 -23 
Honduras -177 -56 -68 153 202 145 -321 -249 -204 249 203 187 -72 -46 -17 
Nicaragua -492 -381 -430 93 140 91 571 -512 -521 657 578 591 86 66 70 
Panama -219 -247 -43 223 231 300 -496 -538 -409 423 524 440 -74 -14 31 
Paraguay -352 -407 -422 -31 -53 4 -378 -391 -463 421 329 429 44 -63 -34 
Dominan Republic -306 -393 -350 293 254 299 -416 -457 -454 454 311 276 38 -146 -178 
Uruguay -397 -48 252 74 197 318 -468 -235 -55 494 -182 111 26 -417 56 
S o u r c e : ECLAC, o n the basis o f official data. 
" Inc luding labour and ownership . ' ' Including net private unilateral transfers . ' I n c l u d i n g long and s h o r t - t e r m capital, official unilateral t ransfers and errors and o m i s s i o n s . 
Var ia t ion in international reserves, including counterpart entr ies . 
Table 55 
L A T I N A M E R I C A : R E L A T I O N B E T W E E N T H E B A L A N C E - O F - P A Y M E N T S 
D E F I C I T O N C U R R E N T A C C O U N T A N D T H E VALUE O F 
E X P O R T S O F G O O D S A N D SERVICES" 
{Percentagesj 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983' 
Latin America 11.1 17.0 34.2 23.3 21.1 29.8 23.7 26.6 35.5 39.4 9.3 
Oil-ex po r t ing 
countries 7.1 -10.9 20.4 22.0 29.0 40.6 14.9 8.6 22.8 24.2 -15.1 
Bolivia -0.7 -21.3 28.8 10.3 18.8 50.2 46.6 15.9 30.8 13.3 29.5 
Ecuador 1.9 -1.7 21.5 2.1 23.7 42.9 27.1 23.4 35.2 45.2 4.9 
Mexico 30.9 47.8 67.1 50.2 24.0 30.3 36.7 35.4 48.7 19.5 -19.8 
Peru 22.4 40.8 93.2 71.5 45.8 10.2 -16.2 1.6 44.6 44.9 29.7 
Venezuela -17.5 -50.1 -23.5 -3.3 30.8 58.1 -2.5 -23.8 -19.2 24.0 -23.7 
Non-o i l expor t ing 
countr ies 13.9 43.9 45.6 24.2 15.9 22.3 31.4 43.9 48.5 55.4 32.6 
Argentina -18.9 -2.6 36.8 -14.2 -17.1 -24.5 5.8 48.3 43.4 27.5 27.4 
Brazil 32.5 87.5 74.3 60.4 39.3 51.5 62.7 58.8 46.1 74.3 32.0 
Colombia 5.0 20.6 5.9 -6.9 -12.8 -7.4 -10.8 3.0 44.2 65.3 52.3 
Costa Rica 26.9 49.9 36.5 28.9 23.6 36.1 50.5 54.9 34.6 19.3 37.3 
Chile 19.7 12.9 27.1 -5.5 21.8 37.8 26.1 33.9 96.2 51.2 26.6 
El Salvador 11.5 26.3 16.0 -2.2 -2.0 31.6 -1.2 - 29.4 33.0 26.0 
Guatemala -1.6 14.5 8.3 8.1 2.8 20.9 14.2 9.5 39.0 28.8 20.3 
Haiti 13.2 36.3 38.1 37.1 40.2 39.8 45.5 45.8 93.8 59.3 53.6 
Honduras 12.9 37.0 36.3 25.3 23.9 24.7 24.4 35.1 36.3 32.5 25.4 
Nicaragua 30.3 61.7 44.2 7.7 26.7 4.8 -13.4 101.2 104.8 114.3 116.8 
Panama 29.7 37.2 25.1 27.8 20.4 25.6 32.1 24.1 30.9 33.6 25.9 
Paraguay 13.0 26.4 38.3 29.7 15.2 27.2 40.9 50.1 66.7 63.4 97.7 
Dominican 
Republic 19.2 33.3 7.8 15.8 14.2 38.1 31.7 53.0 27.5 40.0 37.2 
Uruguay -4.4 27.3 35.9 11.8 21.2 14.5 30.4 46.9 27.5 15.3 4.0 
Source: E Œ A C , on the basis of official figures. 
Negative figures indicate a surplus on the balance-of-payments current account. Provisional figures. 
economies to a lesser degree than in the past. Thus, apart from Ecuador and 
Uruguay —where the deficit/export ratio was below 5 %— in the great majority 
of the countries of the region the ratio in question ranged from 25% to 40%. 
Moreover, the deficit on current account was equivalent to over half the exports 
of goods and services in Colombia and Haiti, to almost 100% of these in 
Paraguay and to close on 120% of them in Nicaragua. 
b) The capital account 
As was mentioned earlier, in 1983 the net inflow of capital decreased for 
the second year in succession. After amounting to the unprecedented sum of 
about US$ 38 billion in 1981 and falling in 1982 to a little over US$ 20 billion, in 
1983 it dropped to barely 8 billion. 
Just as in the preceding year, this new contraction of the net flow of loans 
and investment chiefly affected Mexico and most of the larger economies of 
South America. On the contrary, the net capital inflow was kept going and even 
increased in most of the Central American countries, among which Nicaragua 
and El Salvador had considerable external financing at their disposal. 
In contrast, the decline in procurement of external resource was very 
marked in Brazil —which, after receiving over US$ 11 billion in net loans and 
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investment in 1982, obtained less than 5.5 billion in 1983— and in Colombia, 
where the net capital inflow of US$ 340 million recorded in 1983 was equivalent 
to barely 15% of the previous year's supply (see table 25). 
During 1983 the external financing received by Peru was also sharply 
reduced, the amount procured by Chile —which had drastically diminished in 
1982— continued to decline, and that obtained by Argentina decreased to a 
moderate extent. 
In Mexico, in turn, there was a new and spectacular change in the external 
financing situation. After dropping from US$ 14.8 billion in 1981 to barely 
2.4 billion in 1982, in 1983 the movement of loans and investment showed a net 
outflow of a little more than US$ 2 billion, mainly as a result of the deficit of over 
US$ 5 billion on the short-term capital account. 
Contrary to what had happened in the preceding year, in 1983 the 
reduction in the net inflow of capital received by Latin America was much 
smaller than that of the deficit on current account. Consequently, the balance-of-
payments deficit, which in 1982 had reached the record figure of US$ 20 billion, 
was reduced in 1983 to a little over 1.25 billion. 
This considerable drop in Latin America's balance-of-payments deficit 
reflected both the smaller negative balances recorded in 1983 in many countries 
of the region and the volte face which took place in others, where the global 
deficits shown in 1982 were replaced by positive balances in 1983. 
Outstandingly significant in this connection were the changes that 
occurred in Mexico and Venezuela. Mexico's balance of payments, which had 
closed in 1982 with a deficit of nearly US$ 2.9 billion, showed a surplus of close 
on US$ 3.3 billion in 1983. For its part, Venezuela, whose deficit of US$ 8.15 
billion in 1982 had been the highest in the whole of Latin America, obtained a 
surplus of nearly US$ 700 million in 1983. 
Significant balance-of-payments surpluses were also achieved in 1983 by 
Ecuador and Uruguay —which had recorded very large deficits in 1982— and 
also by El Salvador, Guatemala and Panama, whose external operations had 
shown small negative balances in the preceding year. 
Among the countries that succeeded in reducing their balance-of-
payments deficits, special mention should be made of Brazil —which brought 
down its negative balance from US$ 5.2 billion in 1982 to 2.1 billion in 1983— 
and Chile, where between those years the deficit dropped from USS 1.34 billion 
to USS 530 million. 
On the contrary, during 1983 the balance-of-payments deficit slightly 
increased in the Dominican Republic, rose significantly in Argentina and almost 
doubled in Colombia, where it thus became the second largest in the whole of 
Latin America (see table 25). 
c) International reserves 
In 1983, Latin America's international reserves decreased for the third 
year in a row, although the reduction was not as big as in the two preceding years. 
As a result of these successive contractions, the total value of reserves was 44% 
lower at the end of 1983 than at the close of 1980 (see table 27). 
However, as in 1983 imports contracted even more sharply, the ratio 
between reserves and the value of imports of goods and services rose to a 
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Table 55 
L A T I N A M E R I C A : E V O L U T I O N O F O F F I C I A L I N T E R N A T I O N A L RESERVES" 
fMillions of dollarsj 
End-of-December balances Growth rates 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Latin America 51 151 53 366 46 563 34 264 29 832 4.3 -12.7 -26.4 -12.9 
Oi l -expor t ing 
countries 18 309 21 703 20 429 15 476 18 445 18.5 -5.9 -24.2 19.2 
Bolivia 469 478 369 466 403 1.9 -22.8 26.3 -13.5 
Ecuador 910 1 259 802 488 592 38.4 -36.3 -39.2 21.3 
Mexico 2 839 4 187 4 999 1 530 3 548 47.5 19.4 -69.4 131.9 
Peru 1 556 2 357 1 395 1 319 1 835 51.5 -40.8 -5.4 39.1 
Venezuela 12 535 13 422 12 864 11 673 12 067 7.1 -4.2 -9.3 3.4 
Non-o i l - expor t ing 
countr ies 32 842 31 663 26 134 18 788 11 387 -3.6 -17.5 -28.1 -39.4 
Argentina 11 378 9 320 5 061 4 449 1 697 -18.1 -45.7 -12.1 -61.9 
Brazil 9 740 6 887 7 506 3 445 1 920 -23.3 9.0 -54.1 -44.3 
Colombia 4 898 6 489 6 181 5 558 3 541 32.5 -4.7 -10.1 -36.3 
Costa Rica 101 141 40 156 153 39.6 -71.6 290.0 -1.9 
Chile 2 453 4 014 3 862 2 570 2 024 63.6 -3.8 -33.4 -21.2 
El Salvador 371 378 240 231 224 1.9 -36.5 -3.8 -3.0 
Guatemala 934 756 253 239 273 -19.1 -66.5 -5.5 14.2 
Haiti 55 5 -6 -35 -60 -91.0 - -
Honduras 215 145 70 15 -27 -32.6 -51.7 -78.6 -
Nicaragua 
Panama 77 94 26 17 14 22.1 -72.3 -34.6 -17.6 
Paraguay 625 783 820 755 694 25.3 4.7 -7.9 -8.1 
Dominican Republic 166 231 260 98 -45 39.2 12.6 -62.3 
Uruguay 1 829 2 420 1 821 1 290 979 32.3 -24.8 -29.2 -24.1 
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics. 
Foreign exchange plus monetary gold valued at London fine ounce prices minus use o f IMF credit. 
moderate degree, after having steadily and rapidly decreased in the three 
preceding years (see table 28). 
In contrast to what happened in 1982, when reserves declined in much thé 
same proportions in the oil-exporting countries as in the other economies of the 
region, in 1983 the reduction was concentrated almost exclusively in the latter. 
On the contrary, in the oil-exporting countries there was a marked increase in 
reserves, except in Bolivia. 
The growth of reserves was especially intensive (132%) in Mexico, where 
they had fallen precipitously (-70%) in 1982. Consequently, despite their 
recovery, at the end of 1983 they were still considerably lower than in 1980-1981. 
But as in the last two years the total value of imports dropped by over 60%, 
reserves were equivalent to a much higher proportion of the value of external 
sales in 1983 than in any of the six preceding years. 
Reserves also increased significantly —although much less than in 
Mexico— in Peru (39%) and Ecuador (21%). However, owing to the severe 
reductions they had undergone in both these countries during the two preceding 
years, they totalled much less, especially in Ecuador, than at the end of 1980. 
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On the other hand, the relative increment in reserves was very small 
(3.5%) in Venezuela. But as they had declined only moderately in the two 
preceding years, their total value in 1983 fell only 10% short of the 
unprecedented level they had reached in 1980. Furthermore, Venezuela's 
reserves were far the highest in the region —in fact, they represented 40% of 
the total for Latin America— and were also equivalent to an exceptionally large 
proportion (133%) of the annual value of imports. However, the unwonted 
magnitude of this figure primarily reflected the effects of the spectacular (54%) 
reduction of the value of external purchases of goods and services which took 
place in 1983. 
Thus, among the oil-exporting countries, the only one in which reserves 
decreased was Bolivia, where they fell by 13-5%. Despite this decline, they still 
represented the equivalent of almost seven months' imports, i.e., one of the 
highest coefficients in the region. But as a very substantial proportion of 
reserves consisted of gold —whose immediate use presents more difficulty than 
that of foreign currencies—, the economic authorities' room for manoeuvre in 
respect of financing temporary deficits on the trade balance was in practice 
decidedly limited. 
In contrast, in the non-oil-exporting countries the drop in reserves was 
sharper in 1983 than in the two preceding years. In these circumstances, the end-
Table 28 
L A T I N A M E R I C A : R E L A T I O N B E T W E E N O F F I C I A L I N T E R N A T I O N A L RESERVES 
A N D I M P O R T S O F G O O D S A N D SERVICES 
(Percentages) 
1973 1975 1977 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983° 
Latin America 51 40 46 58 46 37 33 40 
Oi l -expor t ing 
countr ies 49 65 50 49 45 34 31 66 
Bolivia 27 31 39 43 50 37 74 56 
Ecuador 49 24 38 34 42 25 20 29 
Mexico 31 23 18 17 16 15 7 28 
Peru 41 19 11 62 61 29 27 50 
Venezuela 90 144 72 88 89 75 59 133 
Non-o i l - expor t ing 
countr ies 51 23 43 64 47 39 34 25 
Argentina 51 15 70 130 71 44 69 28 
Brazil 83 29 50 45 25 28 14 10 
Colombia 39 32 73 125 119 103 75 62 
Costa Rica 11 3 16 7 9 3 16 14 
Chile 10 -6 9 47 57 47 51 50 
El Salvador 20 24 26 30 32 21 22 21 
Guatemala 46 42 52 52 39 13 15 20 
Haiti 18 -1 5 17 1 -1 -8 -12 
Honduras 14 17 27 23 13 7 2 -3 
Nicaragua 26 18 18 
Panama 7 1 2 6 6 1 1 1 
Paraguay 36 41 62 85 93 84 71 74 
Dominican 
Republic 16 13 14 11 12 14 6 -3 
Uruguay 108 78 78 122 113 87 81 87 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of table 27 and official data. 
'Provisional figures. 
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of-year value of reserves was equivalent to only just over one-third of that 
recorded at the end of 1979. Moreover, since the relative decrease in reserves was 
once again greater than the contraction of imports, the ratio between the total 
amount of the former and the value of the latter also declined for the fourth 
consecutive year (see tables 27 and 28). 
The biggest reduction of reserves occurred in Argentina, where they went 
down by 62%, thus falling to a level equivalent to barely 15% of that reached at 
the end of 1979. This new and enormous decrease in reserves signified a severe 
constraint on the management of the balance of payments, which was further 
accentuated by the fact that a high proportion of them consisted in holdings of 
monetary gold. 
In Brazil, too, reserves dropped very abruptly for the third time in the last 
four years. Thus, at the end of 1983 they amounted to only 20% of their value in 
1979 and were equivalent to scarcely more than one month's imports —an 
exceptionally low ratio which was above only those recorded in Haiti and 
Honduras. 
The decline in reserves was also considerable (-36%) in Colombia. 
However, as they had amounted to very large sums in 1980 and reductions in the 
two following years had been relatively small, they were still equivalent to over 
seven months' imports, a proportion exceeded in the region only by Venezuela. 
Lastly, in 1983 decreases of more than 20% occurred in the international 
reserves of Chile and Uruguay, both of them countries in which reserves had 
already steeply declined in the two preceding years. Even so, since imports had 
also fallen abruptly, reserves were still equivalent to very high proportions of 
external purchases. In the case of Uruguay, however, the exceptional magnitude 
of the reserves/imports coefficient (87%) makes for an overestimate of the 
economic authorities' room for manoeuvre, since a very large proportion of the 
reserves consisted of monetary gold stocks. 
II. FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS, TRANSFER OF 
RESOURCES AND RENEGOTIATION OF THE 
EXTERNAL DEBT 
The evolution of Latin America's external financing and indebtedness during 
1983 was characterized by two main features. The first was the accentuation of 
the constraints under which the region had been labouring since mid-1982 in 
respect of its access to international financial markets; the second was the 
initiation of a second round of renegotiations of the external debt, in which the 
debtor countries obtained, in general, somewhat more favourable terms and 
conditions than in the first. 
A. FINANCIAL CONSTRAINT 
Table 29 shows, through the figures for the movement of financial resources 
between the region and the rest of the world, the magnitude of the financial 
constraint with which Latin America had to cope. 
As already noted, during the 1970s there was a net transfer of resources to 
Latin America from abroad, i.e., what happened was what normally should in the 
5 9 
case of a developing region. A transfer of this kind, besides contributing external 
saving and thus giving an additional impulse to internal development or 
adjustment efforts, facilitates debt servicing, inasmuch as the inflow of new 
resources under the head of net loans and investment exceeds net remittances of 
interest and profits. 
Furthermore, during the 1970s the transfer of resources to Latin America 
took place on a very large scale: by the middle of the decade it totalled more than 
20% of the value of exports of goods and services, which, in their turn, were 
expanding at a very high average rate. In these circumstances, the region's 
capacity to import increased at high speed, as can be seen in figure 11. 
By the end of the decade, however, a marked and progressive decline had 
begun both in the absolute value of resources transferred and in their ratio to the 
value of exports. In consequence of this trend, the direction of the financial flow 
was reversed in 1982, and a massive negative balance resulted. In that year the 
net transfer of resources abroad amounted to about US$ 17 billion, and the 
process was intensified in 1983, in which year it is estimated that the resources 
transferred abroad represented a sum of approximately US$ 87 billion.15 
Thus, just as during the preceding year, in 1983 Latin America had to face a 
combination of highly unfavourable events: precisely when the net inflow of 
resources was converted into an enormous net outflow, the international 
recession and the increase in protectionism limited the possibilities of stepping 
up export earnings. In consequence of these two phenomena, the region's 
capacity to import suffered a new and drastic contraction (see figure 11). 
Table 29 
L A T I N A M E R I C A : N E T I N F L O W O F C A P I T A L A N D T R A N S F E R O F RESOURCES 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
1970 3.8 0.1 3.9 2.6 2.8 1.0 1.1 17.0 5.9 6.5 3.4 
1971 4.5 -0.2 4.7 -4.4 3.0 1.5 1.7 17.7 8.5 9.6 -2.7 
1972 6.0 1.0 7.0 16.7 3.1 2.9 3.9 20.5 14.1 19.0 2.8 
1973 8.5 -0.7 7.8 -8.2 4.2 4.3 3.6 28.9 14.9 12.5 13.4 
1974 12.7 -1.3 11.4 -10.2 5.0 7.7 6.4 43.6 17.7 14.7 15.8 
1975 16.0 -1.8 14.2 -11.3 5.5 10.5 8.7 41.1 25.5 21.2 -13.5 
1976 18.9 -0.7 18.2 -3.7 6.8 12.1 11.4 47.3 25.6 24.1 4.6 
1977 15.4 1.6 17.0 10.4 8.2 7.2 8.8 55.9 12.9 15.7 6.1 
1978 24.4 1.7 26.1 7.0 10.2 14.2 15.9 61.4 23.1 25.9 -10.6 
1979 26.9 1.7 28.6 6.3 13.6 13.3 15.0 82.0 16.2 18.3 4.1 
1980 35.5 -5.5 30.0 -15.5 18.0 17.5 12.0 105.8 16.5 11.3 3.3 
1981 48.3 -10.6 37.7 -21.9 27.7 20.6 10.0 114.1 18.1 8.8 -8.9 
1982 2a 1 -7.8 20.3 -27.8 36.9 •8.8 -16.6 102.6 -8.6 -16.2 -8.6 
1983' 12.5 -4.5 8.0 -36.0 34.7 -22.2 -26.7 100.0 -22.2 -26.7 -7.1 
Source: 1970-1982: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook, 1983: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
Equivalent to net inflow of capital minus unregistered transactions. 'Corresponds to balance-of-payments item "errors and 
omissions". 'Provisional estimates. 
" As can be seen in table 29, the absolute value of the transfer of resources abroad is smaller if account is 
taken of the errors and omissions item in the balance of payments, which probably was constituted in the main, 
especially in 1982, by unregistered capital outflows. But if this procedure is followed, the magnitude of the volte face 
in the transfer of resources which was produced between 1981 and 1983 turns out to be even greater. 
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Figure 11 
LATIN AMERICA: NET INFLOW OF CAPITAL AND TRANSFER OF RESOURCES 

















Source: ECLAC, on the basis of da ta f r o m the In terna t ional Moneta ry F u n d and official i n fo rma t ion . 
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T h e financial constraint occurred, moreover, at a t ime w h e n the region's 
real capacity to import had been decreasing on account of the continuous and 
rapid deterioration of the terms of trade. Thus, in addition to the US$ 20 billion 
reduction of the capacity to import brought about in 1982-1983 by this 
deterioration, a drop of about US$ 43 billion resulted from the draining-off of 
financial resources. 
In these circumstances, the countries of the region had to adapt their 
economies by means of a radical contraction of their imports, which, as already 
mentioned, was the main cause of the decline in domestic levels of production 
and employment . 
Thus, the emergence of these substantial net transfers of financial 
resources from Latin America to the creditor banks and countries had highly 
unfavourable consequences. Economic deve lopment is a long-term process in 
which a stable net inf low of external resources usually fills an essential role in the 
financing of investment. Accordingly, a diminution of this inf low and, above all, 
its replacement by a net outf low directly affects both the rate and the social cost 
of the development process. Furthermore, such a reversal of the direction of 
resource transfers proves particularly serious w h e n it occurs during the 
downturn of the economic cycle, since in that event it reinforces the negative 
effects of the conjunctural fall in the volume and prices of exports. Lastly, the net 
transfer of resources abroad may promote a major crisis, both for the developing 
countries and for the international financial system, in so far as the payments 
problems which it helps to generate may affect large-scale debtors in such a way 
as to call in question, or even imperil, the solvency of the creditor financial 
institutions. 
T h e immediate causes of this adverse trend in financial movements were 
two in number: the rise in the cost of external credit, and the abrupt decrease in 
the net capital inflow. 
1. The increase in the cost of external credit 
A very important factor behind the net outf low of financial resources from Latin 
America was the heavy and sustained increase in the servicing of foreign capital, 
in the form of remittances of interest and profits. Between 1977 and 1982 net 
payments under this head grew at an average annual rate of 34%, a figure w h o s e 
significance in real terms can be more clearly assessed if it is borne in mind that 
during that period domestic prices in the industrialized countries rose at an 
average rate of 9%, and, above all, if it is recalled that Latin America's terms of 
trade deteriorated at an average annual rate of about 3%. Although in 1983 
payments of interest and profits slightly declined in consequence of the fall in 
international interest rates and the contraction of economic activity in Latin 
America, they still amounted to nearly U S $ 35 billion, i.e., more than three t imes 
as much as in 1978 (see table 29). 
T h e most important component of this phenomenal expansion of 
payments on foreign capital was constituted by net interest payments. These 
represented 83% of the outf lows recorded under this head between 1978 and 
1983, a period in which, moreover, they continued to soar, and were ultimately 
quadrupled. In turn, this evolution of interest payments had its origin in the 
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Table 55 
L A T I N A M E R I C A : T O T A L GROSS D I S B U R S E D E X T E R N A L DEBT" 
End-of-year balances in millions of dollars Growth rates 




Latin America 150 893 181 978 221 059 275 422 308 336 332 279 22.2 12.0 7.8 
Oi l -expor t ing 
countr ies 64 390 77 585 92 324 118 963 128 657 137 387 22.7 8.1 6.8 
Bolivia' 1 762 1 941 2 220 2 450 2 373 2 780 11.6 -3.1 17.2 
Ecuador 2 975 3 554 4 652 5 868 6 187 6 689 25.4 5.4 8.1 
Mexico 33 946 39 685 49 349 72 007 78 000 82 000 28.5 8.3 13.9 
Peru 9 324 9 334 9 594 9 638 11 097 12 418 3.4 15.1 11.9 
Venezuela' ' 16 383 23 071 26 509 29 000 31 000 33 500 21.0 6.9 8.1 
Non-o i l -expor t ing 
countr ies 86 503 104 393 128 735 156 459 179 679 194 892 21.8 14.8 8.5 
Argentina 12 496 19 034 27 162 35 671 43 634 45 500 41.9 22.3 4.3 
Brazil ' 52 285 58 907 68 354 78 580 87 580 96 500 14.5 11.5 10.2 
Colombia 4 247 5 117 6 277 7 930 9 421 10 740 23.1 18.8 14.0 
Costa Rica 1 870 2 333 3 183 3 360 3 497 3 848 21.6 4.1 10.0 
Chile 6 664 8 484 11 084 15 542 17 153 17 454 32.6 10.4 1.8 
El Salvador 986 939 1 176 1 471 1 683 2 000 14.3 14.4 18.8 
Guatemala 821 934 1 053 1 409 1 504 1 766 19.7 6.7 17.4 
H a i t i ' 210 248 290 372 410 446 21.0 10.2 8.8 
Honduras 971 1 280 1 510 1 708 1 800 2 000 20.7 5.4 11.1 
Nicaragua' 961 1 131 1 579 2 163 2 797 3 385 31.1 29.3 21.0 
P a n a m a ' 1 774 2 009 2 211 2 338 2 820 3 275 9.6 20.6 16.1 
Paraguay 669 733 861 949 1 204 1 469 12.4 26.9 22.0 
Dominican 
Republic 1 309 1 565 1 839 1 837 1 921 2 000 12.0 4.6 4.1 
Uruguay 1 240 1 679 2 156 3 129 4 255 4 509 36.1 36.0 6.0 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. Brazil and Venezuela: ECLAC, on the basis of data from the Bank for International Settlements. 
"Provisional figures Total public and private external debt. c Corresponds to public debt. "'including public debt, plus 
unguaranteed long and short-term debt with financial institutions supplying data to the Bank for International Settlements. 'Including 
total medium and long-term debt plus short-term debt with financial institutions supplying data to the Bank for International Settlements. 
rapid growth of the external debt and the considerable increases in international 
interest rates. 
During the past decade many countries of the region took advantage of the 
then easy access to the Eurocurrency market to pursue a development strategy 
based on liberal use of external credit.16 Thus, the region's external debt shot up 
at a very high rate, which between 1978 and 1981 averaged about 22% per 
annum (see table 30). Although this growth rate fell to 12% in 1982 and to less 
than 8 % in 1983, it still far exceeded that of other main macroeconomic 
variables. For this reason, by the end of 1983 the external debt was equivalent to 
proportions of the gross domestic product and of exports which not only were 
very high — 4 2 % and 333%, respectively— but topped all those recorded in 
earlier years (see tables 31 and 32). In these circumstances, a steadily increasing 
proportion of Latin America's national income had to be diverted from domestic 
consumption and investment to debt servicing.1 7 
16 For more background information on this subject, see CEPAL, Adjustment policies and renegotiation of 
the external debt (E/CEPAL/SES.20/G.17), Santiago, Chile, February 1984. 
17 The burden of indebtedness is obviously heavier in relation to exports than to the product. Whereas the 
debt/product coefficient is not much higher in Latin America than in some Asian countries whose creditworthiness 
is still well-seen in the credit markets, the ratio of more than three to one existing between debt and exports trebles 
that of the large debtor countries in Asia. 
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Of course, as always happens, these regional averages conceal widely 
differing situations in the various countries. Thus, in 1983 the debt /export 
coefficient was especially high in Nicaragua (759%), Argentina (485%) and 
Brazil (408%), and, on the other hand, fluctuated around 150% in Guatemala, 
Haiti and the Dominican Republic. The debt/produt ratio, in its turn, reached 
more than 80% in Costa Rica and over 135% in Nicaragua, but was only 20% in 
Colombia and Guatemala. 
Apart from the intensive growth of the total debt during the 1970s, there 
was a striking change in the sources of external credit, which caused a 
considerable increase in the average rate of interest. In the course of that decade 
private banks took the place of official credit institutions (bilateral and 
multilateral) as the region's main creditors. Thus, the share of the commercial 
banks in Latin America's total external debt has climbed from very modest levels 
at the beginning of the 1970s to approximately 8 0 % at the present time. This 
structural change has implied a rise in the average cost of credit, since, as a 
general rule, commercial banks charge an interest rate about 50% higher than 
that charged by public international f inancing institutions, such as IDB and the 
World Bank. 
In practice, however, the chief cause of the rapid increase in interest 
payments lay in the variability of the interest rates at which private bank loans 
were contracted. Since in recent years the economic policies applied in some of 
Table 31 
L A T I N A M E R I C A : R E L A T I O N B E T W E E N T O T A L G R O S S D I S B U R S E D E X T E R N A L 
D E B T A N D G R O S S D O M E S T I C P R O D U C T " 
(Percentages) 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983° 
Latin Amer ica 30 31 33 37 39 42 
Oi l -expor t ing 
countr ies 33 34 35 39 40 43 
Bolivia 52 51 53 54 54 66 
Ecuador 34 36 41 45 44 47 
Mexico 26 25 27 33 34 36 
Peru 51 45 41 36 39 48 
Venezuela 50 64 69 69 69 74 
N o n - o i l expo r t i ng 
countr ies 28 29 31 35 39 41 
Argentina 22 28 37 47 58 56 
Brazil 32 31 30 32 34 37 
Colombia 13 14 15 17 19 21 
Costa Rica 54 59 73 73 78 82 
Chile 41 44 49 59 72 71 
El Salvador 26 23 29 36 41 47 
Guatemala 13 13 13 16 17 19 
Haiti 22 23 22 27 29 30 
Honduras 49 56 59 60 61 65 
Nicaragua 51 74 86 99 123 136 
Panama 56 56 50 47 51 56 
Paraguay- 25 23 22 20 25 30 
Dominican Republic 26 28 28 25 24 23 
Uruguay 20 24 27 35 49 53 




L A T I N A M E R I C A : R E L A T I O N B E T W E E N T O T A L GROSS D I S B U R S E D E X T E R N A L 
D E B T A N D E X P O R T S O F G O O D S A N D SERVICES 
( Percentages) 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983° 
Latin America 246 222 210 242 301 332 
Oi l -expor t ing 
countr ies 254 207 177 208 245 281 
Bolivia 251 227 213 242 260 326 
Ecuador 175 147 162 201 230 255 
Mexico 316 262 210 249 286 305 
Peru 388 228 206 238 273 335 
Venezuela 167 154 133 139 177 225 
Non-o i l - expor t ing 
countr ies 241 234 241 276 359 382 
Argentina 167 207 275 329 484 485 
Brazil 383 353 313 308 399 408 
Colombia 107 113 118 185 192 261 
Costa Rica 186 213 266 286 327 374 
Chile 227 184 186 310 370 379 
El Salvador 107 74 97 159 204 217 
Guatemala 63 63 61 97 115 151 
Haiti 100 116 95 149 155 152 
Honduras 141 153 160 193 235 249 
Nicaragua 133 168 319 397 624 759 
Panama 189 178 147 145 176 208 
Paraguay 154 143 152 167 195 310 
Dominican Republic 158 138 145 121 168 164 
Uruguay 136 141 141 184 277 326 
Source: ECLAC, on [he basis of official data. 
"Provisional figures. 
the main industrial centres led to an unprecedented rise in bank interest rates, 
the effective rate of interest that had to be paid by the Latin American countries 
also went up unusually fast. In 1978 the nominal level of LIBOR and the United 
States PRIME rate was already over 9%, and they reached maximum average 
values of 16.5% and 18.9%, respectively, in 1981. Although in the two following 
years they showed a downward trend, their levels in 1983 —10% for LIBOR and 
11% for PRIME— were still very high in comparison with past periods (see 
table 33). 
Moreover, to the cost represented by the basic rates must be added the 
spread, which since 1982 has risen steeply, with the result that some countries 
have had to pay an average spread fluctuating between 1.5% and 2.0%. Lastly, 
the increase in the rate of interest was also spectacular in real terms: as can be 
seen in figure 12, after registering negative values in 1974-1977, LIBOR and 
PRIME swung over to the positive side, attaining values of 6 % and 8%, 
respectively, in 1981. Although in the next two years they declined, their level in 
1983 was still more than twice that of about 2 % recorded in the past.1 8 The 
heavy financial burden represented for the Latin American countries by the rise 
in interest rates is highlighted in tables 34 and 35. 
18In the first half of 1984 this downward trend was reversed, so that the two rates rose to 11% and 12%, 
respectively. 
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The first of these shows that in 1983 net interest payments absorbed 31% 
of the value of exports of goods and services. This figure, although slightly lower 
than in 1982, was equivalent to two and a half t imes the coefficient of 12 % noted 
in 1978 and 1979. 1 9 
In several countries, of course, the problem was of even greater 
dimensions than are indicated by the regional average. For example, in 1983 the 
proportion of exports represented by interest was 53% in Argentina, 4 7 % in 
Bolivia, 4 0 % in Brazil and 39% in Costa Rica. Since 1978 the growth of this 
coefficient had been exceptionally intensive in Argentina, where it increased by a 
factor of ten, and in Costa Rica, where it was quintupled (see table 34). 
Although the main causes of the spectacular rise in the net interest /export 
ratio between 1981 and 1983 were the high interest rates and the increase in the 
external debt, another influencing factor was the serious depletion of the 
region's international reserves. Through its deposits in the international 
financial markets, Latin America traditionally received a substantial amount of 
resources, which helped partly to counterbalance interest payments. Of course, 
as international reserves decreased, interest earnings were reduced as well. 
Table 33 













Ra te ' 
1972 5.41 5.25 4.7 0.7 0.5 
1973 9.31 8.03 7.7 1.5 0.3 
1974 11.20 10.81 13.3 -1.9 -2.2 
1975 7.61 7.86 11.1 -3.1 -2.9 
1976 6.12 6.84 8.3 -2.0 -1.3 
1977 6.42 6.83 8.4 -1.8 -1.4 
1978 8.33 9.06 7.2 1.1 1.7 
1979 11.99 12.67 9.2 2.6 3.2 
1980 14.15 15.27 11.9 2.0 3.0 
1981 16.52 18.85 9.9 6.0 8.1 
1982 13.25 14.77 7.5 5.3 6.8 
1983 9.79 10.81 5.0 4.6 5.5 
1981 
I 16.58 19.05 10.1 5.9 8.1 
II 16.46 18.65 9.8 6.1 8.1 
1982 
I 15.14 16.29 8.3 6.3 7.4 
II 11.35 13.25 6.7 4.4 6.1 
1983 
I 9.47 10.73 5.3 4.0 5.2 
II 10.11 10.89 4.7 5.2 5.9 
1984 
I" 11.10 11.80 5.3 5.5 6.2 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data from the Morgan Guaranty Trust, World Financial Markets, and from Economic Report of the President, 
Washington, February 1984. 
"Corresponding to the interest rate on 180-day Eurodollar deposits in London. * Preferential rate granted by United States banks to their 
best clients. e Nominal rate deflated by the consumer price index of the industrialized countries. 'Provisional estimates. 
19 To appreciate the gravity of the situation, it is useful to recall that an interest/export coefficient of 20% 
is already considered to constitute an unduly onerous financial burden. 
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Figure 12 
NOMINAL AND REAL INTERNATIONAL INTEREST RATES 
(Percentages) 
1972 1975 1980 1983 
Source: EC LAC, on the basis of da ta f rom Morgan Guaranty Trust, World Financial Markets, and f rom 
Economic Report of the President, Washington, D.C., February 1984. 
• R a t e of interest on deposi ts in Eurodol lars (180 days) in London. ^Nominal rate 
def lated by the consumer price index of the industrialized countries. P r e f e r e n t i a l rate granted 
by the Uni ted Sta tes banks to their best clients. 
Lastly, the rise in the interest/export coefficient was also due to a decline in the 
value of exports during the last three years. 
There was also a rapid increase in the proportion of the region's gross 
domestic product represented by interest payments. The coefficient for the 
region as a whole rose from only 1.5% in 1978 to 4.0% in 1982-1983 and was 
much higher in 1983 in Bolivia (9.5%), Costa Rica (8.7%), Chile'(6.6%) and 
Argentina (6.1%). While in the first three countries the net interest/product 
ratio was already a good deal higher than the regional average in 1978, in 
Argentina its increase was really spectacular, inasmuch as in that year the 
country in question had had one of the lowest coefficients in Latin America 
(0.7%) (see table 35). 
2. The decline in the net inflow of capital 
The other fundamental cause of the negative transfer of resources that Latin 
America had to make in the last two years was the striking reduction of the net 
inflow of capital. As previously noted, the net amount of this inflow notably 
decreased both in 1982 and 1983. In effect, its values —US$ 20 billion in 1982 
and US$ 8 billion in 1983— were equivalent, respectively, to only 20% and 8% 
Table 34 
L A T I N A M E R I C A : R E L A T I O N B E T W E E N N E T I N T E R E S T P A Y M E N T S A N D 
E X P O R T S O F G O O D S A N D SERVICES 
( Percentages) 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983° 
Latin America 12 12 14 21 32 31 
Oi l -expor t ing 
24 26 countr ies 13 11 12 17 
Bolivia 14 18 23 31 43 47 
Ecuador 8 11 15 21 29 24 
Mexico 20 20 19 24 35 33 
Peni 21 13 12 19 22 29 
Venezuela 3 2 3 4 6 12 
Non-o i l -expor t ing 
26 36 countr ies 12 13 17 39 
Argentina 5 5 10 27 49 53 
Brazil 20 25 29 36 52 40 
Colombia 5 5 3 7 15 15 
Costa Rica 8 12 17 26 31 39 
Chile 16 14 14 26 39 35 
El Salvador 4 3 4 6 10 13 
Guatemala 1 2 1 4 6 5 
Haiti 3 3 2 2 2 5 
Honduras 6 6 8 12 20 16 
Nicaragua 8 9 16 16 31 12 
Paraguay 4 2 1 2 5 9 
Dominican Republic 11 12 11 19 22 25 
Uruguay 8 5 7 4 11 23 




L A T I N A M E R I C A : R E L A T I O N B E T W E E N N E T I N T E R E S T P A Y M E N T S A N D 
G R O S S D O M E S T I C P R O D U C T " 
(Percentages) 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983' 
Latin America 1.5 1.8 2.3 3.3 4.1 4.0 
Oi l -expor t ing 
countries 1.7 1.9 2.4 3.2 4.0 4.0 
Bolivia 2.8 4.0 5.8 6.9 9.0 9.5 
Ecuador 1.6 2.6 3.7 4.7 5.4 4.4 
Mexico 1.6 1.9 2.4 3.2 4.2 3.8 
Peru 2.7 2.7 2.3 2.9 3.2 4.1 
Venezuela 1.0 0.9 1.7 2.2 2.5 3 8 
Non-o i l -expor t ing 
countr ies 1.4 1.7 2.2 3.3 4.2 3.8 
Argentina 0.7 0.7 1.3 3.9 5.8 6.1 
Brazil 1.6 2.1 2.8 3.8 4.4 3 6 
Colombia 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.7 1.4 1.2 
Costa Rica 2.4 3.3 4.6 6.7' 7.5 8.7 
Chile 2.8 3-3 3.7 5.0 7.5 6.6 
El Salvador 0.9 0.8 1.3 1.5 2.1 2.7 
Guatemala 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.6 0.9 0.7 
Haiti 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.9 
Honduras 1.9 2.3 3.0 3.9 5.3 4.2 
Nicaragua 3.1 3 8 4.3 3.9 6.0 2.2 
Paraguay 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.9 
Dominican Republic 1.9 2.3 2.2 4.0 3.2 3.5 
Uruguay 1.3 0.8 1.2 0.8 1.9 3.7 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data from official sources and from the International Monetary Fund. 
' Interest payments include those corresponding to the short-term debt. Provisional figures. 
of the region's total exports, which were figures far below the averages of about 
33% recorded during the period 1978-1981.20 
This falling-off in net capital inflows had its origin in two factors: the 
procyclical behaviour of the international private banks and the flight of capital 
from Latin America to the outside world. 
a) The procyclical behaviour of the international private banks 
The slump in credit activity was related, in the first place, with the 
behaviour of the private banks, Latin America's principal creditors. These 
institutions are guided by a private and commercial perception of risk, which is 
highly sensitive and therefore imparts a high degree of variability to the loans 
they are prepared to grant. 
It is common knowledge that the banks' image of Latin America's 
creditworthiness began to deteriorate as from 1982, a circumstance which was 
2 0The exceptional magnitude of the decline in net inflows of capital is clearly evidenced in column 3 of 
table 29. These figures, however, include the effect of inflows and outflows under the head of unregistered 
transactions, those termed "errors and omissions" in the balance of payments. Accordingly, so that a more exact 
picture of annual credit activity may be formed, column 1 of the same table presents an estimate of the effective net 
capital inflow, correcting the figures in column 3 by those financial operations which are not included in the 
economic authorities' accounts. Although, as was said before, when this operation is performed the absolute 
amount of the net inflow of capital works out to be larger in each of the last four years, the decline in the net inflow 
of loans and investment between 1981 and 1983 is also greater. 
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partly due to the overwhelming increase in debt servicing. As can be seen in 
table 36, the sum to which this amounted in absolute terms was more than 
doubled between 1978 and 1982. U p to 1981, however, this upswing did not 
create major difficulties, inasmuch as exports also expanded at a very rapid rate. 
Thus, despite the ever-increasing commitments under the head of 
amortization and interest payments, the debt service coefficient — t h e 
creditworthiness indicator in commonest use among creditors— remained 
relatively stable, fluctuating between 42 and 49%. 
But in 1982, mainly as a result of the international recession, Latin 
America's total exports contracted by 10%, whereas debt servicing rose by 
almost 16%. Thus, the ratio between amortization and interest payments and 
the value of exports jumped from 49% in 1981 to 61% in 1982. Moreover, if 
short-term debt maturities —which amounted to approximately U S $ 69 
Table 3 6 
LATIN AMERICA: EXTERNAL DEBT I N D I C A T O R 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983° 
Billions of dollars 
Medium and long-term disbursements 38.4 46,0 43.0 59.5 43.6 
Oil-exporting countries 13.3 17.2 14.5 18.8 15.5 
Non-oil-exporting countries 25.1 28.8 28.5 40.6 28.0 
Debt service 26.7 37.0 43.3 53.8 62.2 
Oil-exporting countries 9.7 15.2 15.9 20.2 23.2 
Non-oil-exporting countries 17.0 21.8 26.4 33.6 39.0 
Total interest payments 9.5 14.2 21.0 31.4 39.2 35.7 
Oil-exporting countries 4.1 5.8 8.6 13.1 16.8 16.2 
Non-oil-exporting countries 5.4 8.4 12.4 18.4 22.4 19.5 
Medium-term amortizations 17.2 22.8 21.3 22.3 22.9 
Oil-exporting countries 5.6 9.4 7.3 7.1 6.4 
Non-oil-exporting countries 11.6 13.4 14.0 15.2 16.6 
Percentages 
Debt coefficients ' 
D S / D I S 72 84 103 94 142 
Oil-exporting countries 73 89 110 105 150 
Non-oil-exporting countries 71 81 101 78 140 
D S / X 45 47 42 49 61 
Oil-exporring countries 38 41 31 35 43 
Non-oil-exporting countries 50 52 54 64 81 
I / X 16 17 20 28 38 35 
Oil-exporting countries 16 16 17 23 31 32 
Non-oil-exporting countries 15 19 23 32 46 38 
T G D / X 247 223 211 243 301 332 
Oil-exporting countries 254 207 177 208 245 281 
Non-oil-exporting countries 242 237 243 278 359 382 
T G D / G D P 30 31 33 37 39 42 
Oil-exporting countries 33 34 35 39 40 43 
Non-oil-exporting countries 28 30 32 36 39 41 
S o u r c e : E C L A C , o n t h e bas is o f o f f i c ia l data. 
P r o v i s i o n a l e s t i m a t e s . 
T h e f o l l o w i n g are the s y m b o l s used: D S : debt serv ices ; DIS: m e d i u m - a n d l o n g - t e r m loan d i s b u r s e m e n t s ; X : e x p o r t s o f g o o d s a n d s e r v i c e s ; 
I: g r o s s in teres t p a y m e n t s o n the s h o r t - a n d m e d i u m - t e r m s debt; T ( i D : total g r o s s e x t e r n a l debt d i sbursed; G D P : g r o s s d o m e s t i c product . 
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bi l l ion— 2 1 wère taken into account, Latin America's debt service coefficient 
would have been about 120% in 1982, a manifestly untenable situation. 
It was in these circumstances that the region's creditors radically changed 
their view of its creditworthiness and decided to restrict their loans severely. T h e 
rapid deterioration of Latin America's capacity to serve its debt and the 
considerable magnitude of the loans already granted by banks in the region were 
among the reasons why these latter saw a much higher degree of risk in their 
financial operations in Latin America. 
Their first reaction to this situation was to harden amortization terms, a 
step which, in turn, had the effect of directly reducing the net inf low of capital. In 
the 1970s the maturities of loans granted to the countries of the region had o f t en 
ranged from seven to ten years; but such amortization periods became 
increasingly less frequent at the beginning of the present decade. What is more, a 
c o m m o n practice among banks w h e n they feel their risk to be greater is to meet 
the borrowers' demand for refinancing by means of a steadily growing 
proportion of short-term credits, i.e., those extended for less than one year. This 
attitude was reflected in the increase of the relative importance of short-term 
credit in Latin America's total debt, the proportion it represented rising from 
15% in 1975 to an average of 23% in 1980-1982.2 2 
The accumulation of these short-term liabilities reflected the severe 
pressures exist ing within the financial system. Credits of this type are usually 
granted for trade purposes, and it is estimated that they should represent the 
equivalent of about three months' imports. In 1982, however, this proportion 
was exceeded three times over. In 1983, the short-term debt was reduced to the 
equivalent of seven months' imports, largely owing to the constraint imposed on 
these credit lines by the creditors during the crisis. 
One effect of these changes was that the rate of amortization —i.e., 
amortization payments as a percentage of the debt— on the bank debt rose 
steadily throughout the second half of the last decade, reaching more than 4 0 % 
in the two-year period 1981-1982. 2 3 This, of course, also pushed up the rate of 
amortization on the total debt, which climbed from about 2 3 % in 1975 to over 
30% in 1982. 2 4 
The increase in the amortization rate threw into relief the countries 
growing vulnerability, since it compelled them to intensify their "debtor 
activity", i.e., that directed towards obtaining new loans to cover amortization 
payments and thus avoid a net outflow of capital. Faced with an intensive 
increase in the demand for credit for the sole purpose of refinancing 
amortization payments, the banks had to meet a growing number of applications 
for credit just when the amount of their commitments in the countries of the 
region forced them to give more weight to considerations of prudence. 
T h e unwil l ingness of the banks to continue increasing their loans in Latin 
America became more patent still w h e n they began to have doubts as to the 
21 See Inter-American Development Bank, La deuda externa y el desarrolla económico en América Imi ina. 
Antecedentes y perspectivas, Washington D.C., 1984. 
2 2See IDB, op.cit., table 7. 
21 See R. Ffrench-Davis, 'El problema de la deuda externa en América Latina', CIEPLAN, Santiago, Chile, 
December 1983, p. 14. 
21 Estimated on the basis of data in IDB, op.cit., tables l and 3. 
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capacity of Argentina — t h e third among the largest debtors in the region— to 
serve its debt, on account of the South Atlantic conflict in March 1982, and was 
made yet more acute by the payments crisis in Mexico in the middle of the same 
year. As this country was the second largest debtor in the Third World, its 
difficulties created a sensation of panic in the financial market, which had a 
negative impact on the volume and terms of the credit available for other 
countries in the region. Thus, from August 1982 onwards the banks' normal 
credit activity was brought to a virtual standstill. 
The magnitude of the constraint imposed by the banks can be appreciated 
in table 37, where the medium-term bank credits reported in the Eurocurrency 
market are presented. Before 1982 this type of credit was increasing at an 
average annual rate of 34% at the world level and 2 1 % in the case of developing 
countries; those granted to Latin America exceeded this average, rising at an 
annual rate of 32%. For reasons already indicated, as from 1982 there was a 
sharp contraction of the new credits granted, and this trend persisted in 1983. 
For Latin America, the amount of new credits was reduced by 11 % in 1982 abd 
4 3 % in 1983, these decreases being a good deal larger than those corresponding 
to the developing countries as a whole. Furthermore, part of the credits granted 
to Latin America in 1982 and practically all those recorded in 1983 were not 
market operations, but non-voluntary loans which formed part of the debt 
refinancing programme organized under the sponsorhsip of the International 
Monetary Fund.2 5 
This drastic reduction in new credits to Latin America, which would have 
led to a net outf low of capital had it not been for the large-scale rescheduling of 
maturities carried out by the creditor banks, accounts for most of the spectacular 
decline in inf lows of capital during 1982 and 1983. 
Such scanty loans as Latin America was able to secure in the last two years 
were obtained, moreover, on very burdensome terms. Over and above the 
extremely high rates of interest, the non-voluntary credits granted by the banks 
Table 37 
M E D I U M - T E R M B A N K C R E D I T S D E C L A R E D O N T H E E U R O C U R R E N C Y M A R K E T 
Billions of dollars Growth rates 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
1978-
1981 1982 1983 
Total 41.8 70.2 82.8 77.4 133.4 84.9 73.9 33.7 -36.4 -13.0 
Industrialized countries 17.2 29.0 27.2 39.1 86.0 42.5 38.4 49.5 -50.6 -9.7 
Countries with centrally 
planned economies 3.4 3.8 7.3 2.8 1.8 0,7 . 1.2 -14.7 -61.0 -71.4 
Developing countries 21.0 37.3 48.0 35.0 45.3 41.5 33.0 21.2 -8.4 -20.5 
Latin America 9.9 21.3 28.1 24.1 30.1 26.7 15.3 32.1 -11.3 -42.7 
Asia 4.3 7.9 10.6 7.1 10.3 8.4 8.8 24.4 -18.5 4.8 
Africa and the Middle East 6.8 8.1 9.3 3 8 4.8 6.4 8.9 -8.3 33.3 39.1 
Others 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.2 1.3 10.7 -33.3 
Source: Morgan Guaranty Trust. World Financial Marh'lf, January 1984. 
" F o r more detailed analysis of the role of the Fund and of non-voluntary loans granted by private banks, 
see CEPAL, Economic Survey of Latin America, 1982, Part Two (E/CEPAL/L.286); and Adjustment Policies and 
Renegotiation of the External Debt (E/CEPAL/SES.20/G.17), Santiago, Chile, February 1984, chapter III. 
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Table 55 
MEDIUM-TERM BANK CREDITS: SPREADS OVER BASIC INTEREST RATE" 
1981 1982 1983 
First Second 
semester semester I II III 
IV I 11 July-
October 
OECD 0.49 0.46 0.57 0.47 0.50 0.55 0.66 0.57 0.63 
OPEC I 0.85 0.80 0.87 0.95 0.87 0.85 1.39 
Other developing J 
countries | 1 0.83 1.05 1.08 1.47 2.02 1.77 1.80 
Overall average 0.74 0.69 0.75 0.78 0.69 0.93 1.53 0.96 1.17 
Source: OECD, Financial Market Trends, Paris, November 1982 and November 1983. 
"Weithted average of spreads for credits of over USI 50 million and with maturities of more than three years. 
included very large spreads; some idea of the magnitude of the change can be 
formed from the figures in table 38, which show that the average surcharge on 
loans to developing countries increased from 0.95% in 1981 to 1.47% at the end 
of 1982 and 1.80% by mid-1983. Thus, the difference between the spreads on 
basic rates paid by the industrialized countries and by the developing countries 
rose from 0 .48% in 1981 to 1.17% in July-October 1983. And, as will be seen 
later, the deterioration was a good deal worse for Latin America than for the 
developing countries as a whole. 
b) The flight of capital 
T h e second determinant of the massive transfer of resources abroad was 
the abundant outf low of private capital from the region. Thus, from the 
standpoint of their effects on the balance of payments, a considerable part of the 
new loans contracted by some Latin American governments was counteracted by 
the outf low of resources from the private sector. In these conditions, the increase 
in public indebtedness partly originated —especially at the beginning of 1982— 
in the need to cover the flight of private capital to the exterior. 
It is of course difficult to estimate the magnitude of the phenomenon. In 
the first place, there are no records of this type of capital movement , either 
because of the existence of a free foreign exchange market in the countries 
concerned, or owing to evasion of exchange controls by means of such 
procedures as under-invoicing of exports and over-invoicing of imports. 
Secondly, the coverage of indirect methods of estimating the fl ight of capital may 
be insufficient —which would lead to underestimating the f l o w — or their scope 
may be excessively broad, incorporating other factors conducive to an 
overestimate. 
A traditional indirect indicator of the fl ight of capital is the balance-of-
payments i tem "errors and omissions", which appears in the second column of 
table 29. According to these figures, between 1980 and 1983 Latin America could 
have experienced a cumulative net outflow of capital of about US$ 28 billion — a 
sum equivalent to almost 7 % of the value of exports of goods and services during 
that period and to approximately 8.5% of the cumulative external debt at the 
end of 1983. As is l ikewise evident from the figures in the same table, this 
outf low absorbed a significant proportion ( 2 5 % ) of the net inf low of capital 
between 1980 and 1983. 
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There are signs, however, that the "errors and omissions" item 
underestimates the effective capital outflow. Another indirect method of 
estimating the flight of capital is to compare the growth of the external debt and 
the net annual inflow of capital recorded in the balance of payments. The 
difference between the two figures will represent the unregistered outflow of 
financial resources. Since the coverage of the data on external indebtedness for 
the years preceding 1980 is less wide, it seems prudent to confine the analysis to 
the three-year period 1981-1983. The corresponding calculation suggests that 
there could have been an unregistered financial outflow of about US$ 45 billion 
in that triennium, i.e., a much larger sum than the US$ 28 billion estimated on 
the basis of the "errors and omissions" item in the balance of payments. These 
US® 45 billion are equivalent to nearly 14% of the external debt existing at the 
end of 1983.26 
Nevertheless, these figures must be handled with a good deal of caution, 
since it is highly probable that they overestimate the unregistered capital 
outflow. In the first place, estimates of indebtedness relating to more recent 
years have a broader coverage than those of earlier date and therefore tend to 
overestimate the growth of the debt. Secondly, the figures on net movements of 
capital, which also enter into the calculation made, are affected by outflows 
which do not, strictly speaking, constitute a flight of capital, such as contraband 
and traffic in drugs. 
The flight of capital tends, of course, to occur or to be accentuated during 
periods of economic crisis and when the private sector loses confidence in the 
economic policies applied. In these circumstances, some of the holders of assets 
look for a haven abroad where the value of their capital may be conserved. 
Another factor that influences the process, and was probably important in 
Mexico, Venezuela and Argentina, is the non-existence of exchange controls. 
Even when such controls are susceptible of evasion, their existence increases the 
cost of transactions of this type and therefore to some extent discourages the 
transfer of capital to the exterior. 
Lastly, it should be noted that although the flight of capital aggravated the 
crisis, it also signifies a potential, since, in principle, the resources concerned 
could be repatriated and thus give an impulse to investment and to the 
reactivation of the economy. For this to happen, however, economic policies 
would have to offer the holders of such assets prospects of security and an 
attractive rate of return. 
B. R E N E G O T I A T I O N OF T H E E X T E R N A L DEBT 
The abrupt drop in Latin America's net external financing in the two-year 
period 1982-1983 interrupted the process of "credit renewal" —i.e., the 
contracting of new loans to cover debt servicing— which had made the servicing 
of external commitments relatively easy during the 1970s. For most Latin 
American countries the change made the debt burden impossible to carry, and 
this in its turn caused many countries of the region to embark upon negotiations 
for the rescheduling of the external debt. 
26 During the period analysed, the flight of capital was appparently concentrated in three countries: 
Venezuela, Mexico and Argentina. Uruguay also seems to have witnessed an outflow of appreciable magnitude in 
relation to the size of its economy. 
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1. The first round of reschedulings 
The first round of reschedulings, which was initiated in August 1982, was 
analysed in depth in the Economic Survey of Latin America, 1982. T h e data on 
this process published there are updated in tables 39, 4 0 and 41. 
In 1982 fourteen of the twenty countries of the region opened debt 
rescheduling negotiations; Colombia was the only country with a relatively large 
debt to the international private banks which did not do so. Generally speaking, 
debt restructuration operations combined two essential components: the 
rescheduling of one or two years' amortizations and the procurement of new 
"non-voluntary" credits from the private banks in order to refinance that part of 
interest payments which the countries were not in a posit ion to cover with 
resources of their own. 2 7 Another characteristic e lement in the negotiations was 
the insistence of the banks that before a rescheduling agreement was concluded 
the country concerned should have agreed with IMF upon an adjustment 
programme. 2 8 Lastly, also as part of the rescheduling processes, the Bank for 
International Sett lements and the United States Treasury granted very short-
term bridge credits to some countries to finance them temporarily during their 
negotiations with IMF. 
Tables 40 and 41 summarize the terms of the first rescheduling. It maybe 
noted that they were exceptionally burdensome and represented a grave 
deterioration of debt conditions, both as regards the e lements of indebtedness 
subject to negotiation (the spread in excess of LIBOR, amortization periods and 
commiss ions) , and with respect to the financial cost. The data in column 7 of 
table 41 reveal that in some cases the terms of the debt deteriorated 
spectacularly —between 175% a n d 2 4 0 % — b e c a u s e of its rescheduling. Column 
10 in the same table shows that very substantial increases —of 20% or over— 
also occurred in the real financial cost of indebtedness in an appreciable number 
of cases. 
2. The second round of reschedulings 
Almost immediately after the first round of rescheduling a second began, 
originating in the operation of several factors (see table 42). In the first place, 
some countries had renegotiated only the payment of maturities falling due in 
1983, with the addition, in some instances, of the arrears accumulated in 1982. 
As the external sector remained sluggish, these countries opted for requesting 
the rescheduling of amortization payments that were due to be made in 1984. 
Secondly, there were some countries which, despite having initiated 
negotiations to reschedule their debt during the first round, for one reason or 
another did not reach the point of s igning a final agreement. Lastly, as already 
mentioned, the private banks agreed to grant new credits, with which a part of 
the interest payments on the bank debt was refinanced under an arrangement 
which covered only one year's payment. Thus, both the countries that 
rescheduled their 1983-1984 maturities and those that requested a year's 
27In 1983 this proportion was about 50%. 
28 The only exceptions to this rule occurred in the reschedulings of the external debt of Cuba and Nicaragua. 
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Table 55 
L A T I N A M E R I C A ( S E L E C T E D C O U N T R I E S ) : R E N E G O T I A T I O N O F 
E X T E R N A L D E B T W I T H P R I V A T E B A N K S 
( F I R S T R O U N D O F R E N E G O T I A T I O N S 1 9 8 2 / 1 9 8 3 ) ° 




at end of 





Loans approved during 
















Argentina 22.2 23.4 Sep 1982 13.00^ 6.00 7.00 Sep 1982-1983 2.20 0.50 1.10", 1.50* 
Brazil 56.0 57.5 Dec 1982 4.80* 1983 6.00 1.20 1.50 4.40 
Cos ra Rica 0.7 0.7 Sep 1981 0.62' 0.62 1982-1984 0.10 0.23 
Cuba 1.0 0.9 Sep 1982 0 Mi 0.14 Sep 1982-/1983 
Chile 10.4 11.0 Jan 1983 3.46" 1.00 2.46 1983-1984 0.88 0.30 1.30 
Ecuador 4.1 4.2 Oct 1982 2.2 d 1.20 1.00 Nov 1982-1983 0.17 0.43 
Honduras 0.2 0.2 Jul 1982 0.12" 0.12 1982-1984 0.11 -
Mexico 59.0 62.9 Aug 1982 23.00" 23.00 Aug 1982-1984 3.97 .1.85 . 1.60 5.00 
Nicaragua 0.6 0.5 ... 1982 0.55° 0.55 
Panama 1.6 ... 1983 0.18 1983 0.26 0.10 
Peru 5.2 4.5 Mar 1983 0.38" 0.38 1983 0.94 0.45 
Dominican 
Republic 1.0 1.0 Dec 1982 0.57' 0.15 0.42 1982-1983 0.46 
Uruguay 1.2 1.5 Feb 1983 0.63' 0.63 1983-1984 0.46 0.24 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data from the countries and from various national and international sources. 
"Including countries which during 1982 and 1983 signed definitive or provisional external debt renegotiation agreements with the private 
banks: excluding the English-speaking Caribbean countries. 
Refers exclusively to each country's short, medium- and long-term public and private debt with the private commercial banks that supply 
information to the Bank for International Settlements. The debt to governments and official agencies is not therefore included, nor the debt 
with suppliers, nor the debt with those commercial banks which do not transmit information to BIS. In some countries, this last item is 
significant. In the case of the Dominican Republic, the data correspond to official informatioa 
'Bank for International Settlements. Short-term bridge credits. 
'Credits granted by the international banks as part of the process of renegotiation of the external debt. 
Corresponds to public external debt maturities falling within the period September 1982 to December 1983 (USS 6 billion ); to those 
maturities of the private external debt, protected by Central Bank exchange insurance, which fell due as from November 1982 
(l)S$ 5.5 billion); and to maturities of swaps (USS 1.5 billion). Jf should be noted that Argentina did not sign any final agreement on 
renegotiation of its public external debt during the year 1983. In December 1983 the new government notified its intention to renegotiate a new 
agreement. 
' T h e international banks are waiting to disburse USS 1 billion until an agreement with IMF is reached. 
*At the end of 1982 an aplication was submitted r<j the foreing banks requesting them to grant 1) new loans ro rhe amount of USS 4.4 billion; 
2) refinancing of public and private debt amortizations to the amount of USS 4.8 billion; 3) maintenance of the short-term loans of 
USS 9-6 billion for the financing of foreign trade operations; and 4) re-establishment of the inter-bank credit lines at the levels reached on 30 
^June 1982 (USS 10 billion). Points 1 and 2 were accepted in February 1983 and point 3 later; point 4 was never settled. 
In September 1983 an agreement was signed providing for the renegotiation of U S l 370 million of arrears and of amortization payments 
amounting to USS 250 million which would fall due during 1983 and 1984. A trade credit equivalent to 5 0 % of the interest payments disbursed 
in 1983 was also granted. T h e banks also agreed to maintain short-term revolving credits to an amount of USS 215 million, with a spread of 
1 3 / 4 % over LIBOR. 
' I n August 1982 a request was submitted for deferment of the external debt service payments which were due to be made between September 
1982 and December 1983. the Banks also agreed to maintain the short-term credit lines with a spread of 1 1/4 % over LIBOR. 
Includes amortization of credits due to be disbursed during 1983 and 1984 (USS 2 158 million) and the restructuring of short-term financial 
credits (USS 1.3 billion). In February 1983 the international banks authorized a moratorium up to April 1983 and then, by successive rollovers, 
up to January 1984. In the latter month and in February 1984 the definitive debt renegotiation agreements were signed. The maintenance of the 
short-term loans for the financing of foreign trade operations (USS 1.7 billion) was also obtained, with a spread of 1 1/2 % over LIBOR. 
Ui September 1983 decrees were signed authorizing the signature of contracts for the refinancing of public and private debt amortizations to 
the amount of USS 2.2 billion in the period November 1982 to December 1983. The agreement includes the maintenance of short-term credit 
lines totalling USS 700 million with a spread of 1 5/8 % over LIBOR. Between October 1982 and January 1983, by common accord with the 
creditors, no payments were made against the public debt. 
A note of understanding between the government and the creditor banks committee was signed in February 1983. but this agreement did not 
come inro force because rhe banks refused to contribute new financing equivalent to double the half-yearly interest payments falling due. Until 
the end of 1983 the government kept up to date with interest payments; the same was not the case with amortization payments on capital. 
" In August 1982 the international banks authorized a moratorium on public external debt amortization payments for three months, which was 
subsequently extended until March 1983 and later to August 1983 In the latter month and in September 1983 contracts weresigned for the 
refinancing of public external debt amortization payments totalling USS 19.83 billion Later on the amount restructured under the agreement 
o reached USS 23 billion. 
During 1982 a renegotiation agreement for this amount was concluded. The terms of the renegotiation are similar to those originally 
contracted in a debt rescheduling agreement the government obtained in 1980. 
In addition short-term credit lines totalling l/SS 2 billion were renewed, with a spread of 1.5 % over LIBOR. 
In September 1983 an agreement was concluded on the refinancing of USS 465 million of short-term debt and USS 100 million of medium-and 
long-term debt. 
Corresponds to 9 0 % of amortization payments on short- and medium-term credits due to be made during 1983 and 1984. In addition, short-
term credit lines amounting to USS 81 million were maintained. At the beginning of March 1983 payments had been deferred for 90 days by 
agreement with the creditor banks. In July 1983 an agreement was signed with 80 creditor banks. 
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Table 55 
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): TERMS OF R E S C H E D U U N G 
OF EXTERNAL DEBT T O PRIVATE BANKS 








period (years) Commissions* 
R AC R AC R AC R AC 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Argentina' 2.13 2.50 7.0 5.0 3.0 3.0 1.25 1.25 
Brazil 2.50 2.13 8.0 8.0 2.5 2.5 1.50 1.50 
Chile 2.13 2.25 8.0 7.0 4.0 4.0 1.25 1.25 
Costa Rica** 2.25 8.5 4.0 - 1.38 
Cuba 2.25 - 8.0 - 3.0 - 1.25 -
Ecuador 2.25 2.38 7.0 6.0 1.0 1.5 1.25 1.25 
Honduras 2.38 7.0 - 3.0 - 1.38 -
Mexico 1.88 2.25 8.0 6.0 4.0 3.0 1.00 1.25 
Nicaragua' / - 12.0 - 5.0 - -
Panama 2.25 2.25 6.0 6.0 2.0 2.0 1.50 1.50 
Peru 2.25 2.25 8.0 8.0 3.0 3.0 1.25 1.25 
Dominican Republic 2.25 6.0 2.0 1.25 -
Uruguay 2.25 2.25 6.0 6.0 2.0 2.0 1.38 1.38 
Source: ECLAC, on the basic of official figures and data from various national and international sources. 
'Column R refers to rescheduled maturities and column AC to terms for additional credits. 
Calculated as a percentage of the total amount of the transaction and paid once only at the time of signing the loan contracts. It should be noted 
that evidence has been found that some commissions were not declared, and consequently the figures could underestimate payments under this 
head. 
At the end of 1983 the new Government of Argentina notified its intention to negotiate another debt rescheduling agreement, the terms of 
which would be better than those included in the present table. 
During 1983 the renewal of short-term trade credits was granted with a spread of 1 .75% over LIBOR and for a term of three years. 
Nicaragua is continuing the rescheduling of its bank debt on the terms established in an agreement signed in 1980. 
'Nicaragua pays a maximum rate of 7 % ; the difference 1*tween the interest rate in force and the 1% ceiling will be capitalized. 
restructuration had to return to the negotiating table to fix the amounts and 
terms of the new credits that they needed to cover their financing requirements 
in 1984. 
a) The reduction of the banks' new commitments 
In 1984 the banks continued to pursue their policy of granting new loans to 
refinance a part of interest payments. However , there was a marked decline in 
this contribution. For example, in 1984 Mexico has received new credits 
amounting to US$ 3.8 billion (a sum which represents a 6 % expansion of the 
banks' commitments ) in comparison with the US$ 5 billion obtained in 1983 
(equivalent to an increase of approximately 8% in the said commitments) . In 
1984 the new credits obtained by Chile were reduced to US$ 780 mill ion as 
compared with US$ 1.3 billion in the preceding year, which implied that the 
growth rate of the banks' commitments fell from 11% to 7%. Similarly, there 
was a reduction of the credits granted to Ecuador and, up to mid-1984, Peru had 
received no new credits, after having been granted US$ 450 mil l ion in 1983 (see 
table 42). The only countries that obtained more credits in 1984 than in 1983 
were Brazil —which received US$ 6.5 billion in 1984, as against US$ 4.4 billion 
in 1983— and Nicaragua, which apparently had the opportunity of organizing a 
new loan for US$ 200 million, after several years in which it had no access to new 
credit from the commercial banks. It must be stressed, however, that the increase 
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in the financing obtained by Brazil was due to the fact that during the first round 
it was impossible to maintain the inter-bank credit lines to that country at the 
established levels. Accordingly, in the second round it was decided to substitute 
new medium-term credits for the short-term lines. 
Several factors account for the decrease in the banks' new commitments. 
On the one hand, the private banks want to restrict the extent of their 
commitments in the Latin American countries, and are therefore seeking 
gradually to reduce the amount of new credits linked to each successive round of 
debt renegotiation. On the other hand, the countries of the region, faced both 
with the unwillingness of the banks to grant new resources and with the strict 
IMF targets designed to reduce financing requirements, have spectacularly 
compressed their imports, whereby they have succeeded in radically reducing the 
deficit on current account and, consequently, the need for new loans. Another 
factor of some importance is that certain countries are hoping to replace part of 
the bank financing with new disbursements by the official international credit 
institutions, such as IDB and the World Bank. 
T a b l e 4 1 
L A T I N A M E R I C A ( S E L E C T E D C O U N T R I E S ) : D E T E R I O R A T I O N O F T E R M S O F 
I N D E B T E D N E S S W I T H P R I V A T E B A N K S 
( F I R S T R O U N D O F R E N E G O T I A T I O N S , 1 9 8 2 / 1 9 8 3 ) ° 
C o u n t r y 
S p r e a d o v e r 
L I B O R 
( p e r c e n t a g e ) 
1 9 8 0 / 
T o t a l p e r i o d 
( y e a r s ) 
( 1 ) (2) 
1 9 8 0 / 
( 3 ) 
R ' A C 
( 4 ) 
C o m m i s s i o n s 
1 9 8 0 / 
1 9 8 1 
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D e t e -
r i o r a -
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of 
t e r m s 6 
( p e r c e n -
t a g e ) 
R e a l c o s t 
o f c r e d i t ' 
1 9 8 0 / r 
1 9 8 1 R A L 
(6 ) ( 7 ) ( 8 ) ( 9 ) 
I n -
c r e a s e 
( 1 0 ) 
A r g e n t i n a 
B r a z i l 
C h i l e 
C o s t a R i c a 
C u b a 
E c u a d o r 
H o n d u r a s 
M e x i c o 
P a n a m a 
P e r u 
D o m i n i c a n R e p u b l i c 
U r u g u a y 
0 . 6 7 
1.62 
0 . 9 1 
1.13 1.00 
0 . 7 4 




0 . 9 8 
2 . 1 6 
2 . 3 2 
2 . 1 6 
2 . 2 5 
2 . 2 5 
2.28 
2 . 3 8 
1 9 5 
2 . 2 5 
2 .25 
2 .25 
2 . 2 5 
7.5 
8 .5 
7 . 6 
6.0 
5 . 0 
8.0 
7 . 6 
8 . 0 
8.2 
8.1 
9 . 1 
6.8 8.0 
7 . 7 
8 . 5 
8 . 0 
6 . 7 
7 . 0 
7 . 6 
6 . 0 
8 . 0 
6.0 
6 . 0 
1 . 0 9 




0 . 9 7 
0 . 7 0 1.00 
1.07 












0 . 9 0 1 .38 





2 4 2 
181 
1 7 4 
9 7 
135 
2 4 9 
5 . 8 2 
6 . 8 6 
6.02 
6 . 3 4 
6 . 1 8 
5 . 8 6 
5 . 7 4 
6 . 2 2 
6 . 2 5 
6 . 4 1 
6.08 
7 .34 
7 . 5 0 
7 . 3 2 
7 .41 
7 .41 
7 . 4 7 
7 . 5 8 
7 . 0 9 
7 . 5 0 
7 . 4 6 
7 . 4 6 
7 . 4 8 
26.1 
9 . 3 
2 1 . 6 
1 6 . 9 
1 9 . 9 
2 7 . 5 
2 3 . 5 
20 .6 
1 8 . 6 
1 6 . 4 
2 3 . 0 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data and information from various national and international sources. 
The symbol R ' A C represents a weighted average of the rescheduled credits and additional credits. 
Based on an index of the cost-of-credit components which are subject to negotiation. The following is the formula used: 
in which: C = Commissions; P = Period; S = Spreadover LIBOR, and in whichsubindex 1 
refers to the conditions existing in 1983 andsubindex 0 to average terms in 1980-1981. All 
components of the formula are weighted by the amount of the loan. It should be noted that 
the deterioration is not in itself an indicator of the quality of a country's negotiation, since 
it is strongly influenced by the borrower's initial position. 
P„ 
CA real annual LIBOR of 5 % is assumed and C/P + S are added. 
At the end of 1983 the new Ciovernment of Argentina notified its intention to negotiate a new external debt rescheduling agreement. 
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L A T I N A M E R I C A (SELECTED C O U N T R I E S ) : R E N E G O T I A T I O N O F T H E 
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( S E C O N D R O U N D O F R E N E G O T I A T I O N S : ¿983/1984) ' 
(Billions of dollars) 









end of 1983 tions Total Public Private scheduled in 1984' 
Argentina 23.4 Dec 1983 22.00'' 22.00 Sep 1982-1984 0.5' 
Bolivia 1.2 Oct 1982 0.64f 0.64 1983-1985 -
Brazil 57.5 Jun 1983 5.40® 1984 6.4 
Chile 11.0 Jan 1984 - - 0.8 
Ecuador 4.2 Nov 1983 1.50 1984 0.4* 
Mexico 62.9 Mar 1983 11.60 11.60 Aug 1982-1984 3.8 
Nicaragua 0.5 Jun 1983 ...Jun 1983-Jun 1984 0.2* 
Peru 4.5 Dec 1983 1.56* 1.56 - 1984-July 1985 -
Venezuela 28.5 Oct 1982 24.00* 1983-1984 -
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data from countries and information from various national and international sources. 
"These data are provisional and subject to revision The countries included are those that during 1983 did not conclude any formal external debt 
rescheduling agreement with private banks; others that during 1983 signed definitive or provisional agreements relating only to that year's 
maturities, and for those of 1984 began a second round of renegotiatkins; and countries that applied for new credits to refinance interest 
payments in 1984. 
Refers exclusively to each country's short-, medium- and long-term public and private debt with the private commercial banks that transmit 
information to the Bank for International Settlements. Accordingly, neither the debt with governments of official institutions is included, nor 
the debt with suppliers, nor the debt with commercial banks that do not transmit information to BIS. In some countries this last item is 
significant, and the figures could therefore underestimate the share of the banks in total external debt. 
'Refers to credits granted by the international banks as part of the renegotiation process. 
'Refers to U S I 14 billion corresponding to amortization payments on the public debt due in 1982-1984; interest payments to the amount of 
U S J 6 billion; and bridge credits for a sum of U S I 2 billion (estimate prepared in May 1984). T h e total amount includes the renegotiated 
public external debt mentioned in table 39, since the authorities never concluded a definitive agreement with the private banks. In mid-
December 1983 the new Government of Argentina asked the international banks for a moratorium on all amortization and interest payments 
up to 30 June 1984. 
' A t the end of March 1984 the Governments of Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela and the United States announced a package financing of 
U S I 500 million for the payment of interest on Argentina's external debt, of which U S I 300 million were prcrvied by the above-mentioned 
countries, USI 100 million by the commercial banks and US$ 100 million by the beneficiary government. The loans from the latin American 
countries are short-term bridge credits and will be replaced by a loan from the United States Treasury once Argentina reaches an agreement 
with IMF. 
'includes maturities amounting to U S I 416 million and corresponding to the debt rescheduled by the banks in 1981, and USS 225 million in 
amortization payments due within the period 1983-1985. In principle, the government reached an agreement with the foreign banks in mid-
1983, but it was conditional upon the approval of an agreement with IMF which up to May 1984 had not been signed. At (he end of 198.<it was 
agreed that 5 0 % of interest would be paid. In June 1984 the government notified its intention of temporarily deferring its amortization and 
interest payments. 
' I n November 1983 a final agreement was reached on financing which includes U S I 6.5 billion provied by the commercial banks, 
U S I 3.5 billion in the shape of refinancing by the Paris Club and U S I 2.5 billion in financing from State entities in the industrialized countries. 
Still in force, moreover, are short-term commercial credit lines to an amount of U S I 10.3 billion and short-term inter-bank credit lines 
amounting to U S I 6 billion. 
As from June 1983 Nicaragua for the first time stopped interest paymets on the bank debt. In December an agreement was reached to refinance 
interest payments in arrears, which provides for capitalization of 100% of interest payments, amortization to begin as from the second 
semester of 1984. 
'Including the refinancing of U S I 610 million corresponding to the medium- and long-term debt and U S I 950 million corresponding to the 
short-term debt. 
'Estimate on the basis of official data. 
* At the end of March 1983 the international banks authorized a three months' moratorium on payments which was subsequently extended on 
four occasions. In April 1984 a sixth moratorium up tojuly 1984 was requested, in June 1984 the Government pledged itself to settle part of the 
cumulative interest payments corresponding to the public and private sectors. 
b) Reduction of the negotiated price of credits 
As mentioned above, the first round of reschedulings was characterized by 
the abrupt deterioration of borrowing conditions. In the second round, on the 
other hand, the countries succeeded in obtaining somewhat more favourable 
terms. In table 43 it can be seen that for all countries both the spreads over LIBOR 
and the commissions were smaller, and that maturities were longer in the second 
round of renegotiation than in the first. Although the new debt terms were still 
burdensome in comparison with those prevailing in the credit market in 1980-
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Table 55 
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): TERMS OF RESCHEDULING 
OF THE EXTERNAL DEBT WITH THE PRIVATE BANKS 








grace (years) Commissions 
R AC R AC R AC R AC 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Brazil 2.00 2.00 9.0 9.0 5.0 5.0 1.00 1.00 
Chile 1.75 9.0 - 5.5 - 0.63 
Ecuador 1.75 9.0 4.0 0.88 
Mexico 1.50 10.0 5.0 0.63 
Peru 1.75 - 9 0 5.0 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data and information from various national and international sources. 
' T h e s e data are provisional and subject to revision. Column R relates to rescheduled maturities and column AC to terms for additional credits. 
Calculated as a percentage of the total amount of the transaction and paid once only on signing (he loan contracts. It should be noted that 
evidence has been found that some commissions were not declared and the figures could therefore underestimate payments under this head. 
Table 44 
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): DETERIORATION OF 
TERMS OF INDEBTEDNESS W I T H THE PRIVATE BANKS 


























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Argentina 0.67 7.5 1.09 5.82 
Brazil 1.62 2.00 8.5 9.0 2.01 1.00 7 6.86 7.11 3.6 
Chile 0.91 1.75 7.6 9.0 0.81 0.63 51 6.02 6.82 13.3 
Ecuador 0.74 1.75 8.0 9.0 0.97 0.88 91 5.86 6.85 16.9 
Mexico 0.65 1.50 7.6 10.0 0.70 0.63 60 5.74 6.56 14.3 
Peru 1.12 1.75 8.2 9.0 1.07 6.25 7.46 18.6 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data and information from various national and international sources. 
' T h e symbol R ' A C represents a weighted average of rescheduled credits and additional credits. 
Based on an index of the cost-of-credit components that are subject to negotiation. The following is the formula used: 
in which: C = Commissions; P = Period; S = Spread over LIBOR and in which subindex I 
refers to terms existing in 1983-1984 and subindex 0 to average terms in 1980-1981. All 
components of the formula are weighted by the amount of the loan. It should be noted that 
the deterioration in itself is not an indicator of the quality of a country's negotiation, since 
it is strongly influenced by the borrower's initial position. 
' A real annual LIBOR of 5 % is assumed and C/P + S are added. 
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1981, the relative deterioration in the conditions negotiated, as well as the 
financial cost, was much more moderate than in the first phase of the 
renegotiations (see columns 7 and 10 in table 44). 
But the relief provided to the Latin American countries by the decrease in 
the negotiated price of credit was largely neutralized by the appreciable rise 
which occurred after December 1983 in LIBOR, the basic interest rate over which 
debtors and creditors have no control. In fact, while the countries obtained a 
reduction of approximately half a percentage point in the spread over LIBOR 
during the second round of renegotiations, LIBOR itself increased two points 
between December 1983 and May 1984, more than counteracting the benefits of 
the improvement in the negotiated price of credit.29 
It is interesting to note that it was the countries which decided to 
reprogramme only one year's maturity (1983) that were able to take most 
advantage of the new situation, since the softer conditions were applied not only 
to new credits obtained in 1984 but also to the rescheduled 1984 maturities. On 
thé contrary, the debtor countries that rescheduled the latter in advance during 
the first round of renegotiations had to comply with the more burdensome 
conditions negotiated on that occasion. 
29It is estimated that if this increase in LIBOR persists for one year, it will signify additional paymentson 
Latin America's external debt of at least USS 5 billion, a sum equivalent to 6% of the value of the region's exports 




EVOLUTION OF THE CARIBBEAN ECONOMIES 
I. STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS AND MAIN TRENDS 
Whether judged by area, population or value of output, the fifteen Caribbean 
countries covered by this survey must all be regarded as exceedingly small. 
Historical associations with colonizing metropolitan countries have bequeathed 
them a variety of languages, ethnic types and independent political systems, with 
no fewer than nine different currencies and parities with the US dollar, the 
common intervention currency. They rely heavily on merchandise imports for 
their supplies and on the export of commodities and services for their income, 
and in many cases their fiscal systems are tied to the indirect taxation of trade in 
goods and services. In order to establish a point of reference, the following 
structural data may be given for 1980 (see table 45). 
In most Caribbean countries historical factors combine with heightened 
expectations and democratic institutions to make the public sector a key 
economic actor. Not only does the State perform its traditional functions but it is 
also directly involved in providing social and economic infrastructure as well as 
economic production. The result of these forces is ¿o maintain high growth of 
public sector expenditure on both current and capital account, and since this 
growth in expenditure outstrips the growth in revenue this generates fiscal 
deficits and rising public debt (see table 46). During 1983, these tendencies 
became increasingly pronounced, raising serious problems for those entrusted 
with the tasks of public management. 
By and large, in 1983 the countries of the region experienced little real 
growth. Performance varied from moderate, in the case of Dominica, St. Lucia, 
Suriname and Jamaica, to poor in the case of Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago. If 
the growth in population is taken into account, there were hardly any real per 
capita gains (see table 47). 
Such a modest economic performance derived from a combination of 
international and domestic economic factors. The recovery in the industrial 
countries, while clearly serving to arrest the downward slide, has only a lagged 
impact, and at any rate was of only moderate strength. Its principal short-term 
effect was to shore up the tourist trade, cause the downturn in bauxite output to 
bottom out, and give rise to a recovery in the price of primary agricultural 
products. However, on account of the strengthening of the dollar against 
European currencies much of this enhanced price effect was lost. Perhaps, 
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Table 45 

































Trinidad and Tobago 
CARICOM Group ' 
Netherlands Antilles* 
Suriname 
Source: Various country reports. 
"Organization of East Caribbean States. Data relate to 1979 • full "lata for 1980 no< available 
Common Market includes OECS Slates. Bahamas a member of Community only. 
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Table 46 
CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES: PUBLIC F INANCES 
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' P r e l i m i n a r y 
Source: Various country reports. 
"As a percentage of total government expenditure. Millions of national currency units, 
figures. ' indicates a surplus. 'Fiscal year April-March. 'Fiscal year July-June. ' N e t internal debt J » 
million. *Net external debt ( U S J million). , 
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Table 55 
CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES: G R O W T H RATE I N REAL G D P 
A N D POPULATION 
Real GDP Population 
1981 1982 1983" 1982 1983° 
Antigua and Barbuda 4.0 2.7 1.1 1.3 1.3 
Bahamas6 
Barbados' 11.6 5.3 6.1 0.4 0.4 
Belize 2.6 -0.3 
Dominica 8.2 3.2 4.0 3.7 
Grenada 3 0 5.5 -
Guyana -0.5 -10.4 -9.6 0.1 0.1 
Jamaica 3.3 0.2 1.7 1.5 2.1 
Montserrat 2.0 1.2 -1.2 1.2 -1.2 
Netherlands Antilles* 
St. Christopher/Nevis 6.6 1.6 
St. Lucia 2.5 2.0 1.6 1.6 
St. Vincent 12.5 0.8 1.8 
Suriname 5.6 2.0 2.0 2.5 2.7 
Trinidad and Tobago 7.3 3.5 -3.8 1.6 1.7 
Source: Various country reports. 
"Preliminary figures. fcThe latest data on G D P are for 1979. 'Growth rate of G D P at current prices. 
however, the more pervasive cause of the poor performance was the continuing 
inability of the Caribbean economies to produce adequate quantities of goods to 
take advantage of available export markets. While in some cases this may have 
been due to shortages of key supplies, consequent on foreign exchange 
restrictions, in others it would appear to derive from basic inefficiencies. 
With continued sluggish export performance, and in view of the high 
inelasticity of demand for imports, foreign exchange was everywhere a problem. 
This had the effect of dampening considerably the fledgling import substitution 
manufacturing sector and with it regional trade. The general slowdown also 
caused the construction sector to decline rapidly. 
During 1983 the price of crude oil fell sharply, with a consequent negative 
impact on the Trinidad and Tobago economy, where crude oil output also 
declined. The reduced cost of energy showed itself positively in the payments 
position of most countries. However, the most pervasive favourable influence 
on most Caribbean economies was the slowing down of international inflation, 
which was reflected almost everywhere in lower rates of domestic inflation. 
During 1983 the Caribbean countries without exception continued to show 
evidence of deep-seated structural problems, as indicated by large current 
account payments deficits, increasing external debt, widespread fiscal deficits 
and structural unemployment. The nature of these problems caused the 
authorities in 1983 to turn their attention seriously to structural adjustment 
programmes intended to cure these defects in the medium to long term. 
Because of the concentration of productive resources in exports and the 
primacy of this sector as a motive force in the economy, short-term economic 
performance in Caribbean countries may be accurately gauged by their export 
performance. Both on account of their small size and their passive incorporation 
into the world economy Caribbean countries are price takers and can usually sell, 
under various commodity agreements, all the staples they can produce. In the 
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classic staple hypothesis it is usual to distinguish a number of typologies. Thus, 
despite efforts to develop tourism and light manufactures, St. Christopher 
remains an old sugar economy, while Belize exemplifies the new plantation 
economy producing sugar, bananas and citrus fruits. Trinidad and Tobago is a 
typical mineral exporter in course of transition from oil to natural gas, which 
must be embodied in exportables such as fertilizers, steel or petrochemicals. 
While nearly all the countries of the region attempt to capitalize on their 
proximity to the large North American markets for services, tourism dominates 
in the Bahamas, Antigua and Montserrat. Peasant agricultural systems in the 
Windward Islands have resulted in their being organized for producing bananas 
and such minor staples as cocoa, spices, and arrowroot, and for cottage tourism. 
Jamaica, with its sugar plantations, bauxite mines, small coffee and banana 
farms, sizeable tourist sector and fledgling light export manufacturing, seems to 
defy categorization. 
Export agriculture is still critical to the foreign exchange earning potential 
of Belize, St. Christopher and the Windward Islands, and in addition to the social 
economy of Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, Guyana and Suriname because of its 
employment effects. Only two commodities —sugar and bananas— are of 
region-wide importance. However, a variety are of significance to individual 
countries: rice, forest products and shrimp to Guyana and Suriname; citrus to 
Belize,Jamaica and Dominica; crawfish to Belize and Bahamas; coffee, cocoa and 
spices to Jamaica and the Windward Islands; and oil palm to Suriname. 
Sugar was by far the most important agricultural commodity, and with the 
cessation of exports f rom Suriname it is now marketed under the Lomé 
Agreement in EEC countries and by quotas in the United States under the GSP by 
six Caribbean countries. The only countries to record increased output in 1983 
were Belize (7.4%) and Jamaica (1.5%), and while Barbados and Trinidad and 
Tobago seemed to have avoided further dramatic reductions in output, Guyana (-
12.3%) and St. Christopher/Nevis (-22.2%) performed poorly, mainly on 
account of organizational and managerial problems. 
Table 48 
C A R I B B E A N C O U N T R I E S : M A J O R E X P O R T STAPLES 
(Thousands of tons) 
Sugar output Banana exports 
1981 1982 1983° 1982 1983° 
Barbados 94 89 86 
Belize 99 108 116 10 
Guyana 307 292 256 
Jamaica 206 196 199 22 23 
St. Chris topher/Nevis 32 36 28 
Suriname* 8 38 32 
Trinidad and Tobago 93 79 77 
Windward Islands: 
Dominica 27 29 
Grenada 10 
St. Lucia 44 55 
St. Vincent 31 
Source : Various country reports. 
Preliminary figures. Suriname no longer exports sugar. 
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Table 55 
C A R I B B E A N C O U N T R I E S : B A U X I T E A N D A L U M I N A P R O D U C T I O N 













Source: Various country reports. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Banana exports from the region in 1983 are believed to have been 
sustained at the same level as 1982. Most exporters were able to maintain their 
shipments, and the decline in Suriname (-16%) seems to have been more than 
compensated by the strong growth in St. Lucia (25%), now the largest producer 
in the region. The enhanced performance of St. Lucia derives in part from the 
relatively new process of field-packing the fruit, which has substantially reduced 
spoilage (see table 48). 
Earnings from staple agricultural exports were not matched by output 
performance. Whereas unit prices increased somewhat —bananas by 4% and 
sugar by about 8%— because most sales were to the EEC countries, the 
appreciation of the US dollar, to which most Caribbean currencies are linked, 
eroded most of these gains. 
The precipitous decline in the output of bauxite and in related activities 
which occurred between 1981 and 1982, especially in Jamaica, seems to have 
been arrested in 1983. While growth was not recorded, the bottoming out of the 
world economy brought a measure of balance between supply and demand with 
consequent reduction in stocks. The full impact of world economic recovery was 
not felt in 1983 but the effect was sufficient to cause an increase in alumina 
production in both Jamaica (5%) and Suriname (1%), laying the basis in some 
measure for the overall growth recorded by these two countries (see table 49). 
While the petroleum industry continued to be the backbone of the 
Trinidad and Tobago economy its further weakening in 1983 was the root cause 
of the decline recorded there. Crude oil output fell by 10% in 1983 following an 
11% decline in 1982 and exports were down by a similar margin. More 
dramatically, however, in 1983 Trinidad and Tobago ceased to be an offshore oil 
refining centre as no crude oil was imported for processing. Declining 
1981 1982 1983° 
971 764 734 
513 392 315 
170 73 
11606 8 447 7 725 
2 556 1 761 1 854 
4 125 3 120 2 832 
156 145 
1 248 1 156 1 172 
43 34 
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production and prices had a pervasive negative impact, as foreign exchange 
income and government revenue both fell. There was a 4% increase in natural 
gas output but the full international monetary benefits from this resource have 
yet to be achieved. 
With the upturn in the economies of the OECD countries most Caribbean 
tourism destinations received a boost, the Bahamas, Jamaica, Barbados and 
St. Lucia being outstanding in this respect. The partial dependence of the 
Netherlands Antilles tourism on Venezuela made 1983 a difficult year for the 
first-named country. There also appears to be a structural shift in the cruise ship 
business which now tends to favour shorter trips. As a consequence a number of 
the more distant destinations experienced reductions in that aspect of their 
trade. Because of the appreciation of the US dollar there was a negative price 
effect on the European market and greater dependence on the North American 
market. It is also evident that visitors are becoming increasingly sensitive to 
price differentials, thereby forcing the Caribbean industry to pay attention to 
pricing. Overall the contribution of tourism to the foreign exchange earnings of 
the region was enhanced in 1983 (see table 50). 
Apart f rom tourism the principal offshore services provided by Caribbean 
countries to the large mainland markets of North America have been oil 
transshipment and refining, ship repair and registration, and offshore banking, 
financing and insurance. The change in United States energy policy in the recent 
past has dealt a severe blow to the offshore oil business, which in 1983 virtually 
came to an end in Trinidad and Tobago. The evolving United States policy on the 
treatment of tax havens, of which the Bahamas and Netherlands Antilles are 
outstanding examples, seems certain to have a negative impact on offshore 
financial centres. 
Table 50 
CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES: INDICATORS OF TOURIST ACTIVITY 
Visitor arrivals Estimated expenditure 
(thousands) (millions of US dollars) 
1981 1982 1983° 1981 1982 1983° 
Antigua 209 164 166 
Bahamas 1 745 1 942 2 218 639 654 724 
Barbados 488 414 431 131 125 125 
Belize 62 60 8 8 
Dominica 23 23 28 3 4 
Grenada 103 85 17 17 
Guyana 
Jamaica 551 670 782 284 336 409 
Montserrat 21 25 19 5 6 6 
Netherlands Antilles 897 366 
St. Christopher/Nevis 46 45 53 
St. Lucia 90 106 113 38 41 42 
St. Vincent 83 80 26 
Suriname 
Trinidad and Tobago 





With the possible exception of the Netherlands Antilles, where deficient rainfall 
and rocky terrain inhibit agriculture, the production of food crops, livestock and 
fish for domestic consumption is of tremendous importance to the social 
economy everywhere in the Caribbean. In Jamaica, the Windward Islands, 
Suriname and Guyana domestic food production is considerable, and some 
countries have set targets of self-sufficiency. The potential for linkage to the 
tourist sector is also attractive. 
After the somewhat uneven performance of the agricultural sector in 
1982, most countries reported very positive results in 1983. In the Bahamas, 
where in recent years considerable policy emphasis has been placed on its 
improvement, domestic agriculture grew strongly, with the value of farm output 
an estimated 17% above 1982 and the volume of fish products 8% higher. 
Barbados recorded a 16% increase in root crops, increased vegetables output and 
a 90% increase in fish. In Antigua and St. Lucia, output of both root crops and 
vegetables increased in 1983, but production of fruits fell, while in Dominica 
there was a general increase in food production and a 25 % increase in fish. After 
the very poor performance in 1982, when the output of domestic agricultural 
commodities fell 12%, Jamaica recorded a 12% increase in root crop production 
and 15% in vegetable production in 1983, while in Guyana there was increased 
root crop production, a 20% increase in maize output and a 14% increase in fish. 
2. Manufacturing 
With the exception of enclave industry in the Bahamas, Netherlands Antilles 
and to a certain extent Jamaica and Barbados, and the recent Trinidad and 
Tobago attempt at heavy industry (fertilizers, iron and steel, methanol) 
Caribbean industrialization strategy has aimed at import substitution for 
regional markets in CARICOM. The weak economic position in 1983 of most 
countries of the region and the continued shortage of foreign exchange impacted 
negatively on this activity. Intra-Caribbean trade in manufactures was severely 
reduced as a number of countries restricted entry to their markets. Payments 
arrangements became difficult when at the beginning of the year, on attaining its 
credit limit, the CARICOM Multilateral Clearance Facility (CMCF) was ended. 
Apart from tiny Montserrat, the only country in which manufacturing 
performed at a substantially higher level than in 1982 was Trinidad and Tobago. 
Here assembly industries for the home market, the refurbished cement industry 
and the coming into full production of some petrochemical plants made the 
largest contributions (see table 51). 
3. Construction 
In almost every country of the Caribbean region, construction activity declined in 
1983. This development has had serious consequences for the maintenance of 
employment levels among skilled and unskilled persons. Perhaps the most 
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dramatic decline took place in St. Lucia, where sector output fell an estimated 
40%, while the completion of a number of infrastructure and tourist-related 
projects in Antigua, Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, Montserrat and 
St. Christopher had the effect of depressing sector output by about 5%. In 
Trinidad and Tobago, the relatively parlous state of the public finances resulted 
in the end of an eight-year-long construction boom and a 3% decline in sector 
output. 
III. THE EXTERNAL SECTOR 
The external accounts are widely regarded as the most critical element in the 
national accounts of Caribbean countries. By comparison with 1982, when the 
external sector of these countries reached its lowest ebb, the year 1983 
represents a recovery, though certainly there continued to be every evidence of 
weak performance. Some countries showed considerable improvement in their 
commodity exports and most were able to contain import growth in spite of the 
inelasticity of demand for most imported goods (see table 52). 
The performance of merchandise exports is only a partial indication of 
performance. Most Caribbean countries earn substantial sums on invisible trade, 
where a positive balance is recorded. Table 53 shows that while the 
phenomenon of an adverse current account balance remained pervasive in 1983, 
there were improvements in most cases by comparison with 1982, with Trinidad 
and Tobago the only substantial exception. 
Estimates of foreign debt are not readily available for most Caribbean 
countries and reasonably reliable data are available for only four of them. While 
displaying the usual upward trend, however, it would seem that by conventional 
standards debt burden and debt servicing ratios are moderate for all countries 
except Jamaica. 
Table 51 
C A R I B B E A N C O U N T R I E S : E V O L U T I O N O F M A N U F A C T U R I N G VALUE A D D E D 
( Percentage) 
1981 1982 1983° 
Antigua -15.1 
Bahamas 
Barbados 11.1 -2.3 -1.4 
Belize -1.4 5.0 
Dominica 17.7 9.6 2.5 
Grenada 
Guyana 24.1 -12.8 -18.8 
Jamaica 1.3 4.2 4.1 
Montserrat 12.9 -2.9 5.9 
Netherlands Antilles 
St. Christopher/Nevis -13.0 
St. Lucia -0.5 13.0 6.6 
St. Vincent 20.3 12.5 
Suriname -44.6 8.4 5.5 
Trinidad and Tobago -2.3 -2.0 7.6 




C A R I B B E A N C O U N T R I E S : T R E N D S I N E X P O R T S A N D I M P O R T S 
(Percentage growth rates) 
Exports Imports 
1982 1983" 1982 1983" 
Antigua -31.1 -19.6 
Bahamas 26.1 10.4 -5.7 8.6 
Barbados -8.4 55.5 -8.6 18.1 
Belize -18.9 -19.4 
Dominica 27.4 12.4 -4.4 -5.1 
Grenada -5.7 3.0 
Guyana -20.4 -18.0 -29.7 -11.3 
Jamaica -25.9 -7.2 -7.6 -6.7 
Montserrat -21.2 55.5 7.6 -1.2 
Netherlands Antilles 
St. Chris topher/Nevis -22.3 -6.5 
St. Lucia - 14.2 -9.5 - 9 6 
St. Vincent -0.4 10.0 
Suriname -9.9 -14.7 -5.3 -13.3 
Trinidad and Tobago -10.2 -19.5 17.6 -23.4 
Source: Various country reports. 
'Preliminary figures. 
Table 5} 
C A R I B B E A N C O U N T R I E S : B A L A N C E O N C U R R E N T A C C O U N T A N D 
E X T E R N A L D E B T 
(Millions of US dollars) 
Current account 
balance External debt 
1982 1983" 1982 1983° 
Antigua -509 
Bahamas -45 -52 147 
Barbados -42 12 144 174 
Belize -14 72 
Dominica -15 33 
Grenada -32 26 
Guyana -142 -134 741 700 
Jamaica -380 -343 2 740 3 274 
Montserrat -8 -9 
Netherlands Antilles 
St. Chris topher/Nevis -11 -8 
St. Lucia -44 -10 24 
St. Vincent -12 17 
Suriname -154 -164 
Trinidad and Tobago -745 -967 558 739 
Source: Various country reports. 
'Preliminary ligures. 
For most Caribbean countries the merchandise terms of trade turned 
favourable in 1983 as export prices generally rose and import prices, including 
the price of oil, were fairly stable or declined. However, Trinidad and Tobago 
was an exception since its oil exports fetched lower prices. Furthermore, the 
general improvement in the merchandise terms of trade was dampened 
somewhat by the appreciation of the US dollar to which all these countries' 
currencies are tied. 
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Not unexpectedly, the weak payments position caused a number of 
countries to have to grapple with the problem of stabilization under the tutelage 
of the IMF. Belize drew credits under the Compensatory Financing Facility, 
Grenada entered into a standby agreement, and Guyana held protracted 
discussions with the Fund. However, it was in Jamaica that the Fund was most 
active. The Extended Financing Facility which had been in use since 1981 was 
terminated and negotiations for a new standby agreement were begun in late 
1983. 
IV. INFLATION A N D UNEMPLOYMENT 
The structural imbalances in the markets for goods, money and labour continue 
to manifest themselves in rising prices and sizeable unemployment rates. The 
fact that in most countries the growth in the retail price index in 1983 was 
moderate and below the 1982 level must be attributed largely to the slowing 
down of international inflation, which tends to be imported. Double-digit 
inflation was experienced in Jamaica, where there was monetary expansion, in 
Guyana on account of supply bottlenecks and monetary expansion, and in 
Trinidad and Tobago where the relaxation of price controls and the removal of 
government subsidies brought latent inflationary pressures into the open. 
However, the return of most Caribbean countries to single-digit inflation in 
1983 must be regarded as one of the more favourable developments of that year. 
After falling continuously from a peak of some 17% in 1975, the measured 
rate of unemployment in Trinidad and Tobago increased by one percentage 
point in 1983, reaching 11%. The slowing-down of construction and mining and 
the inevitable spread effect were the factors responsible for this. In Barbados, the 
rise in unemployment resulted mainly from the decline in manufacturing and 
construction (see table 54). 
Table 54 
CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES: INDICATORS OF I N F L A T I O N A N D U N E M P L O Y M E N T 
Consumer price index Unemployment 
(percentage variation) (percentage) 
1981 1982 1983° 1982 1983° 
Antigua 11.5 4.6 20.0 
Bahamas 11.1 6.0 4.0 
Barbados 14.6 10.3 5.3 13.7 15.0 
Belize 11.4 9.4 
Dominica 13.3 4.4 2.7 15.0 
Grenada 19.6 13.2 14.2 
Guyana 22.2 20.9 15.1 
Jamaica 11.9 6.5 11.3 27.4 26.1 
Montserrat 10.6 9.8 4.7 5.6 7.0 
Netherlands Antilles 8.6 
St. Christopher/Nevis 10.3 5.9 2.5 
St. Lucia 15.1 4.6 1.5 
St. Vincent 13.0 7.2 
Suriname 8.7 7.3 4.4 
Trinidad and Tobago 14.3 11.4 15.2 10.4 11.1 




CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES: PERCENTAGE G R O W T H I N 
MONETARY RESOURCES 
Money supply Quasi-money 
1982 1983" 1982 1983" 
Antigua -7.5 22.8 21.5 -17.0 
Bahamas 6.0 12.7 17.9 11.5 
Barbados -1.3 16.2 9 0 4.1 
Belize -0.5 
Dominica -3.8 0.1 29.4 10.0 
Grenada 18.4 -4.5 
Guyana 27.4 20.8 29.1 23.2 
Jamaica 6.1 21.3 32.4 28.0 
Montserrat -4.7 6.2 6.0 0.7 
Netherlands Antilles 20.2 
St. Christopher/Ne vis 5.9 -3.1 14.2 14.5 
St. Lucia 
St. Vincent 
Suriname 17.6 8.1 
Trinidad and Tobago 43.9 -8.2 33.4 
Source: Various country reports. 
"Preliminary figures. 
In general, monetary policy in Caribbean countries aims to maintain 
balance in the external accounts and to channel resources to stimulate expansion 
of the productive sectors. Because of the enhanced performance of these 
economies compared to 1982, monetary resources were allowed to grow at a 
relatively faster rate. This was especially the case in Barbados and Jamaica. In 
Trinidad and Tobago, where during 1983 the spectre of fiscal and payments 
crises became evident, the authorities pursued tight money supply policies, with 
the effect that the massive expansion of 1982 was arrested (see table 55). 
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CUADERNOS DE LA CEPAL 
N a 1 
América Latina: El nuevo escenario regional y mundial 
Exposición del Secretario Ejecutivo de la Comisión Económica para América Latina, señor 
Enrique V. Iglesias, en el decimosexto período de sesiones de la Comisión. 
N° 2 
Las evaluaciones regionales de la Estrategia Internacional de Desarrollo 
Evaluación de Quito, Resolución 320 (XV) de la CEPAL. 
Evaluación de Chaguaramas. Resolución 347 (XVI) de la CEPAL. 
Nfl 3 
Desarrollo humano, cambio social y crecimiento en América Latina 
Separata de El desarrollo latinoamericano y la coyuntura económica internacional (E/CEP AL/981). 
N° 4 
Relaciones comerciales, crisis monetaria e integración económica en América Latina 
Separata de El desarrollo latinoamericano y la coyuntura económica internacional 
(E/CEP AL/981/Add.2). 
Nfi 5 
Síntesis de la evaluación regional de la Estrategia Internacional de Desarrollo 
Este trabajo se presentó en versión mimeografiada en el decimosexto período de sesiones de la 
Comisión con la signatura E/CEPAL/1004. 
N° 6 
Dinero de valor constante. Conceptos, problemas y experiencias/ Jorge Rose 
Funcionario de la División de Desarrollo Económico de la CEPAL. 
N° 7 
La coyuntura internacional y el sector externo 
Versión revisada de El desarrollo latinoamericano y la coyuntura económica internacional, segunda 
parte, capítulos I y II (E/CEPAL/981/Add.2). 
NQ 8 
La industrialización latinoamericana en los años setenta 
Este trabajo apareció anteriormente en versión mimeografiada con la signatura 
ST/CEPAL/Conf.51/L.2. 
N° 9 
Dos estudios sobre inflación 
La inflación en los países centrales. Este artículo está tomado del capítulo I del Estudio Económico de 
América Latina, 1974 (E/CEPAL/982). 
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América Latina y la inflación importada, 1972-1974. Por Héctor Assael y Arturo Núñez del Prado, 
funcionarios de la División de Desarrollo Económico de la Comisión Económica para América Latina 
(CEPAL). 
N° 10 
Reactivación del Mercado Común Centroamericano 
Este Cuaderno refunde las partes más relevantes del documento (E/CEPAL/CCE/367/Rev.3), 
preparado por la Oficina de la CEPAL en México, y del Informe de la Décima Reunión del Comité de 
Cooperación Económica del Istmo Centroamericano (E/CEPAL/CCE/369/Rev.l). 
NQ 11 
Integración y cooperación entre países en desarrollo en el ámbito agrícola/Germánico Salgado 
Peñaherrera, Consultor de la FAO 
Este trabajo se presentó, con la signatura LARC/76/7(a) a la Decimocuarta Conferencia Regional de 
la FAO para América Latina y a la Conferencia Latinoamericana CEPAL/FAO de la Alimentación 
que se realizaron en Lima del 21 al 29 de abril de 1976. 
N° 12 
Temas del nuevo orden económico internacional 
Este documento se publicó originalmente con el título "Temas de la UNCTAD IV", 
E/CEPAL/L.133, el 19 de abril de 1976. 
Na 13 
En torno a las ideas de la CEPAL: desarrollo, industrialización y comercio exterior 
Al reanimarse antiguas discusiones sobre la naturaleza del desarrollo regional y particularmente 
acerca de las relaciones entre la industrialización y el comercio exterior, se ha creído oportuno reunir 
en este Cuaderno algunos textos preparados por la CEPAL sobre este tema. 
Na 14 
En torno a las ideas de la CEPAL 
Problemas de la industrialización 
Este volumen pretende continuar la tarea iniciada en el Cuaderno N° 13, refiriéndose especialmente 
a los problemas de la industrialización latinoamericana. 
NQ 15 
Los recursos hidráulicos de América Latina 
Informe regional 
Este trabajo se presentó a la Reunión Regional Preparatoria para América Latina y el Caribe de la 
Conferencia de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Agua que se realizó en Lima, Perú, del 30 de agosto al 
3 de septiembre de 1976. 
NQ 16 
Desarrollo y cambio social en América Latina 
Este trabajo preparado como contribución a la tercera evaluación regional de la estrategia 
internacional de desarrollo, compara los planteamientos políticos de los años cincuenta y siguientes 
en las áreas del desarrollo urbano, del desarrollo rural, de la educación y del empleo con los cambios 
reales, señala contradicciones, y formula algunas interrogantes para el futuro. 
N° 17 
Evaluación de Guatemala 
Resolución 362 (XVII) aprobada por la CEPAL en su decimoséptimo período de sesiones, 
Guatemala, 1977. 
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N ° 18 
Raíces históricas de las estructuras distributivas en América Latina/A. Di Filippo 
Atendiendo a la naturaleza de los distintos regímenes de propiedad, trabajo e intercambio heredados 
de la fase colonial, se analiza la constitución y desarrollo de las economías exportadoras de América 
Latina y sus repercusiones en materia de urbanización e industrialización. El objetivo básico de este 
ensayo es proveer un marco histórico-estructural para el análisis de la distribución del ingreso en las 
economías latinoamericanas contemporáneas. 
N ° 19 
Dos estudios sobre endeudamiento externo/Carlos Massad y Roberto Zahler 
El Cuaderno NQ 19 contiene dos estudios. En el primero, "Financiamiento y endeudamiento externo 
de América Latina y propuestas de acción", se evalúa la magnitud y estructura de la deuda externa 
latinoamericana, tanto garantizada como no garantizada, y se señalan algunas propuestas de solución 
frente a este problema. 
En el segundo "Inflación mundial y deuda externa: el caso del deflactor impropio", se critica la 
tendencia generalizada a suponer que la inflación mundial reduce el peso efectivo del servicio de la 
deuda externa, y se concluye que el tipo de cambio social, y no la inflación externa, es el mejor 
deflactor para medir esa carga desde el punto de vista del país deudor. 
N Q 20 
Tendencias y proyecciones a largo plazo del desarrollo económico de América 
Latina/E/CEPAL/1027 
En este Cuaderno se analizan los principales rasgos del desarrollo económico y social de América 
Latina en los últimos 25 años, mediante un enfoque crítico de la magnitud y profundidad de la 
transformación productiva y social, y la identificación de las características generales más relevantes 
del estilo de desarrollo que prevaleció en ese período; se examinan en forma esquemática los 
principales objetivos, metas y orientaciones de la política económica formulados por los países de la 
región en los planes de desarrollo de los años setenta, e incluye proyecciones demográficas hacia el 
año 2000 y proyecciones macroeconómicas para los países no exportadores de petróleo en el decenio 
de 1980. 
N Q 21 
25 años en la agricultura de América Latina: rasgos principales 1950-1975 
Este Cuaderno pasa revista a los rasgos principales de la evolución de la agricultura latinoamericana 
en el marco de las economías nacionales, a la producción y el abastecimiento agrícolas, al desarrollo de 
la agricultura en relación con el sector externo, a los problemas planteados en la utilización de los 
recursos productivos y sus rendimientos, y a los aspectos institucionales básicos de la estructura 
agraria. 
N Q 22 
Notas sobre la familia como unidad socioeconómica/Carlos A. Borsotti 
Se analiza el papel de las familias, en cuanto unidades socioeconómicas, en la producción social y en la 
reproducción cotidiana y generacional de los agentes sociales, destacándose las variaciones en sus 
estrategias de vida y en sus modelos socio-organizativos, según las situaciones de clase a las que 
pertenecen. 
El objetivo básico es proponer algunas hipótesis conceptuales y metodológicas para vincular a las 
unidades familiares, como grupos focales y estratégicos de las políticas de desarrollo social, con la 
estructura de la sociedad y los estilos de desarrollo. 
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NQ 23 
La organización de Ja información para la evaluación del desarrollo/Juan Sourrouille 
Este trabajo examina algunos de los problemas vinculados a la forma de organizar la información 
para evaluar el proceso de desarrollo económico y social. El tema se aborda aquí desde tres 
perspectivas distintas: el uso de las concepciones sistemáticas como marco de coherencia de los 
planes estadísticos, la búsqueda de un indicador sintético de los resultados del proceso de desarrollo, y 
la definición de un conjunto de indicadores que faciliten la evaluación de ese proceso en sus distintas 
facetas o áreas de interés. 
NB 24 
Contabilidad nacional a precios constantes en América Latina /Alberto Fracchia 
Este trabajo aporta antecedentes relativos a las cuentas nacionales en América Latina y propone un 
sistema de índices de precios y cantidades adecuado a los países de la región, sobre la base del 
propuesto por la Oficina de Estadística de las Naciones Unidas. 
NQ 25 
Ecuador: Desafíos y logros de la política económica en la fase de expansión petrolera 
En este Cuaderno se examinan los principales rasgos del desarrollo económico y social del Ecuador, 
durante lo que ha transcurrido del decenio de 1970, especialmente considerando los efectos que se han 
derivado de la producción y exportación de petróleo del país. 
Nfi 26 
Las transformaciones rurales de América Latina ¿Desarrollo social o marginación? 
Este Cuaderno, preparado por el Proyecto Interdisciplinario de Desarrollo Social Rural, contiene un 
diagnóstico e interpretación de las principales transformaciones de la economía y la sociedad rurales 
en los últimos años en América Latina, un análisis de los posibles escenarios futuros y un examen de 
los grandes problemas que enfrentan las diversas estrategias para lograr un efectivo avance hacia los 
objetivos de desarrollo social establecidos por los gobiernos en la Estrategia Internacional del 
Desarrollo y en las Evaluaciones de Quito, Chaguaramas y Guatemala. 
N° 27 
La dimensión de la pobreza en América Latina/Oscar Altimir 
Este trabajo tuvo su origen fen el proyecto sobre Medición y Análisis de la Distribución del Ingreso en 
América Latina, que realizan conjuntamente la CEPAL y el Banco Mundial. Contiene una reseña de 
los problemas relacionados con el concepto de pobreza y con la medición de la misma, presenta 
también un método para el trazado de líneas de pobreza en países de América Latina cuya aplicación 
permite cuantificar la dimensión de la pobreza en los países de la región. 
N° 28 
Organización institucional para el control y manejo de la deuda externa/Rodolfo Hoffmann 
Este estudio constituye un análisis evaluativo de la organización institucional para la evaluación de la 
deuda externa de Chile. 
N° 29 
La política monetaria y el ajuste de la balanza de pagos: tres estudios 
En este Cuaderno, el primer estudio, "La demanda de bienes de importación", formula un modelo 
para identificar las variables económicas que más influyen sobre dicha demanda, y evalúa asimismo 
su importancia empírica en varios países de la región. El segundo, "Ajuste del balance de pagos, 
política crediticia y control del endeudamiento externo", identifica las demoras en dicho ajuste en 
relación con los desequilibrios monetarios. El último estudio, "El enfoque monetario del tipo de 
cambio", pone de relieve la importancia de las variables monetarias en la determinación del tipo de 
cambio. 
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N ° 18 
América Latina: Las evaluaciones regionales de la Estrategia Internacional del Desarrollo en los 
años setenta 
Las cuatro evaluaciones de la Estrategia Internacional del Desarrollo en los años setenta, preparadas 
en Quito, Chaguaramas, Ciudad de Guatemala y La Paz, examinan el proceso de desarrollo económico 
y social de la región en el marco del concepto integral contenido en dicha estrategia. Expresan con 
franqueza juicios críticos acerca de la naturaleza de ese proceso, especialmente en lo que respecta a sus 
limitadas proyecciones sociales. Evalúan además los problemas de las relaciones externas de América 
Latina en esta etapa de su desarrollo y formulan planteamientos acerca de la posición de los países 
latinoamericanos en relación con cada uno de los principales temas vinculados a la cooperación 
internacional. Por último, también se ocupan de la cooperación e integración regionales en América 
Latina, y de la cooperación con otras regiones en desarrollo. 
Na 31 
Educación, imágenes y estilos de desarrollo/Germán W. Rama 
El presente trabajo intenta analizar la educación en forma integrada con el proceso de cambio social. 
El marco conceptual de la indagación es el de los estilos de desarrollo, tema que ha sido analizado en 
varios estudios de la CEPAL y que en este texto tiene una consideración específica, que agrega una 
perspectiva complementaria a los análisis anteriores. 
N° 32 
Movimientos internacionales de capitales/Ricardo H. Arriazu 
El principal objetivo de este estudio consiste en evaluar los avances analíticos en materia de 
movimientos de capitales y en adaptarlos a las realidades económicas e institucionales de la región, lo 
que permite identificar los principales factores que influyen sobre los movimientos de capitales de y 
hacia América Latina. En una primera parte, analiza modelos teóricos y presenta un "modelo 
combinado simplificado" para las investigaciones empíricas. Seguidamente, se refiere a las 
principales variables económicas que explican el comportamiento de los movimientos de capitales, 
presentando los resultados empíricos obtenidos para los países considerados. Por último, destaca las 
conclusiones de política económica que se derivan del estudio. Contiene además un apéndice 
estadístico. 
N° 33 
Informe sobre las inversiones directas extranjeras en América Latina/Alfredo Eric Calcagno 
Este estudio presenta un panorama de la actual situación de las inversiones directas extranjeras en 
América Latina. Procura determinar cuál es su magnitud y algunas de sus características y tendencias, 
y establecer cuál es su papel como instrumento para el financiamiento de inversiones en los países 
latinoamericanos o para la expansión productiva de los países desarrollados inversores. En síntesis: 
a) se pasa revista al contexto internacional; b) se indican algunos rasgos del contexto nacional; c) se 
resumen los principales datos cuantitativos sobre las inversiones directas extranjeras en América 
Latina; d) se muestran algunas características de las empresas que realizan las inversiones, en 
comparación con las empresas nacionales grandes; e) se plantea el problema de la influencia que en 
esta materia podrían ejercer las especializaciones productivas en los países desarrollados; f) se 
reseñan algunas de las líneas de política económica adoptadas recientemente, y g) en una 
recapitulación final, se mencionan algunas de las evaluaciones e interpretaciones. 
N° 34 
Las fluctuaciones de la industria manufacturera argentina, 1930-1978/ Daniel Heymann 
Este estudio forma parte del Programa de la Oficina de CEPAL en Buenos Aires sobre "Información y 
Análisis de Corto Plazo de la Economía Argentina". Examina el ciclo de la industria manufacturera 
argentina en el período 1950-1978. Para ello ubica los puntos críticos de las fluctuaciones de esa 
actividad, su longitud, amplitud y forma sobre la base de indicadores trimestrales elaborados para ese 
propósito. Estos indicadores se refieren a la producción, demanda e inventarios de la industria en su 
conjunto y de sus principales subsectores. 
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N ° 18 
Perspectivas de reajuste industrial: la comunidad económica europea y los países en 
desarrollo/Ben Evers, Gerard de Groot y Willy Wagenmans 
Este estudio forma parte de una serie de investigaciones realizadas por el Instituto de Investigación 
para el Desarrollo de la Universidad de Tilburg destinadas a analizar las causas y efectos del proceso 
de creciente penetración de exportaciones industriales provenientes de países en desarrollo en los 
mercados de los países desarrollados. En este informe se analizan particularmente las futuras 
relaciones entre la Comunidad Económica Europea (CEE) y los países en desarrollo, partiendo del 
reconocimiento que las posibilidades de exportación de manufacturas de los países en desarrollo no 
dependen solamente de sus propias políticas de industrialización y de comercio, sino también —y tal 
vez en mayor medida aún— de las políticas aplicadas por los países desarrollados. El informe 
comienza con una visión global del desarrollo económico internacional durante los últimos 30 años y 
continúa examinando el proceso de transferencia de ciertas actividades productivas hacia países de 
menores niveles de salarios, para concluir con un análisis más detallado de la naturaleza del proceso 
de producción y del tipo de relaciones competitivas internacionales, agrupando las actividades 
industriales en 4 categorías principales: industria elaboradora (tanto liviana como pesada), 
industrias de productos semielaborados, industrias pesadas de bienes de capital e industrias 
envasadoras y de armaduría. Finalmente se ana/iza la posible reacción de la CEE en matéria de 
políticas frente a los cambios en la división internacional del trabajo. 
Na 36 
Un análisis sobre la posibilidad de evaluar la solvencia crediticia de los países en 
desarrollo/Alvaro Saieh 
Este trabajo presenta un análisis crítico de una serie de indicadores económicos de la "capacidad de 
pago" o ".solvencia crediticia" de los países latinoamericanos no exportadores de petróleo. Define 
cada indicador, reseñando brevemente sus ventajas y desventajas y hace un análisis de sus valores 
históricos; luego, por medio del análisis factorial, disminuye su número y determina así un 
subconjunto de indicadores para explicar mejor la varianza de todas las variables estadísticas. En este 
trabajo, se pone de relieve la parcialidad de los indicadores individuales, que hace poco aplicable su 
uso como una forma de obtener conclusiones definitivas sobre la capacidad de pago de un país, y la 
conveniencia de utilizar un subconjunto de variables seleccionadas estadísticamente, cuyas 
conclusiones aun así deben manejarse con cautela. 
N° 37 
Hacia los Censos Latinoamericanos de los Años Ochenta 
Este Cuaderno presenta una discusión actualizada y detallada de los principales problemas 
observados en Ias práricas censales de la década del setenta y formula una serie de sugerencias para 
superar esos problemas en los censos de la década del ochenta. El Cuaderno incluye tres áreas mayores 
de discusión: i) la organización y administración del operativo censal; ii) los criterios de selección de 
las características o variables a ser investigadas, así como la validez y confiabilidad de distintos 
procedimientos de medición da cada variable; iii) los principales factores que deben tomarse en 
cuenta en la etapa de procesamiento de los datos. 
El documento va dirigido a los productores y usuarios de datos censales en los países de América 
Latina, y en particular a los encargados de los operativos censales, y busca transmitir el conocimiento 
teórico y la experiencia práctica acumulada en la región por expertos de distintos organismos 
internacionales. 
N° 38 
El desarrollo regional argentino: la agricultura 
Este trabajo tiene como objeto analizar las particularidades que presenta la estructura y 
funcionamiento de la agricultura en la Argentina y explicar algunas de las causas determinantes de los 
bajos niveles de productividad e ingreso medios en áreas rurales de la región norte. Con este 
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propósito, se diferencian las modalidades de especialización provincial, se examina la importancia de 
la agricultura en las economías provinciales y la composición de la base productiva. Abarca el 95 % del 
valor bruto de producción agrícola nacional , y más del 90% del valor correspondiente a cada 
provincia, analiza la base productiva y concentra la atención en los productos de exportación 
provincial. Se examinan las consecuencias de las diversas modalidades de especialización provincial 
aproximando el análisis al comportamiento de los productores y productos atendiendo la dotación de 
recursos de distintos tipos de unidades productivas. Ello conduce al examen de la capacidad y de los 
mecanismos de acumulación de unidades productivas de distinta escala y especialización, con lo que se 
diferencian los niveles de ingresos entre productores y entre éstos y los asalariados agrícolas. Con 
base f n lo precedente, se plantea una tipología de provincias, atendiendo su grado de diversificación y 
el tipo de cultivos que las caracterizan en su inserción en la economía nacional. La tesis central del 
trabajo consiste en que la interacción entre la modalidad de especialización y la heterogeneidad 
interna permite explicar los bajos niveles de productividad e ingresos de la región norte del país. 
N° 39 
Estratificación social y movilidad ocupacional en América Latina/Carlos Filgueira y 
Cario Geneletti 
En este estudio se describen e interpretan los cambios ocurridos en las estructuras de estratificación 
ocupacional desde 1950 hasta 1970, sobre la base de la información proporcionada por los censos de 
población de los países de la región. 
En la primera parte se analizan los conceptos básicos relativos a la estratificación y movilidad 
social, en relación con el desarrollo económico de los países de la región; en la segunda parte se 
examinan en más detalle la movilidad social estructural y el crecimiento de la clase media, así como 
los aspectos relativos a la diferenciación interna y el crecimiento. Asimismo, se discuten los aspectos 
relativos a la movilidad demográfica. Por último, se incluye un apéndice metodológico en que se 
indica la forma en que se analizó la información. 
El estudio señala que durante el período de referencia la región experimentó un proceso de cambio 
muy dinámico que tuvo consecuencias importantes para la movilidad social. Dichas consecuencias se 
reflejaron en el grado creciente de incorporación de las personas a los frutos de la modernización y del 
desarrollo económico. Sin embargo, se indica que la movilidad no ha sido integradora dada la 
asincronía entre los diversos órdenes de la estructura social que han generado fuertes tensiones 
estructurales determinadas por el distanciamiento creciente entre las aspiraciones y la posibilidad de 
satisfacerlas. De esta forma, las modificaciones en la composición sectorial de la fuerza de trabajo, la 
expansión del sistema educativo y la rigidez de la distribución de los ingresos, plantean serios desafíos 
y tensiones para la continuidad dinámica del crecimiento de los países de la región. 
NB 40 
Programa de Acción Regional para América Latina en los Años Ochenta 
En mayo de 1981 los gobiernos latinoamericanos, reunidos en Montevideo en el decimonoveno 
período de sesiones de la CEP AL, aprobaron un Programa de Acción Regional para América Latina 
en los Años Ochenta, destinado a instrumentar en el ámbito latinoamericano la Nueva Estrategia 
Internacional del Desarrollo (EID). 
El Programa trata separadamente objetivos y metas, medidas de política y mecanismos de 
evaluación. Incorpora además una breve síntesis de la situación actual del desarrollo latinoamericano. 
Naturalmente, el contenido de los capítulos hace hincapié en los aspectos latinoamericanos y muy 
especialmente en la cooperación regional y en la cooperación con otras regiones en desarrollo. 
Los gobiernos destacaron tres problemas centrales del desarrollo latinoamericano: la asimetría que 
se continúa registrando en las relaciones económicas externas, la declinación del ritmo de 
crecimiento en la mayoría de los países latinoamericanos y la conformación de sociedades 
extremadamente inequitativas 
Se enumeraron once objetivos concretos que suponen atacar los problemas estructurales y en 
especial la confrontación de un orden mundial más equilibrado y sociedades más equitativas. 
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Finalmente, se proponen medidas de política en materia de desarrollo económico y social nacional, 
de la cooperación intralatinoamericana, de la cooperación con otras áreas en desarrollo y de la 
cooperación internacional. 
N° 41 
El desarrollo de América Latina y sus repercusiones en la educación. Alfabetismo y escolaridad 
básica 
El Cuaderno NQ 41 comprende dos estudios sobre el desarrollo social y la educación. El primero de 
ellos titulado "Estructura y dinámica del desarrollo de América Latina y el Caribe y sus repercusiones 
para la educación" fue originalmente concebido como una contribución de la CEPAL a la Conferencia 
de Ministros de Educación convocada por la UNESCO en México en diciembre de 1979, en el que se 
presentan las transformaciones económicas, las tendencias y transformaciones demográficas, la 
distribución del ingreso y la diseminación de la pobreza para luego considerar la estructura del 
mercado de empleo y situar a partir de estas referentes estructurales, los procesos educativos que se 
desarrollan en la región y sus efectos en términos de concentración o de equidad social. El estudio 
asigna la mayor importancia a la situación de los grupos sociales excluidos de la educación o que sólo 
reciben una parte ínfima de sus beneficios, lo que se complementa con el análisis del segundo texto 
titulado "Alfabetismo y escolaridad básica de los jóvenes en América Latina". 
Este último fue realizado en el marco de las actividades del Proyecto Desarrollo y Educación en 
América Latina y el Caribe ejecutado conjuntamente por la CEPAL con UNESCO y el PNUD. 
Utilizando como base de información los censos de América Latina se presenta una documentación 
exhaustiva sobre la situación de los grupos de edad joven y dentro de ellos identificando quiénes son 
los analfabetos o titulares de una escolarización mínima, cómo se distribuyen espacialmente y según 
sexo y a qué inserción social los condena la carencia de educación. El trabajo analiza cuidadosamente 
el papel de las barreras culturales en la integración social y los efectos de reproducción de la 
marginalidad y de la pobreza que eventualmente pudieran ser evitados con una efectiva' 
escolarización básica de la totalidad de los integrantes de las generaciones jóvenes. 
NQ 42 
América Latina y la economía mundial del café 
En este Cuaderno se examinan diversos aspectos de la actividad cafetera a nivel mundial, tanto en las 
fases de producción como en las de transformación industrial, comercio y consumo, manteniendo 
como foco central la formación del precio del producto final y, en estrecha relación con ello, la 
distribución de ingresos entre los distintos agentes económicos que intervienen en el proceso. 
Después de un examen de las características generales del mercado mundial, el análisis deriva hacia la 
profundizaciónílel estudio de casos de cinco países productores (Colombia, Guatemala, Costa Rica, 
Perú y Brasil) y de cuatro países consumidores (República Federal de Alemania, Francia, Reino 
Unido y Estados Unidos), para finalizar con un análisis de las políticas de regulación internacional del 
mercado y una serie de fichas relativas a las principales empresas que operan en esta rama a nivel 
mundial. 
NQ 43 
El ciclo ganadero y la economía argentina 
La importancia del ciclo ganadero, que se manifiesta en las fluctuaciones recurrentes de un conjunto 
de fenómenos asociados entre sí, ha motivado este estudio que se basa en información primaria muy 
detallada y que ha supuesto resolver previamente algunos problemas de información y 
metodológicos, para llegar a la descripción del ciclo. En este texto se hace además un primer análisis 
de las fluctuaciones de las existencias ganaderas, y se adelantan algunas observaciones sobre su 
crecimiento de largo plazo. 
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N ° 18 
Las encuestas de hogares en América Latina 
Este Cuaderno reúne tres trabajos referidos a las prácticas de medición en los países de América 
Latina de variables sociodemográficas importantes a través de encuestas de hogares, as! como a los 
principales problemas que enfrentan tales mediciones. 
El primer estudio fue preparado como contribución de la CEPAL a la revisión del Manual de 
Encuestas de Hogares de las Naciones Unidas y presenta un panorama resumido de las dificultades 
que encuentra en la región la investigación a través de estas encuestas de variables demográficas, de 
las migraciones internas, del empleo y de los niveles de vida. Entre las fuentes de tales dificultades, se 
analiza la calidad de los instrumentos utilizados para la captación de los datos, y las características de 
las operaciones de campo y del diseño de las muest ras. 
El segundo estudio resume la experiencia del CELADE en su búsqueda de alternativas a los 
métodos tradicionales de obtener la información básica para estimar los niveles y la estructura de 
edad de la mortalidad. A tal efecto, se comparan estimaciones de mortalidad derivadas de encuestas 
demográficas prospectivas y retrospectivas que se llevaron a cabo en Honduras, Panamá y Perú, con 
la asistencia técnica del CELADE. El tercer trabajo describe las características de las principales 
encuestas de hogares en trece países de América Latina, y examina todas las variables pertinentes 
para la medición del empleo, desempleo y subempleo. 
N° 45 
Las cuentas nacionales en América Latina y el Caribe 
Este Cuaderno, motivado por el permanente interés de la CEPAL en contribuir al avance de las 
mediciones macroeconómicas en la región, es la continuación de los sucesivos análisis que ha venido 
produciendo, y que han permitido describir tanto la situación en que se encuentran las cuentas 
nacionales en América Latina como los obstáculos encontrados en su desarrollo. Aquí se actualizan 
las reseñas y diagnósticos de los anteriores análisis sobre la disponibilidad de estimaciones de cuentas 
nacionales y sobre los métodos utilizados por los países para realizarlos. Se pretende, además, 
promover una amplia discusión sobre las posibilidades de extender la cobertura de dichas 
estimaciones para incorporar áreas temáticas que se han vuelto indispensables en el análisis de las 
economías latinoamericanas, mejorar la calidad de las actuales mediciones, y contribuir al consenso 
entre productores y usuarios acerca de las prioridades y orientaciones que debe regir el desarrollo de 
las estadísticas económicas básicas en los países de América Latina y el Caribe. 
Na 46 
Demanda de equipos para generación, transmisión y transformación eléctrica en América Latina 
Este trabajo es uno de los estudios realizados en virtud del Proyecto CEPAL/ONUDI sobre la 
situación y perspectivas de la producción de bienes de capital en América Latina. Incluye información 
sobre los programas para ampliar la capacidad de generación, transporte y transformación de 
electricidad en 17 países latinoamericanos y muestra la evolución histórica de la potencia instalada en 
la región y en otras zonas del mundo. Las cifras que el estudio presenta ponen de relieve que América 
Latina constituye, en términos absolutos, un mercado considerable para equipos de generación 
eléctrica de gran tamaño, en especial los destinados al aprovechamiento de recursos hidráulicos. En 
términos relativos, la región representa una proporción muy significativa (y cada vez mayor de la 
demanda mundial de tales equipos. Por otra parte, los requerimientos están geográficamente bien 
distribuidos e incluyen productos de diverso nivel de complejidad, lo cual abre perspectivas de interés 




La economía de América Latina en 1982: Evolución general, política cambiaría y renegociación 
de la deuda externa 
En la primera pane de este cuaderno se analizan las características principales de la profunda crisis 
económica que afectó a América Latina en 1982. En particular se examina la caída del nivel de la 
actividad económica, el aumento de la desocupación y el subempleo, la aceleración de los procesos 
inflacionarios y las bajas considerables de las remuneraciones reales que ocurrieron en numerosos 
países de la región. Además, se consideran las tendencias del comercio exterior, el balance de pagos y 
la deuda externa. En la segunda parte se examinan la política cambiaría y los procesos de 
renegociación de la deuda externa. En lo referente a la primera se analizan las relaciones entre la 
política cambiaría y la inflación en las economías que rradicionalmente han utilizado sistemas con 
tipos de cambio fijos, devaluación periódica gradual y devaluación preanunciada. El examen 
comprende, además, un análisis de las características y efectos de las devaluaciones y significativas 
modificaciones introducidas en los sistemas cambiarios durante 1982 en numerosos países 
latinoamericanos con miras a reducir el desequilibrio externo. Por último, se describen los 
mecanismos generales de las reprogramaciones de la deuda externa llevadas a cabo por 16 países 
latinoamericanos en 1982 y se evalúan sus condiciones y costos. 
N° 48 
Políticas de ajuste y renegociación de la deuda externa en América Latina 
En este Cuaderno se describe y analiza las políticas aplicadas y los resultados obtenidos en América 
Latina en materia de ajuste interno y renegociación de la deuda externa. Tales políticas han 
constituido, en esencia, una primera respuesta inmediata de la política económica al desafío plan-
teado por la profunda y generalizada crisis económica que desde 1981 viene afectando a la región. En 
la primera parte se examinan con detalle las causas tanto internas como externas de esa crisis 
económica. En la segunda parte se describen y analizan los procesos de ajuste verificados en los países 
de la región, se señalan sus logros y limitaciones, y aunque no se proponen fórmulas precisas y de 
aplicación general para superar las deficiencias observadas en dichos procesos, se hace hincapié en 
algunos aspectos que se consideran de validez general. En la tercera parte se examina el crecimiento, 
transformación y crisis del endeudamiento externo, se describen las dos primeras rondas de repro-
gramaciones de la deuda externa y se presentan los principios subyacentes de la reprogramación 
ortodoxa. También se hace un planteamiento general para una renegociación más equitativa, y con 
este fin se proponen diversas soluciones. Finalmente, se reseña en un apéndice aspectos conceptuales 
de las políticas de ajuste. 
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